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Preface 
 
 
My interest in writing a PhD thesis started ten years ago. At that time, I was finishing the Master’s 
program in mathematical economics and econometric methods at Tilburg University. I did my Master’s 
internship at a commercial organization specialized in online marketing. My research was about optimal 
advertising strategies on search engines. During my internship I found out that I enjoyed the process of 
conducting my own research and writing a thesis. As opposed to many of my friends that worked on their 
theses, I had no idea what was meant with a ‘writers block’. In addition, I found out that it satisfied me 
that my findings could be applied in practice. I was intrinsically motivated to translate the results of my 
thesis into useful advices for the organization.  
 
After finishing my Master’s thesis I had the opportunity to start as a PhD student at Tilburg University. 
Although I considered this as an interesting option, I was not fully convinced of working as a full time 
PhD student. I decided to look further for a job where I could combine ‘practical work’ with doing a PhD 
research, and applied at CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. The thing that attracted 
me most at CPB was the work at the crossroads of the economic sciences and public policy. I have always 
felt the need to focus my research on topics with clear goals and practical relevance. CPB provided the 
opportunity to work in a scientific environment on topics that were directly relevant for policymakers and 
society. I started as a young professional in 2005 with the prospect of potentially writing a PhD thesis 
later on in my career. During my young professional period I got the opportunity to take M-Phil courses 
at the Tinbergen Institute to improve my economic and econometric skills. I mostly liked the courses on 
(applied) micro-econometrics and a course in the economics of education by Hessel Oosterbeek and Erik 
Plug. After two years, I started working at the education program, headed by Dinand Webbink. We 
mainly used quasi-experimental evaluation techniques and set up field experiments to investigate the 
effects of specific educational policy measures. I enjoyed the pleasant collaboration with Dinand and my 
CPB colleague Marc van der Steeg, with whom I have worked on numerous projects. We often carried 
out our research at the request of the Ministry of Education and it satisfied me that our empirical findings 
were directly informative to policymakers. Dinand taught me how to write papers that were suitable to 
submit to an economic journal and started motivating me for writing a PhD thesis. I have to say that after 
having worked at CPB for about four years the idea of writing a PhD thesis had been erased a bit, but his 
enthusiasm made me start thinking about it again. When Dinand left CPB to work as Professor at the 
 Erasmus University Rotterdam in 2010, this provided a clear opportunity to turn my thoughts about 
writing a PhD thesis into concrete plans. 
 
With the support of CPB I started as an external PhD student under the supervision of Dinand at the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. This enabled me to combine my work at CPB with writing a PhD thesis 
on policy evaluations in education. I felt privileged with this unique opportunity. The fact that I had 
already worked on educational policy evaluations for a couple of years helped to get off to a flying start. 
Although work priorities naturally kept me from spending time on my thesis sometimes, the combination 
between my work at CPB and my PhD research turned out to be fruitful. My PhD research has benefited 
from substantial spillovers of my work at CPB. Most of the chapters in this thesis are based on published 
CPB Discussion Papers. The CPB rather generously enabled me to devote time on my PhD research, 
which contributed much to the progress I could make. I have enjoyed working on this thesis and I am 
happy to see now that my alternative route has eventually, after ten years, still resulted in a PhD thesis.   
 
My experience with writing a PhD thesis could not have been so positive without the help and support of 
several important people surrounding me. First of all, I would like to thank Dinand for our fruitful 
discussions, his always positive and constructive comments, creative ideas, enthusiasm and sense of 
humour. He gave me a lot of freedom to carry out my PhD research in the way that suited me best. I feel 
lucky that he was my supervisor. 
   I am indebted to my employer, CPB, for enabling me to combine work with writing a PhD thesis. I 
would like to thank Coen Teulings, Casper van Ewijk, George Gelauff and Ruud Okker for giving me the 
opportunity to start my PhD research in 2010. I am very grateful to Bas ter Weel for his trust and support 
in the latter phase of my PhD research. The last two chapters of the thesis have benefited from his 
valuable comments. Furthermore, I would like to thank Debby Lanser for our great cooperation during the 
last couple of years and her flexibility when I needed time for my PhD research. My co-authors also 
deserve special mention. It was a pleasure working with Marc and Suzanne. Special thanks to Marc for 
being my paranimf. Thanks also go to my other CPB colleagues who have provided a nice and inspiring 
work environment each day. 
   Furthermore, I am grateful to the members of my PhD committee, Lex Borghans, Robert Dur, and 
Pierre Koning, for their time and effort.  
   Last but not least I would like to thank my family and friends, who have indirectly contributed a lot to 
my work performance. In particular I would like to thank my mother who has always been a special 
support during my entire educational career, and my father who always gave me the feeling that I did 
well. I am sure that he would have been proud. Special thanks also go to Freek, for being a ‘broeder’, 
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friend and paranimf. Finally, I would like to express my love and gratitude for my wife Rieneke. Our 
story also started ten years ago at Tilburg University.....After writing my Master’s thesis while living 
together on a 16m2 student room, I knew that our relationship was solid. She has been on my side ever 
since. I was finishing this thesis during the first months after the birth of our beautiful son Mauk. I cannot 
say that he contributed substantially to it. But much more importantly, he contributed most to my life. I 
am proud of him.  
 
 
Roel van Elk 
The Hague, March 2014. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Motivation and purpose 
 
This thesis focuses on identifying educational policies that work. This is important for several reasons. 
First, recent experience has shown us that the introduction of new policy measures has not always been a 
clear success. The parliamentary investigation committee on education reform, chaired by the current 
Dutch Minister of Finance Jeroen Dijsselbloem, evaluated some of the most significant educational policy 
changes in the Netherlands in the 1990s.1
 
 The committee concluded that the Dutch government had 
neglected its task to ensure the provision of high-quality education (Parliamentary investigation 
committee on education reform, 2008). Among other things, the committee noted the implementation of 
several - potentially counteracting - changes at the same time, policy choices that were chiefly based on 
financial motives, and the lack of a thorough problem analysis and scientific foundation that legitimized 
the reforms. One of the advices for future improvement concerns the use of policy evaluations to 
scientifically validate new measures. The committee recommends implementing a new policy instrument 
on a small scale first to assess its impact in case it lacks the necessary scientific basis.  
The increased attention for a scientific foundation of policies is observed in other countries as well. In the 
United Kingdom, the Blair Government stated that policy choices should be based on scientific evidence 
rather than on political or ideological arguments (Blair and Cunningham, 1999). In the United States, the 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 placed emphasis on the use of interventions that have been 
demonstrated to work. Implementing policies that do not work can be costly and may have detrimental 
consequences for the quality of education.  
                                                 
1 The policy reforms that were analysed include the introduction of a new type of secondary education (‘vmbo’) 
and substantial adjustments in the education programs in secondary education (‘basisvorming’ and ‘tweede fase’).  
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Second, educational performance is an important determinant of economic and social outcomes. The 
interest of economists in education dates back to early studies on human capital in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Becker, 1964; Mincer 1958, 1962). The human capital theory treats education as an investment in the 
acquisition of skills to improve future outcomes. The costs include expenses from schooling and the 
earnings foregone by being in school rather than at work. An important benefit is the increase in future 
earnings. Since the initial human capital contributions a large literature has emerged that documents the 
importance of schooling for economic and social outcomes. Higher educated people generally earn higher 
wages (e.g. Card, 1999; Ashenfelter et al., 1999), are healthier (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2007) 
and get less often involved in criminal activities (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Machin et al., 2011; 
Webbink et al., 2013). The private returns to education, i.e. the percent increase in earnings caused by an 
additional year of schooling, are consistently estimated in a broad number of empirical studies within a 
range from 5 to 10% (Card, 1999; Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Harmon et al., 2003; Heckman et al., 2006). In 
addition, an increasing body of studies shows that education promotes economic growth. Most of these 
studies relate the average educational attainment in countries to economic growth and find social returns 
to education that slightly exceed the private returns (De la Fuente and Domenench 2006; Cohen and Soto 
2007; Coe et al. 2009). More recent studies have also focused on the returns to cognitive skills, as proxied 
by test scores. The measurement of human capital by cognitive skills rather than school attainment allows 
taking into account quality differences of a year in education across countries. These studies provide 
evidence that cognitive skills are strongly related to individual earnings and to the economic growth of 
nations (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; 2012).  
 
The importance of human capital for economic and social well-being explains the worldwide interest in 
the potential of government policies to improve educational performance. In most countries governments 
play a predominant role in the provision and financing of education. Policymakers face limited budgets 
and have to decide how to allocate scarce resources. This requires evidence of what works and what does 
not. Policy evaluations can provide insights for policymakers into the effects of government interventions 
that can help guide their decisions. These insights can be used to improve the education system by 
introducing or expanding policies that have been shown to be effective or by renouncing ineffective 
policies.  
 
The complex nature of education production poses challenges for a credible policy evaluation. Student 
performance at any point in time is the cumulative result of the entire history of all inputs that affect 
student’s learning, such as school and teacher characteristics, peers, family inputs, neighbourhood 
characteristics and the individual’s ability (Hanushek, 1986; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). The multitude 
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of observable and unobservable factors that affect educational outcomes makes it difficult to isolate the 
causal impact of a specific policy intervention. The identification of causal effects of policies has received 
much attention in the empirical economic literature in the past decades. This has led to a shift from 
control-based research approaches to design-based research methods that provide credible ways to deal 
with these challenges (e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Angrist and Pischke, 2010).   
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the search for effective policies in education. The thesis presents four 
empirical evaluations of educational policies. It applies state-of-the art design-based research methods in 
real policy cases in the Netherlands. In each of the studies particular attention is paid to making the case 
for a credible identification of the causal effect of the policy. The thesis adds to different strands of the 
literature of the economics of education by providing new evidence on the effects of different types of 
policy interventions. The interventions studied concern one institutional policy, one incentive-based 
policy and two resource-based programs. The first study investigates the effect of the timing of tracking 
on higher education completion. The second study focuses on the effectiveness of a new type of financial 
incentive for regional educational authorities in reducing school dropout. The third study evaluates the 
effects of a special program for multi-problem school dropouts on schooling, labour market and crime 
outcomes. The fourth study examines the impact of a comprehensive school reform policy for failing 
schools on student achievement. 
 
1.2 Developments in policy evaluation 
 
The multitude of factors that influence educational outcomes poses serious challenges for researchers 
aiming to determine the causal impact of policy interventions. A reliable policy evaluation requires that 
the effects of the intervention can be credibly disentangled from the effects of other, potentially 
unobserved, factors. 
 
An essential principle underlying policy or treatment evaluations follows from the potential outcome 
model (Rubin, 1974; 1977). This model assumes that each subject has two potential outcomes: an 
outcome when exposed to the treatment and an outcome when not exposed to the treatment. The causal 
effect of the treatment then follows from the difference between the two potential outcomes. In case of 
heterogeneous effects of the treatment, the causal average treatment effect follows from the population’s 
average difference between the two potential outcomes. In practice, however, we observe at most one of 
the outcomes. The potential outcome without treatment is not observable for subjects that are exposed to 
the treatment. We thus have to rely on another group that is not exposed to the treatment for the potential 
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outcome without treatment. The critical assumption needed to determine the causal effect of the treatment 
is that the observed outcome of this control group equals the potential outcome of the treatment group had 
they not been exposed to the treatment. Hence, the most important challenge for the identification of 
causal effects is to find a credible control group that satisfies this assumption.   
 
Self-selection into a treatment or control condition threatens the validity of this assumption. Individuals 
who choose to be exposed to the treatment are by definition different from individuals who choose not to 
be exposed to the treatment. These, potentially unobservable, differences can invalidate a comparison of 
the outcomes between treatment and control groups. For instance, when evaluating the effects of class 
size on student achievement, one should be aware that choices made by schools or parents can affect the 
assignment to a small or a large class. Schools may be willing to group weaker students together in a 
small class. Parents that are more involved with their child’s learning may arrange that their child is 
placed in a small class. In such cases, differences in outcomes between students in small and large classes 
not only reflect the effect of class size but also the effects of confounding factors such as (unobserved) 
ability or family inputs.   
 
Selection is the most important problem in policy evaluation studies. If the policy variable of interest is 
correlated with omitted variables or unobservable factors that affect the outcomes, standard regression 
methods fail to produce reliable estimates of the impact of the policy. These problems for the 
identification of causal effects received little attention in the early literature on education production. 
Hanushek (1986) summarized the result of 147 studies that estimated education production functions. The 
estimated effects of school inputs such as class size and teacher characteristics varied widely across those 
studies. For each of the inputs the results differed both in sign and statistical significance. The author 
concluded from these conflicting results that there appears to be no clear relationship between school 
inputs and student achievement. However, selection bias is a serious concern in the studies reviewed that 
may have caused the inconsistency in estimated effects. The increased interest in appropriate ways to 
handle selection problems originates mainly from studies in the field of labour economics on the impact 
of government training programs (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Lalonde, 1986). These 
studies found difficulties in establishing robust results and questioned the reliability of econometric 
evaluation techniques. An influential study by Lalonde (1986) examined the impact of a federal training 
program for disadvantaged workers on earnings and compared the outcomes of two different approaches. 
The first approach was based on random assignment to the program, while the second was based on an 
econometric evaluation. The outcomes of both approaches differed and the author concluded that studies 
that do not take into account selection issues can yield biased estimates. This conclusion largely 
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contributed to the awareness of the importance of properly addressing selection problems for identifying 
causal effects. Consequently, the research focus in empirical economics has shifted more and more 
towards research designs that provide solutions for the selection problem from the early 1990s onwards. 
This has resulted in an increase of design-based studies that pay explicit attention to the identification of 
treatment effects. The shift from control strategies and econometric methods to design-based research has 
been an important development in empirical economics in the past decades. 
 
This development, referred to as ‘the credibility revolution in empirical economics’ by Angrist and 
Pischke (2010), has contributed largely to the understanding of credible ways to deal with selection issues 
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government rules or the forces of nature. We distinguish three dominant types of natural experiments: 
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1.2.1 Instrumental variables 
 
Instrumental variables (IV) models address the selection problem by the use of an exogenous variable, the 
instrument, which is correlated with the treatment variable but otherwise uncorrelated with the outcome 
variable. Instrumental variables can overcome the estimation biases that arise from selection by using 
only the exogenous variation in the treatment status that is induced by the instrument. The IV method 
allows estimating treatment effects consistently with two-stage-least-squares (2SLS). If treatment effects 
are homogeneous, this yields the average treatment effect among all subjects. Imbens and Angrist (1994) 
show that, in case of heterogeneous effects, the IV estimate yields a local average treatment effect 
(LATE). They introduce the assumption of monotonicity, which implies that the instrument affects 
treatment status in a monotone way, i.e. that an increase in the value of the instrument does not decrease 
the value of the treatment status. Under the monotonicity assumption and the standard IV assumptions 
that the instrument (i) has a clear impact on the treatment variable (first-stage), (ii) is independent of 
potential outcomes, conditional on covariates, and (iii) only affects the outcome variable through the 
treatment status (exclusion restriction), IV estimates yield a causal treatment effect for the subpopulation 
of individuals whose treatment status is affected by the instrument. Hence, estimated treatment effects 
using IV should be interpreted as a LATE that applies only to the subsample of subjects that comply with 
the instrument.  
 
The art of applying IV models lies in finding appropriate instruments that satisfy the required 
assumptions. Special cases are studies that use a randomized assignment to treatment as an instrument for 
actual treatment (e.g. Angrist, 1990; Bloom et al., 1997). The actual treatment status may differ from the 
instrument if subjects do not comply with their assignment. In such cases with a binary instrument, the 
assumption of monotonicity partitions the population into three subgroups: compliers, never-takers and 
always-takers (Angrist et al., 1996). Compliers are those who always comply with their assignment. Both 
never-takers and always-takers are the subjects whose treatment status is not affected by the instrument. 
These subjects never (or always) take the treatment, independent of their assignment. Since the treatment 
is invariant to the assignment, the IV estimates are uninformative on the treatment effects for these 
subgroups. In cases with one-sided noncompliance, the LATE can be shown to equal the average 
treatment-on-the-treated effect (Bloom, 1984). This occurs when participation in the treatment is 
voluntary among those assigned to the treatment, while those not assigned are not allowed to participate 
in the treatment. The intuition is that such situations rule out the existence of always-takers, which implies 
that all treated individuals are compliers.    
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Overviews of the use of IV in economics are presented in Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Angrist and 
Pischke (2009). An example where IV has been frequently used is the literature on the returns to 
schooling. Educational attainment is an endogenous variable that is related to many factors such as 
(unobserved) ability or motivation. Instruments for schooling can help overcome endogeneity biases in 
the estimation of the returns to education. These studies have used variation in schooling induced by 
differences in the regional supply of schools (Card, 1995), tuition costs (Kane and Rouse, 1995) or 
compulsory schooling laws (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Oreopoulos, 
2006).  
 
1.2.2 Regression discontinuity designs 
 
Regression discontinuity designs have been used in the field of psychology dating back to the 1960s and 
have only recently come to the forefront in the economics literature (Cook, 2008). Regression 
discontinuity designs exploit threshold values that are used in rules for treatment assignment. The 
treatment status then depends on the value of an underlying variable. Subjects with values above (or 
below) the cut-off are assigned to the treatment, while subjects with values below (or above) the cut-off 
are not. Regression discontinuity designs essentially compare the outcomes of subjects just above and just 
below the threshold value, while controlling for a smooth function of the underlying variable. The 
assumption needed for identification of a causal treatment effect is that subjects below the threshold value 
do not differ from subjects above the threshold value, conditional on a smooth function of the underlying 
variable and covariates. This assumption implies that there are no other confounding discontinuities 
around the cut-off. To contribute to the credibility of the identifying assumption, regression discontinuity 
designs are often estimated in a narrow range around the cut-off. 
 
Regression discontinuity designs can be distinguished in sharp and fuzzy designs (Hahn et al., 2001). In a 
sharp regression discontinuity design, treatment assignment is a deterministic function of the underlying 
variable, i.e. all subjects above the threshold value are treated, while all subjects below the threshold are 
not. In fuzzy regression discontinuity designs, the probability of receiving treatment is discontinuous at 
the threshold value, but does not change from zero to one. Fuzzy regression discontinuity designs can be 
analyzed using instrumental variables, in which a dummy variable for being on either side of the cut-off 
can be used as an instrument for treatment. The ratio between the impact of the instrument on the 
outcome variable (reduced form) and the impact of the instrument on the treatment status (first-stage) is 
an IV-estimate of the impact of the treatment. 
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Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Van der Klaauw (2008) review the use of regression discontinuity 
designs in empirical economics. An example in the field of education is Jacob and Lefgren (2004), who 
examine the impact of remedial education on student performance. In addition, a series of studies have 
investigated the impact of class size on student achievement making use of discontinuities that follow 
from maximum class size rules. These rules create exogenous variation in class size. The intuition is that 
cohorts with a total number of students that just exceeds the maximum size is split in two small classes, 
while cohorts with a total number of students that is just below the maximum size is left in a single large 
class. A seminal paper by Angrist and Lavy (1999) exploited these rules in Israel in a regression 
discontinuity framework and found that small classes improve student achievement. More recently, other 
studies that used a similar regression discontinuity design showed results that support these findings 
(Urquiola, 2006; Browning and Heinesen, 2007).2
1.2.3 Difference-in-differences 
 
  
 
Difference-in-differences (DID) models make us of pre-treatment and post-treatment outcomes for 
subjects that are affected by a policy change and subjects that are not, or less, affected by the same 
change. This type of model is particularly applicable if a policy intervention is implemented in specific 
regions. DID models essentially compare the change in outcomes after and before the start of the policy in 
the treated regions (the treatment group) to the same development in other regions that are not treated (the 
control group). The identifying assumption is the common trend assumption. This assumption implies that 
the development of outcomes in the control group would have been the development of outcomes in the 
experiment group in the absence of the policy change.  
 
Difference-in-differences models have been widely used in empirical economics (see e.g. Ashenfelter and 
Card, 1985; Card and Krueger, 1994; Blundell et al., 1998). Examples in the field of education include 
Pischke (2007), who evaluates the impact of the length of the school year on student performance, and 
several studies that examine of the impact of accountability systems on educational achievement 
(Hanushek and Raymond, 2004; Jacob, 2005; Dee and Jacob, 2011). These latter studies exploit the fact 
that accountability reforms have been implemented in specific states in the Unites States and provide 
evidence that such systems can help to improve educational performance. 
                                                 
2 Whereas earlier studies on the impact of class sizes showed mixed results (Hanushek, 1986), the recent design-
based studies turn out to yield a more consistent pattern of results that point at modest improvements in 
educational achievement induced by small classes. The reduced variation in outcomes across studies may be well 
explained by the more appropriate designs used to address selection problems.    
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1.3 Outline and results 
 
This thesis presents four empirical evaluations of educational policies in the Netherlands. In each of the 
studies specific attention is paid to the identification of the causal effect of the policy by making use of 
design-based research methods. The interventions studied concern one institutional policy, one incentive-
based policy and two resource-based programs. Each of the Chapters 2-5 presents a separate study on the 
impact of a particular educational policy that is readable in itself. The outline of the thesis is presented 
below including a preview of the main results. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of the timing of tracking on higher education completion. This chapter 
relates to the literature on institutional features of education systems. The age at which students are 
tracked into different types of education is one of the most remarkable differences in education systems 
across countries. Previous studies on school tracking have often relied on differences between countries 
or states (Schuetz et al., 2005; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006). The Dutch education system offers the 
opportunity to investigate the effect of the age of tracking within a single school system. Some schools in 
the Netherlands directly track 12 year old pupils that leave primary education into categorial classes of a 
particular education level, while other schools offer comprehensive classes that postpone the time of 
tracking with one or two years. This causes variation in the timing of tracking, which we exploit in our 
analysis. The main challenge for the identification of causal effects is the potential self-selection of 
students into tracked or comprehensive classes. To address this potential problem we control for a large 
set of covariates including various measures of socioeconomic background and test scores on arithmetic, 
language and information processing. Moreover, we adopt an instrumental variable approach in which we 
exploit regional variation in the supply of schools. The estimation results provide evidence that early 
tracking negatively affects the probability of higher education completion.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the effects of a new type of financial incentive targeted at regional education 
authorities in the Netherlands. This chapter relates to the debate on the use of resource-based versus 
incentive-based policies in education. Many empirical studies fail to find a positive association between 
increased resources or inputs and an improvement in educational quality (Woessmann, 2003; Hanushek, 
2006). The conclusion that additional resources are no guarantee for improved student performance has 
shifted the interest of policymakers and researchers more towards the use of incentive-based policies in 
education. A variety of new incentive-based policies have been started around the world. Empirical 
evaluations of these programs show that financial incentives can improve education quality (e.g. Angrist 
and Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Lavy, 2002, 2009). At the same time there remains severe 
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opposition from teacher unions and educators against the use of incentives and strategic responses seem 
to be a serious threat to the effectiveness of the programs (Glewwe et al., 2003; Jacob, 2005; Figlio and 
Getzler, 2006). Previous studies have mainly focused on incentives for students, teachers and schools. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature by analysing the effectiveness of a financial incentive 
scheme for regional education authorities. These authorities were selected based on their pre-treatment 
number of school dropouts and received additional resources if they reduced school dropout compared to 
a baseline level. The introduction of the policy in 14 out of 39 regions and the use of the specific selection 
rule for the participating regions allow us to estimate local difference-in-differences models. This 
approach essentially combines a difference-in-differences model with a regression discontinuity design. It 
estimates difference-in-differences models around the cut-off level for being selected into treatment. 
Using administrative data for all Dutch students in the year before and the year after the introduction of 
the new policy we find no effect of the financial incentive scheme on school dropout. In addition, we find 
suggestive evidence for strategic behaviour in response to the program. 
 
The next two chapters are dedicated to an investigation of the potential of comprehensive programs in 
improving outcomes for troubled individuals or schools. Chapter 4 investigates the impact of the 
Neighbourhood School Program (NSP), a special program designed to increase school enrolment and 
employment among a problematic target population of young school dropouts in Rotterdam. Young 
school dropouts are at risk for future unemployment or getting involved in criminal activities (e.g. 
Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Machin et al., 2011). The high social costs associated with unemployment 
and crime legitimize publicly subsidized interventions aimed at improving the prospects for these youths. 
Previous studies, however, have shown that is difficult to design effective interventions that help this 
problematic group back on track (LaLonde, 2003). The NSP is largely designed in line with the most 
promising existing programs and provides a broad range of educational, work, and health services, and 
guidance by personal coaches. This chapter provides evidence on the effects of the program on school 
enrolment, employment and criminal behaviour from a field experiment. Since random assignment of the 
target group to the program and control condition was infeasible, we set up a controlled natural 
experiment. During specific time windows potential candidates for the program were assigned to the 
regular interventions used by the municipality. We use the youths that were eligible for the program but 
that were assigned to the regular interventions because of these time windows as our control group. Our 
design illustrates a potential set-up of field experiments in cases where random assignment is not feasible. 
We use administrative information about school enrolment, employment, and criminal behaviour three 
years after the start of the intervention. The impact of the program is identified by comparing the 
outcomes of youths assigned to the NSP with the outcomes of youths assigned to regular interventions, 
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conditional on the time of application. We use an instrumental variables approach to address 
noncompliance with the assignment rule. The estimated effects show that assignment to the program did 
not increase school enrolment or employment. Most important, we find evidence that assignment to the 
NSP increased criminal activity, especially among the youths who had been criminally active before the 
time of entry. This chapter relates to the literature on school dropout and crime. The results are consistent 
with a large body of the literature that shows no impact of training programs on the labour market 
outcomes of at-risk-youths and with studies that document the adverse effects of group-based 
interventions on delinquent behaviour (Dishion et al., 1999; Dodge et al., 2007).  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the impact of a comprehensive school reform (CSR) policy for failing schools. CSR 
methods have been widely used to improve the educational quality of failing schools, especially in the 
United States in the 1990s and early 2000s. Such programs involve a set of integrated changes at all levels 
within schools rather than isolated interventions targeted at single aspects. Yet the evidence on the 
effectiveness of such programs in increasing student outcomes is limited, and prior research often did not 
use credible research designs to handle potential selection issues (Borman et al., 2003). We use a 
difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of a CSR policy, the Amsterdam School 
Improvement Program (ASIP), on pupil achievement. The program implements a systematic and 
performance-based way of working and integrates measures such as staff coaching, teacher evaluations 
and teacher schooling, and the use of new instruction methods. As of 2008, all primary schools in 
Amsterdam that were judged to perform below national quality standards were invited to voluntarily 
participate in the program. We make use of administrative data on the high-stakes CITO test scores from 
2005 to 2012, which allows us to compare the development of pupil achievement in failing schools in 
Amsterdam to that in failing schools outside Amsterdam in a difference-in-differences framework. We 
present intention-to-treat estimates and find substantially negative effects on test scores in the first four 
years after the introduction of the program. The introduction of the ASIP decreases test scores by 0.17 
standard deviations. A potential explanation for this finding is the intensive and rigorous approach that 
caused an unstable work climate with increased teacher replacement. The resulting loss of school specific 
knowledge, increase in recruitment and hiring costs, and uncertain work atmosphere felt by teachers may 
have negatively affected pupil achievement.  
 
Chapter 6 presents a summary of the main findings, followed by a brief discussion on its limitations, 
suggestions for further research and some overall concluding remarks. 
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Does the timing of tracking affect higher education 
completion?1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter investigates the effect of the timing of tracking on completion of higher education by 
exploiting unique variation from the Dutch education system. At the age of 12 Dutch students can enrol in 
tracked schools or in comprehensive schools. The comprehensive schools postpone enrolment into 
tracked classes by one or two years. OLS- and IV-estimates, using regional variation in the supply of 
schools as instruments, show that early tracking has a detrimental effect on completion of higher 
education for students at the margin of the Dutch high and low tracks. The negative effects of early 
tracking are larger for students with relatively high ability or students with a higher socioeconomic 
background. In addition, we find no negative effects of comprehensive classes on higher ability students. 
These results suggest that increasing participation in comprehensive classes would increase graduation 
from higher education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Marc van der Steeg and Dinand Webbink: Van Elk, R., M. van der Steeg, 
D. Webbink, 2011, Does the timing of tracking affect higher education completion?, Economics of Education 
Review, 30, 1009-1021. 
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2.1 Introduction 
One of the most remarkable differences between school systems is the age at which students are tracked 
into different levels of education. Countries such as Germany, Austria, Hungary and the Slovak Republic 
track students as early as age 10. Other countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Canada, the US, the UK and 
Japan, have a comprehensive school system until the end of secondary education. Differences in the age 
of tracking might have far-reaching consequences for the equity and efficiency of educational outcomes. 
However, little is known about the effects of this key institutional feature of education systems.  
A researcher interested in the effect of the age of tracking would like to know what would have 
happened with a student if he/she had not been tracked at, for example, the age of 12 but rather at 14. 
Investigating this question requires variation in the age of tracking. However, in most countries or states 
tracking takes place at one age or not at all. Hence, variation in the age of tracking is often not available 
within a single education system. Therefore, researchers often rely on variation between countries or 
states, and estimate regression models using a large set of covariates (for instance, Schuetz et al. 2005). 
The multitude of potential confounders due to differences between countries or states poses serious 
problems for the identification of the effect of the age of tracking in these models. A recent innovative 
study by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) addresses this problem by using a difference-in-differences 
approach exploiting international test scores taken at different ages. However, this study has also been 
criticized for neglecting incentive effects of tracking (Eisenkopf, 2007). Studies that investigate the 
effects of tracking within countries compare the outcomes of tracked students with non-tracked students 
(Figlio and Page, 2002; Duflo et al. 2008) or exploit the gradual introduction of a comprehensive system 
(Pekkarinen et al., 2009). To our knowledge there are no previous studies that exploit differences in the 
timing of tracking within the same education system.  
 
 The Dutch system offers the opportunity to investigate the effect of the age of tracking within a 
single school system. At the age of 12 Dutch students can enrol in tracked classes (categorial classes) or 
in comprehensive classes. The comprehensive classes consist of a combination of school types and take 
one or two years. Basically, these comprehensive classes delay enrolment into tracked classes until age 13 
or 14. This chapter compares higher education completion rates of students that are tracked at the age of 
12 with the outcomes of students that are tracked at the age of 13 or 14 within the Dutch education 
system. The advantage of this approach is that students in the tracked and comprehensive parts of the 
system encounter exactly the same educational environment after the period of treatment. Hence there are 
no concerns for confounding factors due to differences between countries. Relative to existing studies that 
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compare outcomes of tracked versus non-tracked pupils, our paper contributes by comparing two 
alternative tracking ages. We compare a group of pupils that is tracked early with a group of pupils that is 
tracked later. This implies that there are two differences in treatment between both groups that may affect 
future educational outcomes. First, there is the difference of being in a tracked versus a comprehensive 
class for one or two years. Tracked pupils might, for example, benefit from more homogeneous 
classrooms, while pupils in a comprehensive class might benefit from the interaction with their peers. 
Second, there is a difference in the age at which pupils enter the tracked system in which they are 
allocated to different education types. This may also affect outcomes if the ability of teachers and parents 
to select the most suitable education types for pupils depends on the pupil’s age. Tracking pupils at an 
early age may imply more uncertainty with respect to the pupil’s true capabilities and hence a higher risk 
of sending them to an inappropriate school type. Hence, the probability of misallocation of pupils to 
tracks may decrease with tracking age. This aspect is not taken into account in studies that compare 
tracked versus non-tracked pupils. Suppose a researcher compared the effects of being tracked versus 
non-tracked at age 12 and found a positive result for tracking. Tracking at age 14 might be better still if a 
positive effect of realizing better matches between students and education types at a later tracking age 
dominates the negative effect of being in a comprehensive class for one or two years. This illustrates that 
comparing tracking ages, taking into account both aspects, is of critical importance for policymakers 
aiming to improve the school system.  
 
The main challenge for our analysis is the potential self-selection of students into categorial or 
comprehensive classes. If categorial or comprehensive classes attract more able or more motivated 
students, unobserved differences might bias the estimates. To address this potential problem we control 
for a large set of covariates including various measures of socioeconomic background and test scores on 
arithmetic, language and information processing. Moreover, we adopt an instrumental variable approach 
in which we exploit regional variation in the supply of schools. Previous papers in the economic literature 
used regional differences in the supply of schools to instrument for educational attainment (see for 
instance Card, 1995; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Park and Kang, 2008). In this paper we use regional 
differences in the supply of tracked or comprehensive classes to instrument for the age of tracking.  
The main outcome variable in the analysis is the completion of higher education. This outcome plays a 
prominent role in the Dutch policy discussion on participation in higher education. A recent report 
suggests that the early tracking regime in the Netherlands constrains the growth of higher education 
participation significantly (OECD, 2007). We focus the analysis on a sample of students that is most 
likely to be affected by early tracking: those who were advised to enrol in the lower track of secondary 
16
16 
 
education. In addition, we investigate the effects of early tracking for higher ability pupils that were 
advised to enrol in the higher track of secondary education. 
 Our main finding is that tracking at the age of 12 compared to tracking at 13 or 14 has a negative 
effect on the probability of higher education completion. Both ordinary least-squares (OLS) and 
instrumental variables (IV) estimations show negative effects of early tracking. We also find that the 
comprehensive school has no negative effect on pupils with a higher ability. This suggests that 
postponing tracking to older children would increase the number of people completing higher education.   
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the previous literature. Sections 2.3 and 
2.4 describe the Dutch context and data. The empirical strategy is discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 
presents the main estimation results. In Section 2.7 several robustness analyses are presented. Section 2.8 
presents an additional analysis for higher ability students. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes and discusses 
potential policy implications. 
 
 
2.2 Previous studies 
 
The empirical literature has produced conflicting results on the effects of tracking. Several studies use 
cross-country data and regress international test scores on institutional differences between countries. 
Ariga and Brunello (2007) study the effect of the number of years spent in a tracked system on the 
performance of young adults in a standardized cognitive test. Using constraints on educational 
participation, such as financial constraint or family reasons, as instrumental variables they find a positive 
effect of tracking on performance. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) use a difference-in-differences 
approach to identify the effect of an early tracking regime on standardized test scores. They match 
international primary school tests to secondary school tests and compare differences in test scores across 
countries. They find that early tracking increases inequality, while it does not have a clear impact on 
average achievement. Recently, this study has been criticized. Jakubowski (2007) argues that the 
differences in design of the international tests may affect the results. While PISA measures pupils aged 15 
(independent of their grade), PIRLS/TIMMS measures achievement in specific grades (independent of 
age). He concludes that early tracking does not increase inequality when comparing pupils of the same 
age and grade. Eisenkopf (2007) argues that the findings by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) are biased 
because they neglect the incentive effects of tracking. Brunello and Checchi (2007) focus on the 
interaction between family background and tracking. They estimate regression models with many 
covariates including country-by-cohort dummies and interactions with family background. Their 
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estimates suggest that tracking reinforces the role of family background with respect to educational 
attainment and labour market outcomes. Schuetz et al. (2005) use a similar approach in which they 
investigate the effect of the interaction of family background with an indicator of school tracking (for 
which they take the age of selection into different tracks) on test scores of pupils in over 50 countries. 
They also find that early tracking increases the effect of family background. 
 
 A second group of studies uses variation within countries. Duflo et al. (2008) provide evidence 
from a randomized experiment in Kenya. In this experiment 121 primary schools, who all had a single 
grade 1 class, received funding to hire an extra teacher and split this class into two sections. In 60 
randomly chosen schools the pupils were randomly assigned to one of the two sections. In the other 61 
schools the pupils were assigned based on a ranking of their previous educational performance. After 18 
months pupils in the schools that selected based on performance scored on average 0.14 standard 
deviations higher than pupils in schools that selected randomly. In addition they find that pupils at all 
levels of the distribution benefited from tracking. The authors suggest that tracking was beneficial 
because it helped teachers to focus their teaching to a level appropriate to most students in class. Evidence 
for developed countries is provided by several studies that exploit educational reforms from countries that 
switch from a tracked to a comprehensive system. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) investigate the 
effect of the change from selective schools towards a comprehensive system in England. However, 
Manning and Pischke (2006) note that the gradual introduction of the new system started in poorer areas 
which might bias the estimates. A recent study by Pekkarinen et al. (2009) exploits the replacement of the 
Finnish two-track school system by a uniform nine-year comprehensive school. Identification comes from 
the gradual introduction of the reform during a six-year period. They find that the reform had a small 
positive effect on verbal test scores but no effect on the mean performance in arithmetic or logical 
reasoning tests. In addition, the reform improved test scores of students from lowly educated families. 
Figlio and Page (2002), using US data, investigate the effect of tracking on the improvement in maths test 
scores between the 8th and 10th grade for different ability groups. They divide the students according to 
the 8th grade test score into top, middle and bottom thirds of the distribution and estimate separate 
regressions for each of these subsets in which they exploit variation in tracking across schools. They find 
no significant effect in each of these regressions and interpret this as evidence that tracking does not harm 
the low-ability students. The results from additional two-stage least squares estimations suggest that low-
ability students may actually gain from tracking. Betts and Shkolnik (2000) examine the effect of formal 
ability grouping in the US, making use of a nationally representative data set which asks principals 
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whether their schools use tracking in their math classes.2
 
 The authors find no overall effect on math 
achievement growth and find little or no differential effects for high-achieving, average or low-achieving 
students.  
Our study provides the following contributions to the literature. 
    First, we examine the effects of the timing of tracking. In the Netherlands, each pupil ends up in a 
tracked system at age 14 and we investigate whether tracking at age 12 improves on tracking at 13 or 14. 
Previous studies, as cited above, investigate whether tracking improves educational outcomes or not.  
    Second, we exploit the coexistence of a tracked and a comprehensive system within the same school 
system. Previous studies exploit the gradual introduction of a reform from a tracked system to a 
comprehensive system within countries, which means that these systems have not been in existence for a 
long time.   
    Third, we investigate long-term outcomes of tracking. Most of the previous work focuses on test scores 
at a relatively young age. This might compromise a proper evaluation of the impact of tracking on 
performance if tracking is not given sufficient time to work out its effect. We look at later outcomes by 
comparing higher education completion rates across early versus later tracked students.  
 
2.3 Variation in the timing of tracking in Dutch education 
In order to analyse the effects of early tracking, we would like to compare the outcomes of pupils that are 
subject to an early tracking regime with the outcomes of those who are not. Although from an 
international perspective the Dutch educational system as a whole is considered to be an early tracking 
regime, there exists some variation in the timing at which pupils are placed in a certain track. At the start 
of secondary education, schools in the Netherlands offer different types of first-grade classes. In some 
schools, 12 year old pupils are directly tracked into categorial classes of a certain education level. Other 
schools offer one- or two-year comprehensive classes, in which pupils are kept together before they are 
tracked in a particular school type. Hence, pupils starting secondary education in a comprehensive class 
postpone their choice of school type by at least one year. This difference causes variation in the timing of 
tracking, which we can exploit to analyse the effects of early tracking by comparing the educational 
outcomes of  pupils who start secondary education in a categorial class (the ‘tracked’ pupils) to those who 
                                                 
2 Rees et al. (2000) have criticized the study because of concerns on the reliability of principal-reported measures 
of tracking. 
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start in a combined class (the ‘non-tracked’ pupils). Strictly speaking, we investigate the effect of being 
tracked one or two years earlier.  
 
The structure of Dutch education after leaving primary education at the age of 12 is shown in Figure 2.1. 
In 1989 secondary education consisted of four tracks: ‘lbo’ (pre-vocational secondary education), ‘mavo’ 
(lower general secondary education), ‘havo’ (higher general secondary education) and ‘vwo’ (pre-
university education).  After secondary education students can enrol in ‘mbo’ (upper secondary vocational 
education) or higher education, depending on the type of school completed. Mbo is oriented towards 
vocational training and is offered at four levels which prepare students for specific professions in the 
labour market. Higher education in the Netherlands is offered in two types of institutions: research 
universities, which offer research oriented programs (‘wo’) and universities of applied sciences, which 
offer programs of higher professional education (‘hbo’) which prepare students for particular professions. 
The minimum access requirements for higher education are a havo degree or a level four (the highest 
level) degree of ‘mbo’. Hence, pupils who have completed havo or vwo are qualified for access to higher 
education, while pupils with a mavo degree can not directly enrol. We label all pupils who start secondary 
education in a stream that does not give direct access to higher education (mavo and lower) as being 
assigned to a low track. Similarly, all pupils who start secondary education in a ‘havo’ or higher are 
assigned to a high track. Both groups of pupils can be considered to be subject to an ‘early tracking 
regime’. After all, both are tracked at the age of 12 in either the low track or the high track. The pupils 
who enter some combined class that consists of at least mavo-havo delay tracking until age 13 or 14. We 
make no distinction whether this is a mavo-havo, mavo-havo-vwo or another combined class that includes 
both mavo and havo. As long as the choice of both the low track and the high track is open it is labelled as 
a comprehensive class. Those pupils can be considered to be subject to a ‘comprehensive system’.  
 
In the literature different definitions of tracking are used. For example, the US has, strictly speaking, a 
comprehensive school system and employs streaming within schools, which is a milder form of ability 
grouping. While tracking implies that students are placed in different school types, streaming implies that 
particular courses are taught at different levels of complexity. Often, this distinction is ignored in the 
existing literature. We define tracking as the allocation of pupils into high or low track classes. In the 
Netherlands first grade categorial classes are in general offered by categorial schools and first grade 
comprehensive classes by comprehensive schools. Parents are equally free to choose for categorial or 
comprehensive schools and there are typically no differences in the way courses are taught between the 
two school types. 
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Figure 2.1 Flow chart of Dutch education system: routes towards higher education for tracked   
versus non-tracked pupils in first year of secondary education.   
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Only a few schools offer both comprehensive and categorial classes. The course programs that are offered 
at these schools are in principle the same as those offered at the single comprehensive or categorial 
schools 
 
In the Netherlands pupils at the end of primary education are advised about the type of secondary school 
most appropriate for them. The advice on education level is not binding, but it is a strong 
recommendation taken seriously by the secondary schools. It can be interpreted as a proxy for perceived 
ability. In our analysis, we primarily focus on pupils that are advised to follow the mavo track when they 
leave primary education and compare higher education completion rates for those who are immediately 
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tracked in a categorial mavo to those who postpone their choice by entering a combined mavo-havo or 
mavo-havo-vwo class. Hence, we select a homogeneous group with respect to ability and compare the 
subsample of this group that moves into a low track to the subsample that moves into a comprehensive 
class. From the OECD-perspective (see introduction and OECD, 2007) this group seems most interesting 
as the former subsample does not qualify for direct access to higher education. If early tracking has a 
detrimental effect on the completion of higher education, the mavo advice pupils who are tracked early 
are likely to be those who are most damaged due to their subsequent inability to access higher education 
directly.  
 
Our main analysis addresses the question whether pupils that are recommended by the teachers to go to 
the low track benefit from being in a comprehensive class compared to being in the low track. In addition 
we will analyse the effects of tracking for higher ability pupils, by focusing on pupils that are advised to 
follow the havo track and compare outcomes of those who enter a comprehensive class to those who are 
tracked early into the high track. 
 
2.4 Data 
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the Secondary Education Pupil Cohort 1989. These are 
longitudinal data collected by Statistics Netherlands and the University of Groningen (Statistics 
Netherlands, 1991; Driessen and Van der Werf, 1992). The cohort consists of a representative sample of 
around 20,000 pupils who enrolled in the first grade of secondary education in 1989. These pupils were 
followed during their school careers until they left the education system. Hence, for each pupil in each 
calendar year their corresponding school type and grade is known. The public files of the Secondary 
Education Pupil Cohorts follow the pupils until the school year 2003-2004. We received access to the 
private files of Statistics Netherlands with the most recent available data until the school year 2007-2008. 
This provided us with the most up-to-date information on completion of higher education. A comparison 
of our sample with the population shows that the shares of pupils who completed higher education 
(around 30%) in the cohort 1989 are quite similar to the nationwide population figures.3
 
 
Our data include information on the highest level of education completed from which we derive a dummy 
variable for completion of higher education. The data also provide information on a pupil’s school type 
                                                 
3 In the Dutch Labour Force Survey 23.6% of the students aged 24 completed higher education in 2001. 
Furthermore, the share of pupils aged 25-34 with a tertiary education degree is 34% in 2004, while the share of the 
population aged 25-65 with a tertiary degree is 29% (Minne et al., 2007). 
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and grade for each calendar year. We observe whether a pupil is enrolled in secondary education in a 
categorial mavo class or in a comprehensive mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. The former group is 
tracked early while the latter delays tracking by one or two years. From this information we construct our 
main tracking variable. Our data contain a large set of covariates. First, the data provide a large set of 
socioeconomic background variables. The parents of the pupils were asked to fill in questionnaires which 
include questions on ethnicity (5 categories), education level (7 levels), profession level (7 categories) and 
family composition (8 categories). Second, the data contain information on the urbanization of residence 
(5 categories), gender and age of the pupils. In addition, we condition on scores from ‘entrance tests’ in 
arithmetic, language and information processing, which pupils undertook at the start of secondary 
education. These tests are comparable to the main standardized test at the end of Dutch primary education 
(the CITO test) and the results serve as an indicator for pupil ability. Scores on each of the tests are 
between 0 and 20 (maximum score).  
 
The sample of pupils that leave primary education with a mavo-advice includes 4912 pupils, of which 
3123 (63.6 %) enter secondary education in a categorial mavo class and 1190 (24.2 %) in a combined 
mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. The sample statistics of the variables we use in our analysis are 
shown in Table 2.1. We exclude pupils who are missing these variables, which leaves us with an 
estimation sample of 3936 students.4
 
 Column (1) reports the sample means for the group of pupils who 
start secondary education in a tracked class, column (2) reports them for the group of pupils who start 
secondary education in a comprehensive class. Column (3) reports the p-value of the difference, 
calculated using a two-tailed t-test or a chi-squared test.  
A comparison of the covariates of the two groups of students reveals some differences in socioeconomic 
background. Parents from students in comprehensive classes are slightly higher educated and their 
professional level is also slightly higher. Parents of students in tracked classes have Dutch nationality 
more often.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 There does not appear to be any systematic difference between our sample of pupils with non-missing values on 
all covariates and the excluded pupils on observable characteristics. Inclusion of the additional observations hardly 
affects the estimation results presented in Section 2.6.  
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Table 2.1 Sample statistics for sample with mavo-advice, early tracked versus later tracked 
 
 Early tracked: 
mavo 
Non-tracked: 
mavo-havo (-vwo) 
p-Value  
Ability    
Test score arithmetic 10.6 10.6 0.864 
Test score language 11.6 11.7 0.620 
Test score information processing      
    
11.7 
 
11.7 
 
0.983 
 Personal and SES variables    
Female    56    55 0.574 
Age 12.6 12.6 0.410 
Highest education level parents   0.000 
    No primary education     1     2  
    Primary education    12    13  
    Secondary education low    30    24  
    Secondary education high          41    39  
    Higher education first phase    14    17  
    Higher education second phase     2     6  
    Higher education third phase     0     0  
Profession level parents   0.000 
    Worker     29    22  
    Self-employed without personnel     5     5  
    Self-employed with personnel     5     5  
    Lower employee    11    12  
    Intermediate employee    22    21  
    Higher profession    12    16  
    Other    17    19  
Ethnicity   0.000 
    The Netherlands    89    81  
    Other (4 categories)        11    19  
Family composition   0.000 
    Father and mother    87    77  
    Other (7 categories) 
 
 
   
   13    23  
Urbanization city of residence   
   
  0.000 
    Very high     9    18  
    High    16    30  
    Median    19    13  
    Modest    29    23  
    Low    26    17  
Educational outcomes    
Ever participated in higher education  33.4  38.3 0.005 
Completed higher education  21.3  26.8 0.001 
    
Number of pupils  2905 1031  
Notes. Test scores are of entrance tests taken in the first year of secondary education. The maximum score for each test is 20. All numbers 
represent percentages unless stated otherwise.  
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In addition, students in tracked classes are more likely to live in families with two parents and in regions 
with a lower degree of urbanization. Despite these differences, the personal characteristics of the students 
in both groups are remarkably comparable. The age and gender composition is equal. Even more 
importantly, the scores on all three ability tests taken in the first year of secondary education are also 
equal. A regression of tracking on all covariates yields no significant effects. As such, the sample 
statistics suggest that the observable characteristics of the groups are quite similar. 
 
The bottom panel of Table 2.1 gives a first impression of the potential effect of early tracking on  
educational achievements. We observe that both enrolment and completion of higher education are 
significantly lower for early tracked pupils. The difference in completion of higher education between the 
two groups is approximately 5 percentage points.  
 
Our data also allow us to observe the educational career of students in the different tracks. This may 
indicate to what extent the lower participation in higher education among the tracked pupils can be 
explained by differences in enrolment opportunities after the first years in secondary education. Pupils 
who started secondary education in a comprehensive class still have an opportunity to enrol into a higher 
track (i.e. havo or vwo) in subsequent years, which grants admission to higher education. Pupils who start 
in a categorial class do not have these possibilities. Only in special cases where pupils turn out to have 
been placed in the wrong track, are pupils allowed to change tracks, in which case they have to repeat one 
grade. Table 2.2 shows what happened with the students in each group during the first nine years after 
enrolment in secondary education. We observe that some of the non-tracked pupils move on directly to 
higher education types, which results in more non-tracked pupils ending up in education levels that 
provide direct access to higher education. In the second cohort year, for example, participation in havo or 
vwo is 14 percentage points higher for the non-tracked students. In the third and fourth cohort years, this 
difference increases to 18 percentage points. Later on, these differences in educational careers translate 
into differences in higher education enrolment in favour of non-tracked students. 
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Table 2.2 Routes through education in first nine years after entering secondary education, tracked 
(=mavo) versus non-tracked (=mavo/havo or mavo/havo/vwo); mavo advice estimation 
sample 
 < Mavo Mavo Comprehensive: 
mh or mhv 
Havo Havo/vwo Vwo Mbo Higher 
education 
Left 
Year 1          
Non-tracked 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tracked 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
Year 2          
Non-tracked 8 42 32 7 9 0 0 0 1 
Tracked 3 94 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
          
Year 3          
Non-tracked 11 58 9 12 5 3 0 0 2 
Tracked 7 90 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 
          
Year 4          
Non-tracked 14 61 1 16 1 3 0 0 4 
Tracked 9 87 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
          
Year 6          
Non-tracked 2 3 0 16 0 4 49 3 22 
Tracked 2 2 0 11 0 1 64 0 20 
          
Year 9          
Non-tracked 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 27 57 
Tracked 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 22 62 
Notes. All numbers represent percentages. 
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2.5 Empirical strategy 
We use two approaches for estimating the effect of early tracking on completion of higher education. In 
our first approach we use linear probability models that include various controls and estimate the 
following equation: 
Yi = α Xi + β Ti + εi ,                                                                                                                                 (2.1)                                                                                                          
  
where Yi is a dummy variable for completion of higher education, Xi  denotes a vector of background 
characteristics, Ti is a dummy variable which indicates whether a pupil is tracked early or not and εi is the 
error term. Ti takes the value 1 if a pupil starts secondary education in a categorial mavo and takes value 0 
if the pupil starts in a comprehensive class. The parameter of interest is β. Estimation of Equation (2.1) by 
OLS may provide biased and inconsistent estimates if the error term is correlated with tracking. Hence, in 
case of unobserved heterogeneity we can no longer interpret β as the causal effect of early tracking. We 
address this problem in several ways. First, by restricting our estimation sample to the group of pupils that 
leave primary education with a mavo-advice, we select a homogeneous group of pupils with respect to 
ability, which reduces potential endogeneity problems. Second, we include a large set of individual 
control variables like personal and socioeconomic background characteristics. In addition, we are able to 
control for differences in ability by including pupils’ test scores. 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that unobservables exist that are correlated both with early tracking and 
the outcome variable. The differences in socioeconomic background characteristics we observe between 
tracked and non-tracked pupils (see Table 2.1) may give rise to concerns about unobserved heterogeneity 
which threatens the unconfoundedness assumption underlying standard OLS regressions. Motivated 
parents, for example, may rather place their offspring in a comprehensive class, which gives better 
opportunities to move into a more advanced type of secondary education (havo or vwo) later on. 
Our second approach addresses this potential endogeneity problem. We use an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach that exploits regional variation in the supply of schools. This approach is similar to 
previous papers in the economic literature that used regional differences in the supply of schools to 
instrument for educational attainment (Card, 1993; Currie & Moretti, 2003; Park & Kang, 2008). 
We use the relative supply of categorial schools in particular municipality types as an instrument for early 
tracking and estimate Equation (2.1) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). The first stage, in which early 
tracking is regressed on the supply-ratio and all covariates, is  
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Ti = γ Xi + δ Si + ui ,                                                                                                                                 (2.2)                                                                   
  
where Si denotes the relative supply-ratio of categorial schools in the municipality of residence type of 
pupil i and ui is the error term. In our data the municipalities of residence of the pupils are classified in 12 
categories based on a number of characteristics including the total number of residents and the percentage 
of the population active in agriculture. For each of these 12 categories the total number of schools 
offering first grade categorial mavo classes (categorial schools) and the total number of schools offering 
first grade comprehensive classes (comprehensive schools) is known. From this we calculate a supply-
ratio of tracked schools which is defined as the total number of categorial secondary schools divided by 
the total number of schools in that type of municipality. Four schools offer both comprehensive and 
categorial classes. They have been counted both as a categorial and a comprehensive school. Table 2.3 
provides an overview of the number of categorial and comprehensive schools in our estimation sample for 
each of the municipality types. The first column reports the twelve different municipality types.  
 
Table 2.3 Supply-ratio of categorial schools 
Municipality type No. of Categorial schools No. of comprehensive schools Supply-ratio 
Countryside A1  0  0  
Countryside A2  0  0  
Countryside A3  4  1 0.80 
Countryside A4 12  0 1.00 
Urbanized countryside B1 11  1 0.92 
Urbanized countryside B2 29  5 0.85 
Specific commuter municipality B3 13  9 0.59 
Rural cities C1   7  1 0.88 
Small cities C2 17  3 0.85 
Medium-sized cities C3  5  4 0.56 
Medium-sized cities C4 12 11 0.52 
Big cities C5 25  9 0.74 
 
For each of these types, the numbers of categorial and comprehensive schools in our sample is reported in 
the second and third column, respectively. The last column shows the corresponding supply-ratios. The 
relative supply-ratios are substantially larger in the countryside, rural and small cities compared to larger 
cities and specific commuter municipalities. Hence, for pupils living in these first types the choice-set 
includes relatively fewer comprehensive schools. 
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The supply-ratio is a legitimate instrument if the exclusion restriction holds. Hence, the effect of early 
tracking is identified on the assumption that the supply-ratio only affects the outcome variable of interest 
through early tracking. To further reduce potential endogeneity bias from unobserved regional 
characteristics that are potentially correlated to both the supply-ratio and outcomes, we include an 
urbanization indicator in the analysis to control for possible effects of the municipality of residence on the 
outcome variable. This urbanization indicator is an additional measure for the type of municipality of 
residence. In contrast to the classification in 12 categories, this indicator is only based on the number of 
residents.  
A concern with using the supply of schools as an instrument is that differences in supply may reflect 
differences in the demand for schools. In our case differences in supply-ratios may reflect differences in 
demand for categorial or comprehensive classes. We pursue this issue by investigating the robustness of 
the results to inclusion of variables that might affect the demand for certain school types (see Section 
2.7.2). An additional issue regarding the exclusion restriction concerns potential education quality 
differences related to the supply of school types. In case of correlation between education quality and our 
instrument, the identifying assumption underlying instrumental variable analyses would be violated. We 
discuss this point in section 2.7.2 and empirically address it by investigating the relationship between the 
supply-ratio and an observable measure of school quality.  
 
Another concern with our instrument is that we measure the supply of categorial and comprehensive 
schools at an aggregated level. We only have information on the pupil’s municipality type, and not 
specifically of the pupil’s own municipality. If there is a lot of variation within municipality types, then 
our instrument may not reflect the actual options that are truly facing the pupils, resulting in a weak first 
stage. Furthermore, information at the individual level, that would also include some distance measure 
(for example the distance between the nearest categorial and the nearest comprehensive class), would be 
even more preferable, and would probably generate an even stronger first stage. Unfortunately, these 
individual data are not available. Nevertheless, as the next section will show, our first stage using 
aggregated information on the supply of schools remains sufficiently strong.  
 
2.6 Main estimation results 
This section shows the main estimation results of the two approaches used in this study. The top panel of 
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results of a linear probability model that regresses completion of higher 
education on a dummy variable for early tracking for three specifications. Column (1) includes no further 
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controls; column (2) controls for age, age squared, gender, ethnicity, educational and professional level of 
the parents, family composition and urbanization of residence; and column (3) also controls for test scores 
at the start of secondary education. The middle and bottom panel of Table 2.4 show the estimation results 
of the first and second stage of the instrumental variable approach, respectively.  
Table 2.4 The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education (OLS and IV estimates) 
                                  (1)                                          (2) 
 
                                         (3) 
 
OLS    
Early tracking  - 0.054*** 
(0.019) 
 
  - 0.051*** 
(0.018) 
 
- 0.045** 
 (0.018) 
 
IV    
First stage    
Relative supply-ratio  0.776*** 
(0.224) 
 
  0.866*** 
(0.254) 
 
0.878*** 
 (0.255) 
 
F-value excluded instrument 12.0 11.6 11.9 
    
Second stage    
Early tracking 0.026 
(0.070) 
 
                          - 0.107 
(0.067) 
 
- 0.129* 
(0.068) 
 
Socio-economic status variables (SES) no yes yes 
Test scores no no yes 
    
Observations 3936 3936 3936 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
 
 
Each estimate is based on a separate regression. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
school level are in parentheses. The top panel of Table 2.4 shows that early tracking is associated with a 
reduction in the probability of completing higher education of approximately 5 percentage points. All 
three OLS-regressions yield a statistically significant negative effect of early tracking on completion of 
higher education. The estimated coefficients slightly decrease (in absolute value) when additional control 
variables are included in the model.  
 
A concern with the OLS-estimates is that they might be biased by unobserved factors. Therefore, we also 
use an instrumental variable approach. The middle panel of Table 2.4 shows the estimation results of the 
first stage equation (2.2). As expected, we find that an increase in the supply of comprehensive schools 
increases the probability of enrolment in comprehensive schools. A well-known concern with the IV-
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approach is the problem of weak instruments (Bound et al., 1995). Staiger and Stock (1997) proposed 
using a cut-off value of 10 for the F-value of the excluded instrument. In the previous section we noted 
that our instrument is based on aggregated information and that an individual measure of the supply of 
schools would be preferable. Nevertheless, the F-values of our excluded instrument are well above the 
cut-off level, suggesting that the issue of weak instruments is not really a concern for our analysis. 
Including some smooth polynomial of the supply-ratios or particular step-functions of the supply-ratios 
yields similar results for the first stage. The bottom panel of Table 2.4 shows the second stage results. The 
models in column (2) and (3), which include controls for socioeconomic background and ability, yield 
negative point estimates. In the full model the estimated effect is -0.13, which is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The results from these two IV-regressions are larger than the OLS-estimates. This 
difference in the size of the estimates might be related to the difference in the treated populations used for 
the estimation. The OLS estimates give the average treatment effect (ATE) for the whole population. The 
IV-estimates give the local average treatment effect (LATE). This is the effect of the treatment on the 
subpopulation of compliers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994): in our case the subpopulation that is more likely 
to choose the comprehensive class if the supply of comprehensive classes increases. The local average 
treatment effect (LATE) can differ substantially from the average treatment effect (ATE) if the fraction of 
the population that is affected is small (Oreopoulous, 2006). 
 
Next, we investigate whether the effects of early tracking are different for specific groups, such as girls 
and boys, high and low ability students and students with different socioeconomic backgrounds. Table 2.5 
presents both OLS and IV estimation results of the full model (including all covariates) for various 
subsamples of pupils. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the samples of girls and boys, 
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) show the results for pupils with relatively high and low ability. For this 
analysis we divided the sample in two based on the total test score (‘low ability’ is defined as having a 
score below the median total test score of 34). Finally, columns (5) and (6) show the estimation results for 
the pupils having parents with a relatively high and a relatively low education level. All pupils with 
parents having a highest education level above lower secondary education are in the top group; all other 
pupils are in the bottom group. 
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Table 2.5 The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education for subsamples   
 
 (1) 
 
Girls 
(2) 
 
Boys 
(3) 
 
High ability 
(4) 
 
Low ability 
(5) 
 
High education 
level parents 
 
(6) 
 
Low education 
level parents 
       
OLS       
Early tracking -0.049** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.036 
(0.024) 
-0.076*** 
(0.024) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
-0.067*** 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
IV       
Early tracking -0.115 
(0.094) 
 
-0.131 
(0.090) 
-0.159* 
(0.086) 
-0.098 
(0.097) 
-0.163* 
(0.095) 
-0.102 
(0.093) 
       
SES yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Test scores yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 2175 1761 2103 1833 2295 1641 
       
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
The estimation results in Table 2.5 show no clear difference between boys and girls. While the OLS point 
estimate is somewhat larger (in absolute value) for girls, the IV estimate is larger for boys. However, for 
the other subsamples we observe differences in the effect of early tracking. The effects of early tracking 
seem to be more negative for students with a higher ability and students with higher educated parents. The 
size of the estimates is larger for both the OLS and IV approach. Additional analyses, in which pupils are 
divided into two groups based on the professional level of the parents, show a similar pattern (not shown 
in Table 2.5). These findings suggest that the detrimental effects of early tracking are larger for pupils 
who are more likely to enrol in and complete higher education. 
 
Summarizing, this section shows that early tracking reduces the probability of graduation from higher 
education for pupils at the margin of the high and low tracks (the pupils with a mavo advice). Both the 
findings from the OLS- and IV-regressions suggest that early tracking has a negative effect on the 
completion of higher education. The detrimental effects are larger for students with a relatively high 
ability and a higher socioeconomic background. 
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2.7 Robustness analyses 
This section presents estimation results from several alternative model specifications and analyses 
designed to probe the robustness of our main results. We concentrate on potential bias of the OLS 
estimations due to unobserved heterogeneity (Section 2.7.1) and concerns regarding the validity of our 
instrument in the IV approach (Section 2.7.2). 
2.7.1 Robustness of OLS analysis 
We present robustness analyses in order to explore the magnitude of potential selection bias, which helps 
us to establish bounds on the true causal effect of early tracking. First we address selection concerns by 
focusing the analysis on a range of test scores. Excluding pupils with the highest and lowest ability from 
the analysis may result in a more homogeneous subsample, thereby reducing the risk of unobserved 
heterogeneity and selection bias in the estimations. Table 2.6 presents the OLS estimation results of the 
full model (including all covariates) in which the estimation sample is narrowed based on test scores. The 
first model presents the results for the pupils with a total test score between 29 and 39 (the second and 
third quartile of the total test score distribution), the second model for the pupils with test scores between 
32 and 37 (quantiles 37.5 and 62.5). Narrowing the subsamples with respect to test scores does not 
decrease the estimated effect (in absolute value) for early tracking. Narrowing to a subsample including 
only the middle 25 percent of the total test score distribution even increases the estimated coefficient (in 
absolute value) to -0.070.  
Table 2.6 The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education (narrowing subsamples) 
 (1) 
 
Test scores between 29 and 39 
(2) 
 
Test scores between 32 and 37 
OLS   
Early tracking − 0.046* 
(0.024) 
− 0.070** 
(0.033) 
   
SES yes yes 
Test score yes yes 
Observations 2027 1178 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * / ** denotes significance at a 10 / 5 % significance level. 
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The major concern regarding potential selection bias is that pupils with ‘better’ unobservable 
characteristics might self-select into the comprehensive classes, in which case the main OLS estimates 
would be biased upwards (in absolute value). As such, we are particularly interested in establishing a 
lower bound of the effect of early tracking. Our second analysis aims to provide a lower bound by 
focusing on a set of municipality types for which observable characteristics are ‘better’ for pupils in 
tracked classes. We use parental education level as the main criterion in the selection of the municipality 
types, as tracked and non-tracked pupils differ significantly on this observable variable (see Table 2.1).   
Our data show that this condition, better observable characteristics for tracked pupils, is met for pupils 
living in municipality types A4, C2, C3 and C5. Table 2.7 presents the covariates on parental education 
level and total test scores of the pupils. Early tracked pupils have significantly higher educated parents 
and higher test scores. Other combinations of 4 or more municipality types yield relatively better 
characteristics for non-tracked pupils. The OLS estimation results of the full model for this subsample are 
presented in Table 2.8  
 
Table 2.7 Sample statistics for sample with mavo-advice, early tracked versus later tracked; 
subsample of pupils living in regions A4, C2, C3, C5 
 
 Early tracked: 
mavo 
Non-tracked: 
mavo-havo (-vwo) 
p-Value  
Ability    
Total test score  33.83 32.92 0.071 
    
Parental education level    
Highest education level parents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    No primary education  2  3  
    Primary education 14 22  
    Secondary education low 30 25  
    Secondary education high       39 34  
    Higher education first phase 14 13 
    Higher education second phase  2  3  
    Higher education third phase  0  0  
    
Number of pupils 296 1228  
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Table 2.8 The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education (subset of regions) 
                                  (1)                                          (2) 
 
                                         (3) 
 
OLS    
Early tracking  − 0.027 
(0.028) 
 
  − 0.040 
(0.028) 
 
− 0.036 
 (0.029) 
 
Socio-economic status variables (SES) no yes yes 
Test scores no no yes 
    
Observations 1524 1524 1524 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
The estimates show that early tracking decreases the probability of completion of higher education with 
3.6 percentage points in the full model. In this analysis tracked pupils have a significantly higher parental 
education level and higher test scores. Assuming that these ‘better’ observable characteristics also imply 
‘better’ unobserved characteristics for tracked pupils, the OLS estimation results may be expected to be 
biased downwards (in absolute value). Hence, the estimation result may be interpreted as the lower bound 
on the true effect of early tracking.  
2.7.2 Validity of the instrument 
To address potential endogeneity bias in the OLS estimation, we use an instrumental variable analysis 
using the relative supply of tracked schools as instrument for early tracking. Identification depends 
crucially on the assumption that the supply-ratio only affects the outcome through early tracking. If the 
only impact of the supply-ratio on higher education completion is through early tracking, then the supply-
ratio should be statistically insignificant in a regression on higher education completion that also includes 
a dummy for tracking. As a first test on the validity of the instrument, we include the supply-ratio in the 
OLS model in column (3) of Table 2.4. This yields an insignificant effect of the supply-ratio.  
 
A concern with using the supply of schools as instrument is that it may be driven by the demand for 
specific school types. We address it by investigating the robustness of our estimation results to inclusion 
of variables that may reflect the demand for schools in various municipality types. 
The first variable we use is a measure of the change in supply-ratios between 1989 and 1993. Changes 
over time may reflect differences in demand for specific school types in 1989. We construct a measure of 
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the change in ratios by dividing the supply-ratio in 1993 by the supply-ratio in 1989 for each municipality 
type. A value larger than 1 implies an increase in the relative supply of categorial schools between 1989 
and 1993. A second indicator is the fraction of highly educated parents in a pupil’s municipality type. If 
higher educated parents place more value on educational attainment and rather send their children to a 
comprehensive class with better opportunities to end up in a higher track later on, the fraction of highly 
educated parents may reflect the demand for comprehensive schools. For robustness, we use two different 
definitions for highly educated parents: the fraction of pupils with parental education levels 4, 5 and 6 and 
the fraction of pupils with parental education levels 5 and 6.   
 
Table 2.9 shows the estimation results of both the OLS and IV models including these variables. The first 
model is the full model in column 3 of Table 2.4, including a variable indicating the change in the supply 
ratio between 1989 and 1993. The second and third models include the two variables for the fraction of 
highly educated parents in the full model. 
Table 2.9 The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education (OLS and IV estimates) 
                                  (1)                                          (2) 
 
                                         (3) 
 
OLS    
Early tracking - 0.046** 
(0.018) 
 
 − 0.045** 
(0.018) 
 
  − 0.046** 
(0.018) 
 
IV    
First stage    
Relative supply-ratio 0.788** 
(0.317) 
 
 0.812*** 
(0.251) 
 
  0.782*** 
(0.273) 
 
F-value excluded instrument 6.2 10.5 8.2 
    
Second stage    
Early tracking -0.191* 
(0.106) 
-0.153* 
(0.091) 
 
                                   -0.213* 
(0.120) 
 
Change in supply-ratio over time yes no no 
Fraction of highly educated 1  no yes no 
Fraction of highly educated 2 no no yes 
Socio-economic status variables (SES) yes yes yes 
Test scores yes yes yes 
    
Observations 3936 3936 3936 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
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The OLS estimates are hardly affected by the inclusion of these variables. The IV results are comparable 
to those in the main estimations. Estimated coefficients are even larger now (in absolute value), with point 
estimates between -0.15 and -0.21. Models in which we include combinations of the three variables do 
not affect the results. We conclude that we do not find evidence that the demand for education might bias 
our findings. 
 
An additional concern regarding the exclusion restriction lies in potential education quality differences 
across schools or regions. Differences in the supply of school types might be related to the quality of 
education, and hence to the outcome. We address the issue of potential confounding regional differences 
in general by including an urbanization indicator in our main regressions. This indicator is statistically 
insignificant in all of our models. Specifically with respect to school quality, structural variation 
originating from differences in resources does not seem plausible since the Dutch system provides equal 
funding to schools. Nevertheless, schools may not be of equal quality because of differences in for 
example teacher effort or peer quality. In order to empirically address this issue we use average total test 
score at the school level as an observable measure of school quality and investigate its correlation with 
our instrument. In a regression of school average total test score on the supply-ratio and all other 
covariates, we find a statistically insignificant positive effect of the supply-ratio. This suggests that, 
conditional on all covariates, our instrument is not significantly related to school quality. Moreover, the 
positive correlation between a larger relative supply of tracked schools and school quality implies that, if 
anything, unobserved quality differences would bias our estimates downwards (in absolute value). Hence, 
we do not find evidence that our finding of a negative effect of early tracking is biased by unobserved 
school quality.  
 
2.8 Effects of early tracking for higher ability pupils 
The previous results suggest that pupils with a mavo advice can gain substantially from being in a 
comprehensive class. It is important to note that this is the result of a partial analysis, which focuses on a 
single advice group and compares only assignment in a low track to assignment in a comprehensive class. 
These results are not sufficient to judge the efficiency of an early tracking regime as a whole. After all, 
higher ability pupils may be negatively affected by the lower ability ones in a comprehensive class. This 
section investigates the effects of tracking for the pupils with a havo advice, the level just above a mavo 
advice. Focusing on the effects of tracking for pupils with different abilities contributes to obtaining a 
more general view on the efficiency effects of early tracking. 
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We concentrate on the pupils who leave primary education with a havo advice. We use this group to 
analyse the effect of being in a high track compared to being in a comprehensive class. The non-tracked 
pupils are again defined as those who enter secondary education in a mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. 
The tracked pupils are defined as those who enter secondary education in a havo or havo-vwo class.5
 
 This 
is the mirror image of the previous analysis on the group of mavo-advice pupils, which compared 
assignment in a low track to assignment in a comprehensive class. We estimate similar models as in Table 
2.4. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate IV-regressions because there are no severe restrictions in the 
supply of high track classes. The possible bias due to self-selection into the high track classes will be 
discussed below. 
Table 2.10 presents the OLS estimates of early tracking on completion of higher education. The 
estimation sample consists of 1162 pupils that entered secondary education in a havo-vwo class and 608 
pupils that entered in a mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class.  
 
Table 2.10 The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education (havo advice group) 
                                  (1)                                          (2) 
 
                                         (3) 
 
OLS    
Early tracking  0.040 
(0.029) 
 
  0.004 
(0.027) 
 
− 0.008 
 (0.026) 
 
Socio-economic status variables (SES) no yes yes 
Test scores no no yes 
    
Observations 1770 1770 1770 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
The results indicate that there is no significant effect of early tracking on completion of higher education. 
This suggests that pupils with a havo advice do not experience negative effects of being in a 
comprehensive class together with lower ability pupils. As mentioned before, we cannot use an IV 
approach to address the potential endogeneity issue. However, it is plausible to assume that potential self-
selection would positively affect educational outcomes for the high track, since pupils with better 
unobservable characteristics are likely to self-select into the high track and to complete higher education 
                                                 
5 We include havo-vwo in the high track because there are hardly any schools which offer categorial havo classes in 
the Netherlands. Actually, there turns out to be no school that offers such a categorial havo class in our estimation 
sample. 
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more often. Hence, we expect that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the upper bounds of the 
effects of early tracking. As such, endogeneity does not seem to be a problem because all of our 
estimates, that might be upward biased, are statistically insignificant.  
 
Summarizing, these analyses suggest that pupils with a havo-advice experience no significant difference 
whether they start secondary education in a high track or in a comprehensive class. Hence, pupils that are 
advised to follow the high track do not gain from enrolment in a high track compared to enrolment in a 
comprehensive class. Together with the previous result that pupils advised to enrol in the low track do 
gain from being in a comprehensive class, this suggests that higher education completion can be improved 
by tracking all pupils later. 
 
2.9 Conclusions and discussion 
This chapter investigates the effect of early tracking on the completion of higher education. In our 
analysis, we use data from the Secondary Education Pupil Cohorts of 1989, and exploit differences in the 
timing of tracking between schools in the Netherlands. To deal with potential endogeneity problems we 
restrict our estimation sample to a particular school advice group which is homogeneous with respect to 
ability, use a large set of covariates and adopt an instrumental variables approach. Our main analysis 
focuses on pupils with a mavo advice. If early tracking would have a detrimental effect on participation in 
higher education, the mavo advice pupils who are tracked early are likely to be the group which is most 
negatively affected because the pupils in the mavo track have no direct access to higher education. 
 
We find negative effects of early tracking on completion of higher education. The OLS estimates are 
supported by the IV estimates. The OLS estimates show that early tracking decreases the probability of 
completion of higher education by approximately 5 percentage points for pupils with a mavo advice. In 
the 1989 cohort, average completion of higher education for the tracked pupils is around 21%. Hence, 
pupils with a mavo advice that are in a categorial mavo can increase their probability of completing 
higher education by around 25% by entering a comprehensive class. The IV analyses yield even larger 
effects in absolute value. Hence, pupils with a mavo advice perform better in a comprehensive class than 
in a low track.  
 
This finding for mavo-advice pupils is not sufficient to judge the efficiency of an early tracking regime as 
a whole. After all, higher ability pupils may be negatively affected by the lower ability ones in a 
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comprehensive class. To obtain a more complete view on the impact of early tracking, we have also 
analysed effects of early tracking for pupils with a havo advice. Based on OLS estimations we conclude 
that pupils with a havo advice experience no significant difference whether they are in a high track or in a 
comprehensive class. Hence, while pupils with a mavo-advice gain from being in a comprehensive class 
(compared to being in a low track), pupils with a havo-advice experience no significant difference 
whether they are in a high track or in a comprehensive class. These results suggest an inefficiency of the 
early tracking regime with respect to completion of higher education. 
Our analysis is not informative on the underlying mechanisms that translate early tracking to outcomes. 
Potential mechanisms might be, for example, peer effects in the classroom or teacher quality effects. Low 
ability pupils may benefit from the interaction with their high-achieving peers in comprehensive classes. 
If peer effects are nonlinear, this gives rise to efficiency gains. In the empirical literature, however, there 
is no consensus yet on the size and functional form of peer group effects and the role of peers in the 
discussion on early tracking remains disputed.6 If better teachers prefer to teach relatively high ability 
classes, teacher sorting may result in a higher quality of education in these classes. 7
    In addition, our empirical results may reflect differences between tracking ages in the ability of 
educators to allocate students to appropriate school types. The role of these mechanisms remains a 
valuable topic for further research which may contribute to a more profound understanding of the effects 
of early tracking. 
  
 
Our study supports the OECD conclusion regarding the Dutch education system that the early tracking 
regime has a negative effect on participation in higher education. Pupils with a mavo advice are more 
likely to complete higher education when they start secondary education in a comprehensive class. As 
such, we expect that the recent decrease in the number of early tracked pupils in the Netherlands will 
increase future graduation from higher education. Completion of higher education can be further 
increased by stimulating participation of pupils with a mavo or havo advice in combined first-grade 
classes that postpone the point in the educational career at which these children enter different tracks. 
 
 
                                                 
6  Sund (2009) finds empirical evidence for the existence of nonlinear peer effects. Other recent work on peer 
effects includes Ammermüller and Pischke (2009) and Eisenkopf (2010). 
7 Betts and Shkolnik (2000) find some evidence that schools would be more likely to allocate highly educated 
teachers to higher ability classes. Rivkin et al. (2005) and, more recently, Hanushek (2011) point out the central 
importance of teacher quality for student achievement.  
40
41
41 
 
3 
 
 
Can financial incentives for regional education authorities 
reduce school dropout?1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter investigates the effect of a new type of financial incentive in education targeted at regional 
authorities. Previous studies have focused on financial incentives for students, teachers or schools. We 
identify the effect by exploiting the gradual introduction of a new policy aimed at reducing school 
dropout in the Netherlands. The introduction of the policy in 14 out of 39 regions and the use of a specific 
selection rule for the participating regions allow us to estimate local difference-in-differences models. 
Using administrative data for all Dutch students in the year before and the year after the introduction of 
the new policy we find no effect of the financial incentive scheme on school dropout. In addition, we find 
suggestive evidence for manipulation of outcomes in response to the program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This chapter is based on joint work with Marc van der Steeg and Dinand Webbink: Van Elk, R., M. van der Steeg, 
D. Webbink, 2013, Can Financial Incentives for Regional Education Authorities Reduce School Dropout?, De 
Economist, 161 (4), 367-398. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The use and effectiveness of financial incentives in the education system is a controversial issue in many 
countries. Incentive-based policies may provide a cost-effective way to improve educational achievement 
compared to traditional resource policies. As ‘throwing money at schools’ appears to be no guarantee for 
improvements in educational quality (Hanushek, 2006; Woessmann, 2003), policymakers and researchers 
around the world have become increasingly interested in the use of incentives. 
      In the U.S., the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 implied a movement towards school accountability 
in order to improve student performance. The U.S. Ministry of Education recently made available 285 
million dollars in the Teacher Incentive Fund grant applications for school districts to support local 
projects with performance-based pay for teachers. Various countries have introduced policy programs that 
contain incentive structures for students. An example from the U.S. is the Quantum Opportunities 
Program (Maxfield et al., 2003), which contains financial incentives based on student’s effort and 
performance. Other projects include the Education Maintenance Allowance in the UK (Dearden et al., 
2009) which offers compensation to low-income families for school attendance and cash payments for 
particular educational achievements, and the PACES program in Colombia (Angrist et al., 2002) that 
provided private school vouchers to students which were only extended if pupils performed well.  
 
At the same time, teachers and their unions often strongly oppose the introduction of financial incentive 
schemes. Skeptics argue that incentives can have unintended and detrimental consequences in the long 
run as they might weaken intrinsic motivation (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) or encourage 
educators to focus on the specific rewarded measure at the expense of other relevant tasks or learning 
objectives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). In addition, individual teacher incentive programs may 
negatively affect mutual collaboration (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), while incentive schemes for group 
performance may lead to free rider behaviour (Lazear, 1999).  
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of incentives in education is ambiguous. Various studies have 
found that financial incentives for students, teachers or schools noteworthy improved the educational 
performance of students (e.g. Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Lavy, 2002, 2009; Hanushek 
and Raymond, 2005; Dee and Jacob, 2011). Other studies, also based on credible research designs, did 
not find an effect of financial incentives on student achievement (e.g. Fryer, 2011; Springer et al., 2010). 
Moreover, there is evidence that financial incentives induce strategic behaviour of schools by keeping 
low-performing students from test attendance (Ladd and Walsh, 2002; Jacob, 2005; Figlio and Getzler, 
2006) or by teaching-to-the-test (Jacob, 2005; Glewwe et al., 2003). These findings suggest that financial 
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incentives can improve student performance and therefore should be considered as a promising tool for 
educational policy. In addition, they point out the importance of properly constructed and implemented 
programs to avoid unintended consequences.  
 
A potentially important feature of incentive programs is the aggregation level at which incentives are 
targeted. Previous studies have focused on financial incentives for students, teachers or schools. To our 
knowledge a more centralized incentive scheme in education targeted towards a regional level has not 
been investigated yet.  
      This study aims to contribute to existing literature by investigating the effects of a new type of 
financial incentive targeted at regional education authorities in the Netherlands. These authorities 
received additional resources if they reduced school dropout compared to a baseline level. The advantage 
of this type of incentive is that it is allows for an improved coordination and less fragmentation of 
activities. Whereas students, teachers or schools may have their own – potentially conflicting or short 
run– objectives, local education authorities have a bird’s eye view on the education system within their 
district. This enables them to coordinate activities of educators or exploit economies of scale, which may 
result in a more efficient use of resources, an increased collaboration between schools or combined efforts 
of schools and other relevant public agencies. An inherent drawback of this type of incentive scheme 
seems to be that it is only indirectly related to teacher and student behaviour within schools.  
 
For identification of the effect we exploit the gradual introduction of the new policy in 2006 in 14 out of 
39 regions based on the number of school dropouts in a baseline year. This introduction strategy and the 
use of a specific selection rule for the eligibility of regions allow us to estimate local difference-in-
differences models. We are able to use administrative data for all Dutch students in the year before and 
the year after the introduction of the new policy.  
Our main finding is that the financial incentive scheme did not have an effect on school dropout. The 
estimated effects on school dropout are statistically insignificant. These results are robust for a variety of 
specifications and sensitivity checks. In addition, we find suggestive evidence for strategic behaviour of 
the treatment regions in response to the incentive program. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the financial incentive 
scheme, including details on school dropout in the Dutch education context and the program 
characteristics. Section 3.3 presents the econometric framework. Section 3.4 describes the data and 
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Section 3.5 presents the main estimation results. Sensitivity checks are presented in Section 3.6. Section 
3.7 concludes.   
 
3.2 The financial incentive scheme 
3.2.1 School dropout in the Netherlands 
In Dutch education a student is classified as a school dropout in a particular school year (t - (t+1)) when 
he/she is (i) aged 12 to 22, (ii) registered in education at October first of year t (the start of the school 
year), (iii) not registered in education at October first of year t+1, (iv) without having completed a certain 
level of education, called the ‘start-qualification’. This start-qualification is considered to be the minimum 
level of education needed to participate well in the labour market and corresponds to a degree in higher 
secondary education or intermediate vocational education.2
      After leaving primary education at the age of 12, pupils can enter three levels of secondary education: 
pre-vocational secondary education (‘vmbo’), higher general secondary education (‘havo’) and pre-
university education (‘vwo’).
  
3 In secondary education grade repetition is permitted and pupils are 
expected to participate at least until age 16 because of compulsory education.4 Pupils older than 16 are 
free to leave education.5 After secondary education students can enrol in intermediate vocational 
education (‘mbo’) or higher education, depending on completed school type.6
 
 Pupils who have completed 
havo or vwo are qualified for access to higher education, while pupils with a vmbo degree can enrol in 
mbo. Mbo is oriented towards vocational training and is offered at 4 levels which prepare students for 
specific professions in the labour market. A start-qualification is defined as being graduated for havo, vwo 
or at least the second level of intermediate vocational education.  
This definition based on enrolment data thus concerns the ‘new dropouts’ in a particular school year and 
does not take into account the stock of previous dropouts that are still aged below 23, without a start-
qualification and not in education (‘old dropouts’). This is currently considered to be the most important 
                                                 
2 Unemployment among youths without a start-qualification is more than twice as high as unemployment among 
youths with a start-qualification (Statistics Netherlands, 2011). In the dropout definition it makes no difference 
whether a dropout actually has a job or not.  
3 The ‘vmbo’ track was introduced in 1999 as a combination of the previous ‘lbo’ and ‘mavo’ tracks. 
4 Despite this minimum school-leaving age, around 2 percent of the pupils aged 16 or younger turned out to leave 
education in the school year 2005-2006.  
5 After the intervention year 2006-2007, compulsory education in the Netherlands was extended to youth aged 
between 16 and 18 without a start-qualification. 
6 Intermediate vocational education is also called upper secondary vocational education. This thesis uses both 
terms as synonyms to indicate ‘mbo’.  
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Section 3.5 presents the main estimation results. Sensitivity checks are presented in Section 3.6. Section 
3.7 concludes.   
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measure of school dropout in the Netherlands.7
Concerns on the substantial number of pupils that left education without attaining a start-qualification 
have led to intensified policy efforts in recent years. Various new policy measures have been introduced 
and budgets for existing measures have been raised over the last couple of years. Examples of new 
measures included in the recently introduced national dropout reduction policy agenda are certification 
courses for 18-23 year olds in which competences gained through work experience are acknowledged, 
and investments in a better registration system of dropouts for policy evaluation and adjustment (Ministry 
of Education, 2008a). 
 The total stock of dropouts consists of both the ‘new 
dropouts’ and the ‘old dropouts’.  
 
3.2.2 Program details 
A key component of the recent Dutch dropout reduction policy is the introduction of a financial incentive 
program for regional education authorities in 2006. In 1994, the government specified 39 school districts 
and raised local education authorities, called ‘RMC-regions’, to monitor, register and fight early school-
leaving regionally.8
 
 Each district has its own regional education authority, which is part of a municipality 
within the district. The RMC regions have two main legal tasks. First, they have to monitor and register 
school dropout. Second, they have to support pupils at the risk of early school-leaving in order to prevent 
them from dropping out and help dropouts by guidance or counselling them back to school or work.  
The regional education authorities coordinate anti-dropout activities within their districts and are 
responsible for the creation of local networks in which schools, school attendance officers and various 
regional youth assistance bodies work together. The authorities are autonomous in their choice of specific 
policy measures to prevent early school-leaving. They can for example choose to intensify the care or 
individual guidance for potential dropouts, improve registration systems of school dropout or school 
absenteeism, or enhance regional cooperation between schools.   
 
The local education authorities receive funding from the central government to carry out their main tasks. 
In the school year 2006-2007, the direct central government funding amounted to 17.5 million Euros. On 
                                                 
7 This differs from the measure of school dropout in the targets of the European Union (EU), which is the share of 
students aged between 18 and 24 with only lower secondary education at best and not in education or training. 
Hence, the most important difference compared to the EU measure is the age criterium. The required education 
level is well comparable in both definitions. Furthermore, the EU measure is in terms of a total stock of school 
dropouts rather than the number of new dropouts in a particular year. 
8 In Dutch ‘RMC’ is an abbreviation of ‘regional report and coordination functions for early school-leaving’. 
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average, this corresponds to a little less than half a million Euros per RMC region. In addition to (direct) 
central government funding, RMC regions also use other municipal funds to carry out their tasks. These 
‘own’ municipal financial means amounted to 21.5 million Euros in 2006-2007 (Research voor Beleid, 
2008). Together, the average yearly amount of money available to RMC’s per new school dropout is a 
little less than 750 Euros. 
 
The Dutch Ministry of Education gradually introduced a financial incentive program for the local 
education authorities in the summer of 2006. In the first year, covenants that included a financial 
incentive to reduce school dropout were offered to 14 out of 39 school districts with the highest number 
of dropouts.9
Eligibility 
 For each reduced early school-leaver the RMC regions could earn 2,000 Euros. The total 
budget of the covenant program amounted to 16 million Euros. This is roughly twice the amount of the 
direct contribution from the central government to the covenant regions for the school year 2006-2007. 
On a per-dropout basis the offered 2,000 Euros is more than 2.5 times the amount of money from direct 
government funding and municipal means. Hence the program offers a substantial financial reward 
compared to regular funding. The financial reward is meant for an improvement of school dropout 
policies. Within this general purpose, the RMC districts are free to decide on the specific allocation of the 
additional resources.   
Eligibility for the program was based on the absolute number of dropouts in the year 2004-2005. More 
specifically, selection of the regions was based on presence in either the top 10 ranking of the number of 
‘new dropouts’ (pupils that drop out during the school year) or the top 10 ranking of the total number of 
dropouts (which include both new dropouts and the stock of previous dropouts that are still aged below 
23, without a start-qualification and not in education) in the reference year 2004-2005. This reference 
year was chosen because the figures for the pre-treatment year 2005-2006 were not available at the time 
the covenants were signed. This resulted in a list of 12 RMC regions. Two other regions, which wanted to 
join the covenant program and were just outside the top ten lists, were added later on own request. These 
are ‘Centraal en Westelijk Groningen’ and ‘Zuidoost-Brabant’. The other 25 regions have not been 
                                                 
9 Although in most districts there were schools that also signed the covenant, the financial incentive is exclusively 
meant for the regional education authority. Hence, only the authority receives a payment from the government in 
case a reduction in school dropout is realized. 
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selected and are not treated with a financial incentive program.10
 
 The complete rankings and selected 
RMC districts can be found in Appendix 3.A. 
Financial incentive 
The covenants provide financial incentives and are based on a ‘no-cure no-pay’-principle. For each 
reduced dropout in 2006-2007, relative to 2004-2005, the local education authority receives 2,000 
Euros.11
Formally, the financial reward scheme can be defined as follows: 
 It does not matter how the reduction is achieved. This payment scheme stops if a reduction of 
10% in the number of school dropouts is realized. In this way the Ministry has limited the maximum 
financial reward for a region.   
 
Pj = min{(2,000*max{(D2004j – D2006j), 0}) , D2004j*0.10*2,000 },  
with: 
Pj                = reward from the Ministry to RMC region j in euros, 
D2004j             = total number of dropouts in region j in 2004-2005, 
D2006j             = total number of dropouts in region j in 2006-2007. 
 
Types of measures 
RMC regions were free to choose which instruments to use to reduce the total number of dropouts. The 
Ministry presented a menu of promising options, but it did not impose any specific actions the regions 
should undertake. 
    The projects which RMC’s were planning to carry out are explicitly mentioned in the individual 
covenants. The majority of the measures agreed upon have a preventive rather than a curative character.12
                                                 
10 After the first year the government scaled up the program and offered new covenants to all 39 regions in late 
2007 and early 2008. These new covenants are four-year instead of one-year arrangements and differ with respect 
to the design from the 2006 covenants which we evaluate in this study. 
 
Examples of frequently undertaken preventive measures are projects to promote a good transition from 
vmbo to mbo, the use of so-called ‘care-advise-teams’ (teams of different actors offering care and 
guidance at school to students at risk of dropping out), and projects promoting the number and choice 
11 An inherent drawback of the choice to use 2004-2005 as the reference year is that fluctuations in the dropout 
figures in 2005-2006 relative to 2004-2005 already affected outcomes of the covenants. We come back to this 
issue in Section 3.6.  
12 The focus on preventive actions is in line with the economic literature which suggests that anti-dropout 
interventions targeted at students-at-risk who are still in education are much more effective than curative 
interventions targeted at students who already have dropped out (Heckman, 2000). 
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process of apprenticeships. Some regions have also devoted more attention to an active approach of 
pupils, e.g. by providing information on school choice, checking enrolment in the beginning of the new 
school year and visiting pupils that are not enrolled.13
 
 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
This section discusses the empirical strategy to identify the effectiveness of the covenant policy. Since 
assignment of regions to the program was not random, identification of the treatment effect is the central 
issue.  
3.3.1 Difference-in-differences 
In order to assess the impact of the covenant policy on school dropout, we start with a difference-in-
differences (DID) estimation approach on the full sample of all 39 regions. This approach exploits the 
availability of data for the full population in the pre-treatment (2005-2006) as well as the post-treatment 
year (2006-07) and basically compares changes in dropout rates over time between covenant and non-
covenant regions.  
We implement this strategy by estimating the following linear probability model14
 
: 
Yijt = β0 + β1 Cij + β2 Tt + β3 Cij*T  + β4 X ijt + αj +  εijt  ,                                                                         (3.1) 
 
with Yijt being a dummy variable indicating whether pupil i in region j in year t is a dropout; Cij being a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 if RMC region j belongs to the 14 covenant regions, and 0 if it 
belongs to one of the remaining 25 regions. T is a time dummy variable taking value 1 in 2006-2007 
(post-treatment year) and value 0 in 2005-2006 (pre-treatment year). Xijt is a vector of background 
characteristics of pupil i in region j in year t, αj is a region fixed effect and εijt  is the error term 
representing all unobservables of pupil i in region j in year t.  
 
For each region j and year t, we include all relevant pupils aged 12 to 22 that are registered in education 
and do not have a start-qualification at the beginning of the year. The coefficient β3 then gives the 
treatment effect of interest. 
                                                 
13 We refer to Ministry of Education (2008b) for a complete list of measures in the different covenant regions.  
14 We find similar results when using a probit model. 
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The difference-in-differences framework allows us to overcome many of the threats to identification. We 
control for all time-invariant (unobserved) heterogeneity across RMC districts and are able to control for 
observable changes in student composition by including student individual background characteristics. 
The identifying assumption underlying the difference-in-differences estimation approach is that treatment 
and non-treatment regions have a common trend, which implies that the paths of outcomes for both 
groups would not be systematically different in the absence of the program.  
 
The common-trend assumption, which rules out group specific trends and composition effects, is not 
testable. A well-known informal technique to provide insight to its validity is to test for equality of pre-
treatment trends between experimental and control groups. However, since the BRON data we use for our 
analysis are only available from the year 2005-2006 onwards (see Section 3.4), we are not able to 
investigate this further.  
 
Composition effects, which might threaten the common trend assumption, do not seem plausible in our 
application. It does not seem realistic that the policy introduction affected the composition of students in 
the treatment and control districts. Moving to another region or choosing a school outside the region 
because of the introduction of the program seems unlikely, especially since treatment regions may not be 
the preferred regions for self-selection as they typically face high levels of school dropout. This 
conjecture is supported by an investigation of the development of the absolute number of registered pupils 
over time for all treatment and control regions. The cohort of relevant students in the post-intervention 
year is 1% larger than the pre-intervention year, and both the treatment and non-treatment regions faced 
an equal increase of 1%. Furthermore we do not find any significant differences in the development of 
observable student composition characteristics over time between treatment and control regions.   
 
3.3.2 Local difference-in-differences 
Although the use of a difference-in-differences framework allows to control for fixed unobservables, 
there might still be concerns regarding potential unobservable differences between treatment and control 
regions that violate the common trend assumption, in which case estimation results would be biased and 
inconsistent. 
 
To further contribute to the credibility of the identifying assumption we exploit the assignment rule for 
the treatment. Selection into the program depended in a deterministic way on the number of total dropouts 
and the number of new dropouts in the school year 2004-2005. All districts that were ranked in the top 10 
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of either the number of total dropouts or the number of new dropouts in the school year 2004-2005 
received treatment, while all other districts did not receive treatment. Hence, eligibility for the program 
can be described as a discontinuous function of these observed underlying variables. This allows us to 
identify regions that were close to being selected and regions that were close to not being selected. This 
type of information is usually exploited in a regression-discontinuity framework.15 In our approach we 
exploit the information about the eligibility for the program to improve our estimates in a local difference-
in-differences framework. Districts around the threshold values are expected to be more similar in 
outcomes and characteristics. We construct samples of regions around the cut-off value for eligibility in 
the program and estimate difference-in-differences models for these samples. We expect that the common 
trend assumption is more likely to hold in these local difference-in-differences models. 16
 
  
Construction of the discontinuity samples is done by exploiting the selection rule for treatment. After 
ranking all regions according to the number of total dropouts and new dropouts in the reference year, we 
can determine the ‘just-selected’ (treatment) regions by looking at the covenant regions that would not 
have been selected if e.g. the top 5 (instead of the top-10) of both lists would have been selected for 
treatment. Similarly, we can determine the ‘just-not-selected’ (non-treatment) regions, by looking which 
non-covenant regions would have been selected if e.g. the top 20 of both lists would have been selected 
for treatment. Adding these regions just below and just above the threshold together yields the 
discontinuity sample.  
 
The procedure can be formalized as follows. Let x(k, l) denote the region x that is in  k-th position in the 
first ranking and in l-th position in the second ranking ( k=1,...,39 and l=1,...,39). The set of treatment 
regions, denoted by T, is then given by: 
 
T = { x(k,l) : k ≤ 10 or l ≤ 10 }.  
 
Let DS (T) denote the set of treatment regions that is ‘just selected’ and let DS (NT) denote the set of 
non-treatment regions that is ‘just not’ selected. Then: 
 
DS (T) = { x∈  T: k > 5 and l > 5 } and 
DS (NT) = { x ∉  T: k < 20 or l < 20 }. 
                                                 
15 For a recent review of the use of regression discontinuity designs in empirical economics see Van der Klauw 
(2008). Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Jacob and Lefgren (2004) are examples in the field of education.  
16 A similar approach is used in Leuven et al. (2007), who evaluate the effect of extra funding for disadvantaged 
pupils on achievement. 
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The set of regions in our discontinuity sample, consisting of both treatment and non-treatment regions, is 
then defined by: 
 
DS = DS (T) ∪DS (NT). 
 
The above formalization of the construction of the discontinuity sample refers to hypothetical top-5 and 
top-20 selection criteria for treatment. The choice of bandwidth around the cut-off is arbitrary and related 
to a trade-off: increasing the sample increases the number of observations which gives more power to our 
estimations, while it increases the risk of violation of the identifying assumption. We also construct a 
second, smaller discontinuity sample of just-selected treatment and just-not selected non-treatment 
regions making use of hypothetical top-7 and top-17 criteria. 
 
In addition to these discontinuity samples we construct two subsamples based on the (ranking of) average 
dropout probabilities in the pre-treatment year 2005-2006. This is done by including only those regions 
remaining after having removed the 10 (or 13) regions with the highest and the 10 (or 13) regions with the 
lowest pre-treatment dropout probabilities. We present estimations on these ‘matched samples’ as an 
alternative for the ‘discontinuity samples’ to improve on the treatment-control balance.   
 
Standard applications of regression discontinuity designs typically include polynomials of the variables 
determining eligibility to control for continuous effects of the underlying variables. In our difference-in-
differences framework we will both use specifications including fixed region effects and specifications 
that include polynomials of the total number of dropouts in the school year 2004-2005. 
 
Two school districts, which were initially not eligible for the program, received treatment later in the year 
on own request. This makes the regression discontinuity design ‘fuzzy’ and may compromise estimation 
results. To address self-selection of these noncompliant regions we also present 2SLS estimates in which 
actual treatment status is instrumented by eligibility. 
 
3.3.3 Standard errors and inference 
Since our treatment variable does not vary within school districts, we have to be careful with inference. 
As Moulton (1986) shows, neglecting the presence of common group errors may substantially bias 
standard errors downwards. In all our estimation results we will therefore present (heteroskedasticity 
robust) standard errors corrected for clustering at the school district level. Still, this might not be a 
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complete response, given the limited number of school districts in our sample. Donald and Lang (2007), 
who investigate the inference properties of difference-in-differences estimators, point out that t-statistics 
are asymptotically normally distributed only if the number of clusters goes to infinity.17 Neglecting that 
standard asymptotics cannot be applied when the number of clusters is small, may largely overstate 
significance of the statistics.18
 
 Although we appear to have a reasonably large number of 39 clusters, we 
will view standard errors with caution. We address this issue in the interpretation of our estimation 
results, especially in case of the local difference-in-differences estimations in which only a subset of 
regions is taken into account.  
3.4 Data  
Until recently, the main sources for monitoring student drop-out in Dutch education were the data 
provided by the RMC regions. However, those data turned out to suffer from serious shortcomings with 
respect to consistency and uniformity (Deloitte, 2006; Sardes, 2006). As a response to the concerns 
regarding the reliability of the RMC-data the government invested in a better registration system of 
dropouts. This has resulted in new administrative data based on individual education numbers that have 
become available from the school year 2005-2006 onwards. These so-called ‘BRON data’ are currently 
used by the Ministry of Education to monitor school dropout and analyse policy interventions. In addition 
to these BRON data, RMC figures are still produced by the RMC districts. 
 
Since these improved data on school dropout have not yet become available at the time of the introduction 
of the covenant policies in the summer of 2006, the Ministry still had to rely on the RMC data for 
determining the selection of regions based on the number of dropouts in 2004-2005. The use of these 
figures for the selection of eligible regions also implied that RMC data from 2006-2007 have been used 
by the Ministry for measuring performance in terms of reduced school dropout between the reference year 
2004-2005 and 2006-2007.  
 
Because of the problems with the RMC data, we only make use of the BRON data to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the incentive program. These administrative data are based on yearly enrolment figures of 
                                                 
17 Other recent work on inference properties in difference-in-differences is Bertrand et al. (2004) who study 
implications of serial correlation. 
18 Donald and Lang (2007) suggest estimation using group means in case of a small number of clusters and propose 
to use t-distributions for inference rather than the standard normal distribution.   
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figures for the selection of eligible regions also implied that RMC data from 2006-2007 have been used 
by the Ministry for measuring performance in terms of reduced school dropout between the reference year 
2004-2005 and 2006-2007.  
 
Because of the problems with the RMC data, we only make use of the BRON data to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the incentive program. These administrative data are based on yearly enrolment figures of 
                                                 
17 Other recent work on inference properties in difference-in-differences is Bertrand et al. (2004) who study 
implications of serial correlation. 
18 Donald and Lang (2007) suggest estimation using group means in case of a small number of clusters and propose 
to use t-distributions for inference rather than the standard normal distribution.   
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schools which are checked by accountants.19
 
 The accountants’ checks minimize the risk of administrative 
errors which contributes to the accuracy of the data we use.   
The dataset covers the whole student population and contains information on the year-to-year progress of 
each individual student throughout education. Dropout is measured consistently and uniformly in BRON, 
based on administrative enrolment figures at the first of October in each year. For instance, if a student 
was present in education at October first of 2006, but not one year later, while not having attained a start 
qualification in the meantime, this student is marked as a school dropout for the school year 2006-2007. 
Since registration occurs at one moment in a year, we cannot distinguish between pupils who are dropped 
out during the school year (t - (t+1)) and returned in education before the first of October of year t+1, and 
pupils who did not drop out at all during the school year (t - (t+1)). Stated differently, the results of 
preventive actions by the local education authorities that keep pupils from dropping out cannot be 
distinguished from the results of curative actions that bring dropouts during the school year back in 
education. Hence, using BRON data on dropout as outcome variable in our analyses measures the effect 
of the incentives on both prevention of new dropouts and curative actions focused on those students that 
dropped out in the school year under consideration. As such, the evaluation using BRON sheds light on 
the total performance of the local education authorities in reducing school dropout.  
 
In addition to yearly administrative information on school enrolment, the BRON data contain a rich set of 
individual background characteristics for the whole relevant student population. First, it contains 
information on personal characteristics like age, gender and ethnicity (7 categories). We use information 
on age to construct a dummy variable that indicates whether a student is subject to compulsory schooling 
(which was the case if students were aged 16 or younger in 2006-2007). Second, it provides information 
on education level and grade. In addition it contains neighbourhood characteristics such as the size of the 
municipality (in three categories: four largest cities, medium-sized and small-sized), and a dummy 
variable indicating whether a student is inhabitant of a so-called poverty accumulation area. Poverty 
accumulation areas are postal code areas which are characterized by an accumulation of social problems. 
Underlying indicators are the percentage of low incomes, the share of welfare recipients and the share of 
non-western foreigners. We have completed our data set by merging these data with figures from the 
Ministry of Education on the central government contributions (per student) to the RMC regions in pre- 
and post-treatment year.   
 
                                                 
19 This is because the central government yearly contributions to schools depend on the number of enrolled 
students to a large extent.  
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We use individual data on dropout for both the pre-treatment year 2005-2006 and the post-treatment year 
2006-2007. The relevant education levels for dropout registration are secondary education and 
intermediate vocational education.20
 
 Therefore, our total estimation sample consists of students aged 12 to 
22 that were enrolled in secondary education or in intermediate vocational education at the start of the 
school years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007. This concerns 1,286,173 students in 2005-2006 (of which 
523,762 are in a non-covenant region and 762,411 are in a covenant region) and 1,301,423 students in 
2006-2007 (of which 530,015 are in a non-covenant region and 771,408 are in a covenant region). The 
total sample contains 2,587,596 students.  
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for all 14 covenant and all 25 non-covenant regions in the pre-
treatment year 2005-2006. Both the outcome variable (dropout probability) and the covariates used in our 
analyses are presented. In the evaluation these variables can be used to control for compositional changes 
in the student population. The first column reports the sample means for the group of students in the non-
covenant regions and the second column reports them for the group of students in the covenant regions. 
The third column reports the p-value of the difference, calculated using a two-tailed t-test or a chi-squared 
test. As expected, a comparison of the covariates of the two groups of students reveals some differences. 
The selection criterion based on total number of dropouts implies that regions which contain the largest 
cities have been selected for the treatment while smaller cities were not selected.  
 
Differences between treatment and control regions are therefore likely to reflect differences in 
characteristics between inhabitants of more and less urbanized municipalities. Larger cities in the 
Netherlands for example typically face a higher proportion of disadvantaged students. Table 3.1 confirms 
this. The average dropout probability in treatment regions was significantly larger (4.6 versus 3.9 
percent). In addition, differences in ethnicity, urbanization degree and poverty accumulation area are 
observed. Both groups seem reasonably comparable with respect to age, gender and education level. 
 
In order to obtain more comparable treatment and control groups we construct four smaller estimation 
samples (see Section 3.3). The first two are discontinuity samples which exploit the selection rule of the 
covenants, whereas the latter two are matched samples that consist of covenant and non-covenant regions 
within smaller intervals of pre-treatment year dropout probabilities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Within these levels we distinguish between 10 categories. 
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20 Within these levels we distinguish between 10 categories. 
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Table 3.1 Sample means for covenant and non-covenant regions, school year 2005-2006 (pre-
treatment year) 
 
 Non-covenant regions Covenant regions p-Value  
    
Dropout probability 3.88 4.64 0.000 
    
Personal characteristics    
Gender  0.51  0.51 0.030 
Age 15.31 15.33 0.000 
Age: compulsory education   0.70  0.70 0.305 
Ethnicity   0.000 
    Dutch 0.86 0.73  
    Surinam 0.01 0.04  
    Aruba/The Antilles 0.01 0.01  
    Turkey 0.02 0.04  
    Morocco 0.02 0.04  
    Other foreign (non-western)  0.04 0.05  
    Other foreign (western) 0.05 0.07  
    
Education level    
Level   0.000 
    first grade secondary education 0.30 0.31  
    vmbo (level 1) 0.05 0.05  
    vmbo (level 2) 0.05 0.05  
    vmbo (level 3/4) 0.08 0.08  
    havo  0.11 0.10  
    vwo 0.11 0.12  
    mbo-1 0.01 0.01  
    mbo-2 0.07 0.08  
    mbo-3 0.07 0.07  
    mbo-4 0.14 0.13  
    
Exam class 0.14 0.14 0.089 
    
Environment of the pupil     
Degree of urbanization   0.000 
    Inhabitant of G4 (4 largest cities) 0.00 0.18  
    Medium-sized municipality 0.21 0.26  
    Small municipality 0.79 0.57  
    
Inhabitant poverty accumulation area  0.05 0.20 0.000 
RMC budget per student (€) 14.91 9.36 0.000 
    
Total number of pupils 523,762 762,411  
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Tables of descriptive statistics for each of the four subsamples can be found in Appendix 3.B. Although 
still statistically significant in most cases, differences in socio-economic characteristics (e.g. ethnic 
distribution, share of inhabitants of poverty accumulation area) between the covenant and non-covenant 
regions become much smaller. Clearly experimental and control groups are more comparable on 
observable covariates in the four subsamples. In addition, the pre-treatment dropout probabilities are 
closer to each other in the subsamples.21
 
  
In the discontinuity samples, we observe that pre-treatment dropout probabilities are smaller in the 
covenant regions. This indicates that some large regions have been selected for treatment, while smaller 
regions with larger dropout probabilities have not.22
 
  
A regression of dropout probability in the pre-treatment year 2005-2006 (based on BRON) on a constant 
and the absolute number of dropouts in the year 2004-2005 (based on RMC) at the region level yields an 
insignificant coefficient for the absolute number of dropouts (with a t-value of 0.65) in the first 
discontinuity sample. The correlation between the two variables is 0.17. A similar regression for the 
second discontinuity sample yields a t-value of -0.51 and a correlation of -0.18. This implies that within 
the discontinuity samples there seems to be no systematic association between the selection rule based on 
absolute number of dropouts according to the RMC-data and the pre-treatment dropout percentage in the 
regions. This supports the notion that within these subsamples regions are more or less ‘randomly’ 
assigned to the incentive program. We conclude that the discontinuity samples improve the treatment-
control balance.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the development of the average dropout probabilities between the pre- and post-covenant 
school year. Average dropout probabilities in the pre-treatment year equal 4.6 percent in the covenant 
regions and 3.9 percent in the non-covenant regions. Note that these probabilities concern the total sample 
including all pupils aged 12 to 22.23
                                                 
21 In the matched samples comparability of dropout probabilities is a consequence of the construction method. 
 We observe a decline in the average dropout probability of 0.16 
percentage point in the 14 covenant regions. The 25 non-covenant regions witnessed a decline in the 
dropout probability as well, though somewhat smaller, of 0.13 percentage point. The average fall in the 
dropout probability is therefore 0.03 percentage points larger in the covenant regions. In the next section 
we further investigate the effects of the covenants in a difference-in-differences approach.  
22 Hence, the eligibility rule selects larger regions into treatment rather than the 12 worst-performing regions. We 
address potential implications of this eligibility rule on the outcomes in Section 3.6.   
23 Among the pupils aged above 16, for example, average dropout percentages are 9.9 and 8.4 percent in the 
covenant and non-covenant regions, respectively.  
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Table 3.2 Development of school dropout percentages between pre-treatment (2005-2006) and post-
treatment year (2006-2007), covenant versus non-covenant regions, complete sample 
 2005-2006 2006-2007 ∆ 2006/07 - 2005/06 
 (%-point)                             
                              
 
    
Covenant regions (14) 4.64 4.48 − 0.16 
Non-covenant regions (25) 3.88 3.75 − 0.13 
    
Difference   -0.03 
    
Notes. Source: BRON data.  
 
 
 
3.5 Estimation results 
3.5.1 Main findings 
This section presents and discusses our main estimation results. Table 3.3 shows the difference-in-
differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability of school dropout using six different 
specifications. The first specification does not include control variables; the second specification only 
includes the school district fixed effects. In the third model personal characteristics, such as age, age 
squared, a dummy variable indicating whether a student is subject to compulsory schooling, gender, and 
ethnicity are included. The fourth model additionally controls for education level and a dummy variable 
for being in an exam class. The fifth model also includes environmental variables which are municipality 
size, a dummy variable indicating whether a student is inhabitant of a poverty accumulation area, and the 
regular central government contribution per student to its RMC district. In the sixth model the region 
fixed effects are replaced by a third order polynomial of the absolute number of dropouts according to the 
RMC-data in the base year 2004-2005. All models are estimated by OLS and estimated coefficients are 
reported in terms of percentage points. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the region level are in 
parentheses. 
 
In all specifications, the estimates of the effect of the covenants do not significantly differ from zero. 
Adding additional covariates increases the estimated coefficients (in absolute value), but all estimates 
remain statistically insignificant. Note that the large estimation sample including all students contributes 
to the precision of our estimates and allows us to identify even small effects. The point estimate of the full 
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model including all covariates and fixed district effects is -0.146, which suggests that the financial 
incentive decreases dropout probability with 0.146 of one percentage point. Models including second or 
higher order polynomials yield similar results.24
 
  
Table 3.3 OLS Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability 
of dropping out, estimates in percentage points 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
(6) 
       
Covenant -0.029 
(0.097) 
-0.028 
(0.097) 
-0.048 
(0.091) 
-0.058 
(0.094) 
-0.146 
(0.103) 
-0.102 
(0.096) 
       
Control Variables       
       
Personal characteristics no no yes yes yes yes 
Education level no no no yes yes yes 
Environment no no no no yes yes 
       
Fixed effects  no yes yes yes yes no 
Polynomial of dropouts no no no no no yes 
       
Observations 2,587,596 2,587,596 2,587,596 2,587,596 2,587,596 2,587,596 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Since two RMC districts which did not initially satisfy the eligibility criteria eventually received 
voluntary treatment, we proceed with an IV approach to address potential self-selection problems. These 
two regions contain 157,438 pupils, which is 6.1% of the total population. We estimate models with 
actual treatment status instrumented by initial eligibility for the program. In these analyses we cannot 
include region fixed effects (or a smooth function of dropouts), because of collinearity in the first stage 
regression. Table 3.4 presents the 2SLS estimates of the effect of the covenant. These estimates are 
                                                 
24 Since we find insignificant effects, the proposed analyses by Donald and Lang (2007) using group means do not 
seem necessary. For completeness, Table 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C presents the estimation results of an analysis at the 
school district level using group means, including 78 observations. We find statistically insignificant effects. The 
positive point estimates may be explained by the better performance of larger districts (see Table 3.7), which are 
less heavily weighted now.  
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similar to the OLS estimates. We find statistically insignificant effects of the covenant on school dropout. 
25
Table 3.4 2SLS estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability of dropping out, estimates 
in percentage points 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
   
Covenant -0.032 
(0.114) 
-0.058 
(0.101) 
-0.060 
(0.110) 
-0.088 
(0.112) 
     
Control Variables     
     
Personal characteristics no yes yes yes 
Education level no no yes yes 
Environment no no no yes 
     
Observations 2,587,596 2,587,596 2,587,596 2,587,596 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
A potential concern with the difference-in-differences estimations on the full sample is that covenant and 
non-covenant regions may differ on (unobservable) characteristics that break down the identifying 
common trend assumption. We therefore perform additional analyses in which we restrict our estimation 
sample to covenant and non-covenant regions which are more similar to each other. We have constructed 
four subsamples. The first two are discontinuity samples identified on the basis of the selection rule of the 
treatment regions; the latter two are matched samples which are constructed by selecting regions within a 
similar interval of dropout probabilities in the pre-treatment year (see Section 3.3). 
 
Since the self-selection of the two regions breaks down the sharp regression discontinuity, we present IV 
models in which the treatment is instrumented by initial eligibility.  
 
                                                 
25 As an alternative way to address the potential self-selection issue, we also performed analyses on a restricted 
estimation sample, in which the two voluntary treated districts are left out. Table 3.C.2 in Appendix 3.C reports the 
estimated effects on the limited sample of 37 school districts. The results are very similar to our main impact 
findings in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.5 reports the full model estimation results including all covariates (except the fixed district effects 
or smooth function of dropouts) for the four subsamples.26
Table 3.5 2SLS estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability of dropping out, 
discontinuity samples (DS) and matched samples (MS), estimates in percentage points 
 
 For each subsample the number of included 
covenant and non-covenant regions is reported.   
 (DS 1) (DS 2) 
 
 
(MS 1) 
 
 
(MS 2) 
 
   
Covenant 0.021 
(0.140) 
-0.102 
(0.159) 
0.022 
(0.133) 
0.078 
(0.184) 
     
Control Variables     
     
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Education level yes yes yes yes 
Environment yes yes yes yes 
     
Number of covenant districts 8 5 8 5 
Number of non-covenant districts 8 5 11 8 
     
Observations 1,143,050 690,111 1,256,966 816,546 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The 2SLS estimates yield larger point estimates compared to the full sample estimates, except for the 
estimate in the second discontinuity sample. In the other three subsamples points estimates are even 
positive. All estimated coefficients remain statistically insignificant. These results confirm previous 
findings.  
 
Especially in our local difference-in-differences estimations including a relatively small number of 
districts, we have to be cautious with inference. As Donald and Lang (2007) point out, precision may be 
overestimated in case of few clusters. We do not find a statistically significant effect in our specifications, 
                                                 
26 Table 3.C.3 in Appendix 3.C additionally presents the full model OLS estimates on the four subsamples for both 
models including fixed district effects and models including a third order polynomial of the absolute number of 
dropouts in the reference year. All OLS estimates are statistically insignificant. Point estimates are negative and 
smaller compared to the corresponding estimates on the full sample (except for the full model estimate with fixed 
effects in the second discontinuity sample).  
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which makes that we can ‘safely’ conclude that we find no evidence that the program has been 
effective.27
 
 
As an alternative robustness check, we have also estimated our main model specifications on a 
subsample which excludes the four largest cities in the Netherlands. These large urban cities, which are 
only included in the treatment group, might face a different nature of dropout problems. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 3.C.4 in Appendix 3.C. We find very similar results, which imply that the 
inclusion of the large cities in the treatment group does not importantly affect our results.  
3.5.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects 
It is conceivable that the covenants had no overall effect on school dropout for the whole student 
population, but still had a partial effect on a specific subpopulation of students. This might for example be 
due to a particular focus on certain education levels in the covenant projects or because of a different 
response of subgroups to the undertaken activities. In order to test for the occurrence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects, we have estimated the difference-in-differences effects on various subsamples of the 
student population. We estimated separate regressions for boys and girls, for students in secondary 
education and in intermediate vocational education, for students aged above 16 and students aged 16 or 
younger, for students in an exam class and students which are not in an exam class, and for Dutch 
students and foreign students. Table 3.6 presents the OLS estimation results for the full model 
specifications with fixed effects in the first row and the full model instrumental variables estimates in the 
second row. 
 
While OLS estimation points to a larger effect for boys (in absolute value), the 2SLS estimations yields a 
larger point estimate for girls.  
   With respect to the education level we find a larger point estimate (in absolute value) in the OLS 
analysis for mbo students, while 2SLS estimates yield similar effects for both groups. In all of these 
specifications, the estimated effects are statistically insignificant. In addition, a separate regression only 
including mbo level 1 and level 2 students (those with the highest dropout probabilities) yields no 
significant results (not in the table).  
 
                                                 
27 Since we find insignificant effects, we do not proceed with the proposed alternative analyses by Donald and Lang 
(2007).  
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Table 3.6 Heterogeneous effects: difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on 
the probability of dropping out, estimates in percentage points 
 
 Gender  Education 
level 
 Age  Exam 
class 
 Ethnicity  
           
 (1) 
boys 
(2) 
girls 
(1) 
secondary 
education 
(2) 
mbo 
(1) 
age>16 
(2) 
age<=16 
(1) 
exam 
year 
(2)  
no exam 
year 
 
(1) 
Dutch 
(2) 
foreign 
           
OLS -0.191 
(0.130) 
-0.095 
(0.121) 
-0.101 
(0.066) 
-0.238 
(0.232) 
-0.281 
(0.252) 
-0.076 
(0.070) 
-0.250 
(0.215) 
-0.131 
(0.098) 
-0.142* 
(0.078) 
-0.043 
(0.258) 
           
2SLS  -0.049 
(0.154) 
 
-0.128 
(0.114) 
-0.089 
(0.068) 
-0.087 
(0.261) 
-0.043 
(0.260) 
-0.104 
(0.076) 
-0.463* 
(0.257) 
-0.026 
(0.101) 
-0.065 
(0.075) 
-0.040 
(0.303) 
Control 
Variables 
          
           
Personal 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education 
level 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Environment yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
           
Observations 1,316,687 1,270,909 1,818,136 769,460 790,942 1,796,654 377,008 2,210,588 2,029,238 558,358 
           
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10 % significance level.  
The OLS analyses yield a larger estimated coefficient (in absolute value) for pupils aged above the 
compulsory schooling age of 16, while IV analyses yield a larger estimated coefficient for younger pupils. 
None of these estimated coefficients is statistically significant. 
    Point estimates are larger for pupils in exam years, with a 2SLS estimate that is statistically significant 
at a 10% level. This might provide some evidence that there has been a beneficial effect of the covenant 
on dropout behaviour of pupils in exam classes of secondary education. Nevertheless, we have to be 
careful being decisive on this regarding the risk of oversignificance of the estimates. Further inspection of 
the results for exam classes by estimating separate regressions on exam classes in vmbo -where dropout 
rates are inherently higher compared to havo or vwo exam classes- yield insignificant results (not in the 
table). In addition, a full sample OLS analysis including an interaction term between a dummy variable 
for being in an exam class and the variable of interest yields a highly insignificant estimated coefficient 
for the interaction term. In sum, these results provide little evidence that the covenants have been 
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le 3.6 eterogeneous e fects: difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the cove ants on 
t e robability of dro ping out, estimates in percentage points 
 
 Gender  Education 
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Table 3.6 Heterogeneous effects: difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on 
the probability of dropping out, estimates in percentage points 
 
 Gender  Education 
level 
 Age  Exam 
class 
 Ethnicity  
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(1) 
secondary 
education 
(2) 
mbo 
(1) 
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(2) 
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(2)  
no exam 
year 
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Observations 1,316,687 1,270,909 1,818,136 769,460 790,942 1,796,654 377,008 2,210,588 2,029,238 558,358 
           
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10 % significance level.  
The OLS analyses yield a larger estimated coefficient (in absolute value) for pupils aged above the 
compulsory schooling age of 16, while IV analyses yield a larger estimated coefficient for younger pupils. 
None of these estimated coefficients is statistically significant. 
    Point estimates are larger for pupils in exam years, with a 2SLS estimate that is statistically significant 
at a 10% level. This might provide some evidence that there has been a beneficial effect of the covenant 
on dropout behaviour of pupils in exam classes of secondary education. Nevertheless, we have to be 
careful being decisive on this regarding the risk of oversignificance of the estimates. Further inspection of 
the results for exam classes by estimating separate regressions on exam classes in vmbo -where dropout 
rates are inherently higher compared to havo or vwo exam classes- yield insignificant results (not in the 
table). In addition, a full sample OLS analysis including an interaction term between a dummy variable 
for being in an exam class and the variable of interest yields a highly insignificant estimated coefficient 
for the interaction term. In sum, these results provide little evidence that the covenants have been 
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successful in reducing school dropout in exam classes. The negative OLS estimate for Dutch students is 
statistically significant at the 10% level, which suggests that the intervention may have been effective for 
this group. The IV-estimate, however, does not confirm this. Hence, these results do not provide clear 
evidence of a beneficial effect of the policy for any one of these subgroups.   
3.6 Sensitivity analyses 
The design of incentive programs is essential to motivate agents and avoid undesired behaviour. We 
investigate to what extent specific characteristics of the covenant program might have influenced the 
effectiveness. We focus on consequences for incentive strength for RMC districts to put in additional 
effort and on consequences for potential adverse responses to the program. Incentive strength may be 
mitigated by the choice of the reference year and by district size. We explore both issues by performing 
analyses for specific subsamples of districts. We analyse the potential of strategic behaviour of the 
districts by comparing outcomes based on BRON and RMC data.  
3.6.1 Choice of reference year 
Since the rewards are based on the differences in the absolute number of dropouts between 2004-2005 
and 2006-2007, pre-treatment dropout development between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 already affects 
(expected) outcomes. Some regions have been ‘lucky’ (i.e. the ones that witnessed a decline in 2005-
2006), while others were ‘unlucky’ (i.e. the regions with an increase in the pre-covenant year). This may 
have mitigated the incentive to put in additional effort aimed at decreasing dropout in the year 2006-2007. 
Low dropout rates in the pre-treatment year 2005-2006 might either discourage the districts or provide an 
additional incentive to work hard to compensate the negative point of departure. Likewise, an increase in 
pre-treatment dropout development might be interpreted as an additional stimulant or as a license to 
passivity. 
 
To analyse the effect of pre-treatment dropout development on the impact of the program, we construct 
specific subsamples of regions. We distinguish between RMC districts that faced a decrease in the total 
number of dropouts between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 according to the RMC data, and RMC districts 
that faced an increase.   
 
Table 3.7 presents separate estimation results for various subsets of regions. The first column presents the 
full model results for the subset of all regions that faced a decline. The second column includes all regions 
that faced an increase. In the third and fourth columns, we include all control regions (either facing a 
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decline or increase) and only the treatment regions with a decline in model (3) and treatment regions with 
an increase in model (4). All difference-in-differences models are estimated with OLS including school 
district fixed effects. Estimations with 2SLS are only presented for the models with regions that face an 
increase (since the two deviant regions both faced an increase).  
 
The results yield larger point estimates (in absolute value) for the subsets of regions that witnessed a 
decline, but none of them are statistically significant. Hence, there is no evidence that the choice of 
reference year has systematically mitigated the effectiveness of the financial incentive. An additional 
estimation (not in the table) of a model which includes the increase (or decrease) in the absolute number 
of dropouts between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 in terms of percentages as covariate (instead of the fixed 
effects) and an interaction term with the treatment effect of interest yields an insignificant effect for the 
interaction term. This indicates that the treatment effect is not significantly different between the ‘lucky 
ones’ and ‘unlucky ones’. Therefore, we conclude that the choice of reference year and the subsequent 
confrontation of the districts with pre-treatment dropout development did not structurally alter the 
conclusions on the effectiveness of the program. 
3.6.2 District size  
A second difference between RMC regions that might be important for the effectiveness of the covenants 
is size. A potential disadvantage of centralizing programs is that incentives for the agents involved 
become diluted. In the context of the covenant policy one might expect the program to be less effective in 
larger districts because of weakened incentives. Empirical evidence along these lines is provided by 
Burgess et al. (2004), who evaluated the impact of a performance pay program in a major government 
agency, and found a substantial positive effect in small teams and a negative effect in large teams. Since 
the eligibility rule implies that larger districts are more likely to be selected into treatment, this may have 
affected the results of the covenant policy.   
 
The last two columns of Table 3.7 present estimation results for subsets of the smallest 7 treatment 
regions and the largest 7 treatment regions, measured with the number of relevant students at the start of 
the school year 2006-2007. In both models all non-treatment regions are taken into account.28
                                                 
28 Note that since eligibility was based on the absolute number of dropouts, it does not work to divide the total 
sample of districts in a subset of ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’ regions as almost all treatment regions would be in the 
former subset. 
 Average 
district sizes in both treatment groups are 40,580 and 69,622. Both OLS and 2SLS estimations are 
presented. 
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Table 3.7 Sensitivity analyses: difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on 
the probability of dropping out, estimates in percentage points 
 Pre-treatment 
dropout 
development 
   District size  
       
 (1) 
All regions 
with decline 
(2) 
All regions 
with increase 
(3) 
Treatment 
regions with 
decline; all 
control regions 
(4) 
Treatment 
regions with 
increase; all 
control 
regions  
(5) 
small 
(6)  
large 
       
OLS -0.173 
(0.228) 
-0.136 
(0.112) 
-0.220 
(0.211) 
-0.141 
(0.087) 
-0.081 
(0.117) 
-0.227* 
(0.124) 
       
2SLS   
 
 
-0.020 
(0.104) 
 -0.039 
(0.080) 
-0.014 
(0.112) 
-0.118 
(0.144) 
Control Variables       
       
Personal 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education level yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Environment yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations  890,343 1,697,253 1,573,269 2,068,104 1,618,761 2,022,612 
       
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10 % significance level. The OLS models also include school district 
fixed effects. 
 
 
Estimated coefficients are larger (in absolute value) in the larger districts. The OLS estimation in the 
subset of large treatment regions is statistically significant at a 10% level. This finding is contrary to 
expected. A suggestive explanation might be that in larger regions, there is a higher potential benefit from 
an increased coordination of activities of educators within the district. Nevertheless, we have to be 
cautious in the interpretation of this finding. First of all, the estimated coefficient is only significant at a 
10% level. Following Donald and Lang (2007) we have to be cautious drawing conclusions from 
inference too soon. Secondly, when estimating the model with 2SLS the point estimate decreases and the 
effect becomes insignificant. Moreover, an additional OLS estimation (not in the table) of a full sample 
model in which we include the district size (instead of the fixed effects) and an interaction term between 
size and the treatment variable of interest, yields a highly insignificant interaction term. This indicates 
66
66 
 
that the treatment effect does not significantly differ with district size. Altogether, we conclude that there 
is too little evidence to state that the incentive program has been more effective in larger regions. 
Nevertheless, the estimates suggest that the selection of larger regions into treatment has not negatively 
affected the impact of the covenant policy.  
3.6.3 Strategic behaviour 
There is much empirical evidence for strategic behaviour in response to financial incentives (see e.g. 
Jacob, 2005; Jacob and Levitt, 2003). In our evaluation we use administrative BRON data which are 
checked by accountants. Hence we can be sure that our data, which played no role in the determination of 
rewards, are not biased by manipulation. 
     Since the policy was introduced in the transition period between using RMC figures and BRON data, 
the government had to rely on the RMC figures yet for measuring performance in terms of reduced 
number of dropouts between the reference year 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. Hence, the monetary reward 
was based on the RMC figures provided by the districts themselves. This may have provided an 
opportunity for strategic behaviour in the treatment districts. If regions have put effort in manipulation of 
the data rather than in reducing dropout, this may have negatively affected the impact of the policy.  
 
The coexistence of RMC and BRON data for the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 allows us to look 
further into the issue of strategic behaviour. We exploit availability of both data sets by comparing 
dropout development in the RMC data with dropout development in the BRON data for both treatment 
and control groups. Despite the serious reliability problems with RMC data, this may provide some 
insight in the occurrence of strategic behaviour. Using BRON we did not find evidence that the covenants 
have been effective in reducing dropout. In case of manipulation, we would expect to observe a more 
favourable dropout development in the RMC data of the treatment districts. 
 
    Table 3.8 shows the difference in the number of dropouts between 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 in terms 
of percentages for the treatment and the non-treatment regions, based on both RMC data and BRON 
data.29 We have excluded one non-covenant region which reported an unrealistically large increase in 
dropouts.30
                                                 
29 The RMC data we use concern the new dropouts, i.e. all early school-leavers within the relevant school year. 
Hence, the stock of previous dropouts that still satisfies the definition of a school dropout in the relevant school 
year is not included in both RMC and BRON data. 
 In the treatment regions, dropout decreased with 3.2 percent according to the BRON data and 
30 This region is ‘Midden-Brabant’ which reported an increase of 910% in dropouts between 2005-2006 en 2006-
2007. Inclusion of this outlier would increase average dropout development in the non-treatment regions 
according to RMC from 5.8% to 12.2%. 
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decreased with 7.5 percent according to the RMC data. The larger reduction in school dropout according 
to RMC is in line with expectations in case of strategic behaviour. However, it may also reflect other 
changes over time in the RMC data, like for instance an improvement in the accuracy of the RMC 
registrations.  
 
If these other changes are general developments in the RMC data and not specifically related to the 
treatment regions, we can control for them by comparing the relative development of the RMC figures in 
the treatment regions with the relative development in the non-treatment regions. In the non-treatment 
regions we observe an increase in school dropouts of 5.8 percent according to RMC relative to a 3.3 
percent decrease according to BRON. Hence, the treatment regions report a 4.3 percentage points more 
favourable dropout development compared to BRON, while the non-treatment regions report a 9.1 
percentage points less favourable dropout development. This suggests that the introduction of the 
covenant is associated with a 13.4 percentage points more favourable reported dropout development in 
the RMC figures relative to BRON. Strategic self-reporting behaviour in response to the program might 
explain this difference.  
 
Table 3.8 Difference in the number of dropouts between pre-treatment year (2005-2006) and post-
treatment year (2006-2007) in terms of percentages, based on both BRON and RMC data, covenant 
versus non-covenant regions, complete sample 
Data Source Covenant Non-covenant 
   
RMC -7.5 5.8 
BRON -3.2 -3.3 
   
Difference  -4.3 9.1 
   
 
 
In addition, we have compared the BRON and RMC figures for a specific subset of treatment regions 
with a weak performance in dropout reduction. We would expect regions that actually do not realize a 
reduction in school dropouts to be most likely to behave opportunistically. It turns out that 3 treatment 
regions did not realize a reduction in dropouts according to BRON. These regions on average face an 
increase in school dropout of 4.6 percent. The corresponding reported average dropout development in the 
RMC data is, however, -4.6 percent (not in the table). Hence, we indeed observe a larger difference 
between the self-reported RMC figures and the administrative BRON data (of 9.2 percentage points) in 
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the regions that seem most suspicious of strategic behaviour. This adds to the conjecture that 
manipulation of the data underlies the reported figures in Table 3.8.31
 
  
Nevertheless, we cannot completely exclude that the observed pattern reflects changes in the RMC data 
that are different between treatment and non-treatment regions. Acknowledging that the observed pattern 
might still be driven by a lack of uniformity in (the development of) the RMC data, we interpret our 
findings as suggestive evidence for data manipulation in response to the introduction of the financial 
incentive scheme. 
3.7 Conclusions  
Incentive-based policies may provide a cost-effective way to improve educational achievement compared 
to traditional expenditure-based policies. Policymakers and researchers have moved their interest more 
and more towards the role of incentives in the last decade. A variety of new incentive-based policies have 
been started, especially in the US and the UK. Empirical evaluations of these programs show that 
financial incentives can improve education quality. At the same time there remains severe opposition 
from teacher unions and educators against the use of incentives and strategic responses seem to be a 
serious threat to the effectiveness of the programs.  
 
Knowledge on optimal policy design is important to successfully implement incentive-based schemes. 
This study contributes to the literature on the role of incentives in education. So far, the main interest has 
been on incentives targeted at the level of students, teachers or schools. We analyse the effectiveness of a 
program targeted at the level of school districts.  
    We exploit the gradual introduction of a substantial financial incentive scheme for local education 
authorities to reduce school dropout in the Netherlands in 2006. In the first year, covenants with financial 
incentives were offered to 14 out of 39 school districts with the highest number of dropouts. This 
selection rule, and a unique dataset containing individual information on the whole student population in 
both the pre- and post-treatment year, offers a good opportunity to evaluate the effects of the treatment. 
We use a (local) difference-in-differences approach and find statistically insignificant effects on dropout 
probability. These findings are robust to a variety of specifications.  
 
                                                 
31 When dividing the remaining 11 treatment regions in different subsets of high performing, middle performing 
and low performing regions, we observe in all of these subsets a larger reported dropout reduction in RMC 
compared to BRON. We do not find a clear pattern of increasing differences between RMC and BRON figures when 
actual performance (in terms of BRON) decreases. 
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the regions that seem most suspicious of strategic behaviour. This adds to the conjecture that 
manipulation of the data underlies the reported figures in Table 3.8.31
 
  
Nevertheless, we cannot completely exclude that the observed pattern reflects changes in the RMC data 
that are different between treatment and non-treatment regions. Acknowledging that the observed pattern 
might still be driven by a lack of uniformity in (the development of) the RMC data, we interpret our 
findings as suggestive evidence for data manipulation in response to the introduction of the financial 
incentive scheme. 
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Knowledge on optimal policy design is important to successfully implement incentive-based schemes. 
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both the pre- and post-treatment year, offers a good opportunity to evaluate the effects of the treatment. 
We use a (local) difference-in-differences approach and find statistically insignificant effects on dropout 
probability. These findings are robust to a variety of specifications.  
 
                                                 
31 When dividing the remaining 11 treatment regions in different subsets of high performing, middle performing 
and low performing regions, we observe in all of these subsets a larger reported dropout reduction in RMC 
compared to BRON. We do not find a clear pattern of increasing differences between RMC and BRON figures when 
actual performance (in terms of BRON) decreases. 
69 
 
Specific program details may have importantly affected the empirical findings on effectiveness. In order 
to add to the interpretation of our results, we have investigated sensitivity to some of these program-
specific characteristics.  
      First, the choice of the reference year 2004-2005 implies that the pre-treatment dropout development 
between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 may already have affected outcomes. Second, the choice to select and 
reward regions based on the absolute number of dropouts implied that incentives were targeted at larger 
districts which might have negatively influenced the results because of dilution of incentives. Sensitivity 
analyses, however, suggest that these aspects did not importantly affect the results.  
A third and probably most important issue is that the government used the region-level RMC data to 
measure performance, which may have provided an opportunity for strategic behaviour of treatment 
regions. From a comparison between BRON and RMC figures we tentatively conclude that there appears 
to be a strategic response of the local education authorities in terms of manipulation of the data.  
 
In sum, we find no evidence that an incentive scheme targeted at regional education authorities has been 
effective. The ineffectiveness of the scheme might be due to strategic behaviour of treatment districts at 
the cost of purposive actions. This once more points out the importance of a proper design with well-
thought prior conditions for a successful implementation of incentive programs in education. In addition, 
we should be aware that the effectiveness of centralized incentives can be dependent on specific 
characteristics of the education system, like the large school autonomy in the Netherlands. As school 
autonomy might limit the power of education authorities, this type of incentive scheme may be more 
successful in other education systems. The promise of incentive-based policies to increase educational 
quality at a relatively low cost asks for additional research efforts to improve knowledge on optimal 
program designs. 
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Appendix 3.A: Selection of covenant regions 
Table 3.A.1 Selection of covenant regions: rankings of regions according to the number of new 
dropouts and total number of dropouts in 2004-2005 
 
Ranking Region Number of new 
dropouts 
Region Total number of 
dropouts 
1 agglomeratie amsterdam 7402 agglomeratie amsterdam 18047 
2 rijnmond 6276 rijnmond 15379 
3 west-brabant 4643 west-brabant 7803 
4 haaglanden 4374 haaglanden 6360 
5 utrecht  2662 gewest limburg-zuid 5631 
6 arnhem/nijmegen  2260 flevoland  4845 
7 twente 2072 utrecht  4185 
8 gewest limburg-zuid 1841 noordoost-brabant  3310 
9 noordoost-brabant  1829 zuid-holland-zuid  3111 
10 gewest noord-limburg  1793 arnhem/nijmegen  2616 
11 zuidoost-brabant 1773 zuid-holland-noord 2395 
12 west-kennnemerland 1292 centraal en westelijk groningen 2254 
13 centraal en westelijk groningenb 1279 twente 2162 
14 zuid-holland-noord 1219 gewest noord-limburg  2059 
15 flevoland  1218 zuidoost-brabant b 1773 
16 westfriesland  1216 noord-kennemerland 1507 
17 ijssel-vecht 1075 west-kennnemerland 1292 
18 zuidoost-drenthe 1052 eem en vallei  1283 
19 eem en vallei  1038 westfriesland  1216 
20 oost-gelderland  980 zuidoost-drenthe 1171 
21 rivierenland 977 oost-gelderland  1148 
22 zuid-holland-zuid  935 ijssel-vecht 1138 
23 stedendriehoek 748 friesland-oost 1060 
24 friesland-oost 697 noord- en midden-drenthe 1046 
25 noord-kennemerland 665 rivierenland 1023 
26 noord-groningen en eemsmond  646 oost-groningen 984 
27 noord- en midden-drenthe 581 kop van noord-holland  842 
28 midden-brabant 554 stedendriehoek 809 
29 gooi en vechtstreek  520 zuidwest-drenthe 740 
30 zuid-holland-oost  467 friesland-noord  693 
31 kop van noord-holland  417 gooi en vechtstreek  665 
32 oost-groningen 391 noord-groningen en eemsmond  659 
33 zuidwest-drenthe 385 midden-brabant 564 
34 friesland-noord  383 noordwest-veluwe 530 
35 zuidwest-friesland 380 zuidwest-friesland 517 
36 walcheren  273 zuid-holland-oost  505 
37 oosterschelde regio  255 walcheren  427 
38 noordwest-veluwe 230 oosterschelde regio  367 
39 zeeuwsch-vlaanderen  165 zeeuwsch-vlaanderen  356 
Notes. Regions in bold are the selected covenant regions. The selection principle is presence in the top 10 of at least one of the two lists of new or 
total number of dropouts in 2004-05. Regions in italic are the two self-selected covenant regions that were interested in signing a covenant. 
Source: RMC registration figures. 
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Appendix 3.B: Descriptive statistics of subsamples 
Table 3.B.1 Sample means for covenant and non-covenant regions, school year 2005-2006 (pre-
treatment year), DS 1 
 
 Non-covenant regions Covenant regions p-Value  
    
Dropout probability 3.93 3.82 0.043 
    
Personal characteristics    
Gender 0.51 0.51 0.245 
Age 15.28 15.34 0.000 
Age: compulsory education  0.70 0.69 0.000 
Ethnicity   0.000 
    Dutch 0.85 0.82  
    Surinam 0.01 0.02  
    Aruba/The Antilles 0.01 0.01  
    Turkey 0.02 0.03  
    Morocco 0.02 0.02  
    Other foreign (non-western)  0.04 0.04  
    Other foreign (western) 0.06 0.06  
    
Education level    
Level   0.000 
    first grade secondary education 0.31 0.31  
    vmbo (level 1) 0.05 0.05  
    vmbo (level 2) 0.05 0.04  
    vmbo (level 3/4) 0.08 0.08  
    havo  0.11 0.10  
    vwo 0.12 0.12  
    mbo-1 0.01 0.01  
    mbo-2 0.07 0.08  
    mbo-3 0.08 0.07  
    mbo-4 0.13 0.14  
    
Exam class 0.15 0.14 0.268 
    
Environment of the pupil     
Degree of urbanization   0.000 
    Inhabitant of G4 (4 largest cities) 0.00 0.00  
    Medium-sized municipality 0.28 0.32  
    Small municipality 0.72 0.68  
    
Inhabitant poverty accumulation area  0.05 0.14 0.000 
RMC budget per student (€) 12.22 10.00 0.000 
    
Total number of pupils 223,324 344,091  
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Table 3.B.2 Sample means for covenant and non-covenant regions, school year 2005-2006 (pre-
treatment year), DS 2 
 
 Non-covenant regions Covenant regions p-Value  
    
Dropout probability 4.04 3.79 0.000 
    
Personal characteristics    
Gender 0.51 0.51 0.311 
Age 15.26 15.32 0.000 
Age: compulsory education  0.71 0.70 0.000 
Ethnicity   0.000 
    Dutch 0.84 0.84  
    Surinam 0.01 0.01  
    Aruba/The Antilles 0.01 0.01  
    Turkey 0.02 0.03  
    Morocco 0.01 0.02  
    Other foreign (non-western)  0.04 0.04  
    Other foreign (western) 0.06 0.06  
    
Education level    
Level   0.000 
    first grade secondary education 0.31 0.31  
    vmbo (level 1) 0.05 0.05  
    vmbo (level 2) 0.05 0.04  
    vmbo (level 3/4) 0.08 0.08  
    havo  0.11 0.11  
    vwo 0.13 0.12  
    mbo-1 0.01 0.01  
    mbo-2 0.07 0.07  
    mbo-3 0.08 0.07  
    mbo-4 0.12 0.14  
    
Exam class 0.15 0.14 0.000 
    
Environment of the pupil     
Degree of urbanization   0.000 
    Inhabitant of G4 (4 largest cities) 0.00 0.00  
    Medium-sized municipality 0.25 0.27  
    Small municipality 0.75 0.73  
    
Inhabitant poverty accumulation area  0.06 0.11 0.000 
RMC budget per student (€) 12.35 10.32 0.000 
    
Total number of pupils 133,613 209,250  
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Table 3.B.3 Sample means for covenant and non-covenant regions, school year 2005-2006 (pre-
treatment year), MS 1 
 
 Non-covenant regions Covenant regions p-Value  
    
Dropout probability 3.99 4.01 0.731 
    
Personal characteristics    
Gender 0.51 0.51 0.523 
Age 15.29 15.30 0.357 
Age: compulsory education  0.70 0.70 0.308 
Ethnicity   0.000 
    Dutch 0.85 0.82  
    Surinam 0.01 0.01  
    Aruba/The Antilles 0.01 0.01  
    Turkey 0.02 0.03  
    Morocco 0.02 0.03  
    Other foreign (non-western)  0.04 0.04  
    Other foreign (western) 0.06 0.06  
    
Education level    
Level   0.000 
    first grade secondary education 0.30 0.31  
    vmbo (level 1) 0.05 0.05  
    vmbo (level 2) 0.05 0.04  
    vmbo (level 3/4) 0.08 0.08  
    havo  0.11 0.11  
    vwo 0.12 0.12  
    mbo-1 0.01 0.01  
    mbo-2 0.07 0.07  
    mbo-3 0.07 0.07  
    mbo-4 0.14 0.14  
    
Exam class 0.15 0.14 0.246 
    
Environment of the pupil     
Degree of urbanization   0.000 
    Inhabitant of G4 (4 largest cities) 0.00 0.04  
    Medium-sized municipality 0.27 0.24  
    Small municipality 0.73 0.72  
    
Inhabitant poverty accumulation area  0.04 0.12 0.000 
RMC budget per student (€) 14.33 9.93 0.000 
    
Total number of pupils 251,112 373,409  
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Table 3.B.4 Sample means for covenant and non-covenant regions, school year 2005-2006 (pre-
treatment year), MS 2 
 
 Non-covenant regions Covenant regions p-Value  
    
Dropout probability 3.96 4.03 0.317 
    
Personal characteristics    
Gender 0.51 0.51 0.682 
Age 15.32 15.30 0.015 
Age: compulsory education  0.70 0.70 0.000 
Ethnicity   0.000 
    Dutch 0.85 0.82  
    Surinam 0.01 0.01  
    Aruba/The Antilles 0.01 0.01  
    Turkey 0.02 0.03  
    Morocco 0.02 0.02  
    Other foreign (non-western)  0.04 0.04  
    Other foreign (western) 0.06 0.06  
    
Education level    
Level   0.000 
    first grade secondary education 0.30 0.31  
    vmbo (level 1) 0.05 0.05  
    vmbo (level 2) 0.05 0.04  
    vmbo (level 3/4) 0.08 0.08  
    havo  0.11 0.11  
    vwo 0.11 0.12  
    mbo-1 0.01 0.01  
    mbo-2 0.07 0.07  
    mbo-3 0.07 0.07  
    mbo-4 0.14 0.14  
    
Exam class 0.14 0.14 0.639 
    
Environment of the pupil     
Degree of urbanization   0.000 
    Inhabitant of G4 (4 largest cities) 0.00 0.00  
    Medium-sized municipality 0.34 0.32  
    Small municipality 0.66 0.68  
    
Inhabitant poverty accumulation area  0.05 0.13 0.000 
RMC budget per student (€) 14.04 9.92 0.000 
    
Total number of pupils 183,362 222,299  
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Appendix 3.C: Additional analyses 
 
Table 3.C.1 OLS Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability 
of dropping out, analysis at the school district level, estimates in percentage points 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
  
Covenant 0.051 
(0.337) 
0.102 
(0.171) 
0.052 
(0.162) 
0.043 
(0.161) 
0.030 
(0.149) 
      
Control Variables      
      
Personal characteristics no yes yes yes yes 
Education level no no yes yes yes 
Environment no no no yes yes 
      
Polynomial of dropouts no no no no yes 
      
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.C.2 OLS Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability 
of dropping out, sample without two self-selected regions, estimates in percentage points 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
(6) 
       
Covenant -0.030 
(0.104) 
-0.029 
(0.100) 
-0.052 
(0.098) 
-0.059 
(0.101) 
-0.159 
(0.111) 
-0.098  
(0.103) 
       
Control Variables       
       
Personal characteristics no no yes yes yes yes 
Education level no no no yes yes yes 
Environment no no no no yes yes 
       
Fixed effects  no yes  yes yes yes no 
Polynomial of dropouts no no no no no yes 
       
Observations 2,430,158 2,430,158 2,430,158 2,430,158 2,430,158 2,430,158 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.C.3 OLS Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability 
of dropping out, for discontinuity samples (DS) and matched samples (MS), estimates in percentage 
points 
 
 DS 1 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
DS 2 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
MS 1 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
MS 2 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
         
Covenant -0.099 
(0.110) 
-0.040 
(0.102) 
-0.147 
(0.131) 
-0.019 
(0.113) 
-0.099 
(0.124) 
-0.016 
(0.103) 
-0.053 
(0.155) 
-0.017 
(0.130) 
         
Control Variables         
         
Personal 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education level yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Environment yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
         
Fixed effects  yes no yes no yes no yes no 
Polynomial of 
dropouts 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
         
Number of 
covenant districts 
8 8 5 5 8 8 5 5 
Number of non-
covenant districts 
8 8 5 5 11 11 8 8 
         
Observations 1,143,050 1,143,050 690,111 690,111 1,256,966 1,256,966 816,546 816,546 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.C.4 OLS Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the covenants on the probability 
of dropping out, sample without four largest cities, estimates in percentage points 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
(6) 
       
Covenant -0.013 
(0.073) 
-0.014 
(0.073) 
-0.034 
(0.070) 
-0.054 
(0.071) 
-0.143 
(0.096) 
-0.094 
(0.075) 
       
Control Variables       
       
Personal characteristics no no yes yes yes yes 
Education level no no no yes yes yes 
Environment no no no no yes yes 
       
Fixed effects  no yes yes yes yes no 
Polynomial of dropouts no no no no no yes 
       
Observations 2,316,453 2,316,453 2,316,453 2,316,453 2,316,453 2,316,453 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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The effects of a comprehensive program for youths-at-risk: 
Evidence from a controlled natural experiment1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter evaluates the effects of a comprehensive program designed to increase school enrolment and 
employment among youths-at-risk. The treatment consisted of a broad range of educational, work, and 
health services, and guidance by personal coaches. For evaluating the impact of the program we exploit 
variation in assignment to the program induced by capacity restrictions of the two program sites. During 
specific time windows potential candidates for the program were assigned to the control group that 
received treatment as usual. We find that the program did not succeed in increasing enrolment in 
education or employment three years after the start of the program. Most important, we find that 
assignment to the program increased criminal activity, especially among the subpopulation of youths who 
had been suspected of a crime before the start of the program. Peer effects caused by grouping youths-at-
risk together may explain the adverse impact on criminal behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Marc van der Steeg and Dinand Webbink: Van Elk, R., M. van der Steeg, 
D. Webbink, 2013, The effects of a special program for multi-problem school dropouts on educational enrolment, 
employment, and criminal behaviour, CPB Discussion Paper 241. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Young individuals that do not finish their schooling and do not have a job are at risk for future 
unemployment and for getting involved in criminal activities (e.g., Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Machin et 
al., 2011). The high social costs associated with unemployment and crime legitimize publicly subsidized 
interventions aimed at improving the prospects for these youths. Many of these interventions focus on 
reducing school dropout. In general, interventions targeted at youths still enrolled in school are more 
effective than interventions targeted at out-of-school youths (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003).2 The results 
of programs focused on out-of-school youths, which is the target group of the intervention studied in this 
chapter, are ambiguous. Many publicly subsidized programs appear not to be successful in improving the 
lives of these youths (Lalonde, 2003).3
                                                 
2 Examples of programs for youth still enrolled in school in the United States that improved educational outcomes 
are Big Brothers Big Sisters (Tierney et al., 1995) and the Philadelphia Futures’ Sponsor-A-Scholar (Johnson, 1999). 
Two programs that provided financial incentives to teenage parents – Ohio’s Learning, Earning, and Parenting 
Program and the Teenage Parent Demonstration – increased future earnings and employment among students 
who were still in school, but not among participants who had already dropped out (Granger and Cytron, 1998). The 
Quantum Opportunities Program, which combines counselling minority students with financial incentives, has 
increased educational attainment in the short run (Taggart, 1995; Maxfield et al., 2003). A 10-year follow-up 
evaluation, however, suggests that most of the beneficial effects disappear in the long run and that the program 
increased the likelihood of committing a crime for male participants (Rodriguez-Planas, 2012). Recently, a novel 
intervention for disadvantaged youths in Chicago high schools, that includes mentoring and cognitive behavioural 
therapy to reduce intuitive judgement and decision-making problems, has been found to improve schooling and 
crime outcomes (Heller et al., 2013).     
 The Job Corps program might be considered as one of the most 
promising interventions. Job Corps is a relatively intensive and expensive program that provides a 
comprehensive set of training services – including vocational education, counselling, work experience, 
social skills training, and health education – for disadvantaged youths aged 16 to 24 in a residential 
setting. The program has been found to increase educational attainment and earnings and to reduce arrest 
rates during the treatment period (Schochet et al., 2001). However, the earnings gains and the reduction in 
criminal activity do not persist in the longer term (Schochet et al., 2008). The National Guard Youth 
ChalleNGe Program, an intensive military structured treatment that offers residential-based education and 
mentoring to young dropouts, increased college enrolment, employment, and earnings, but did not 
decrease criminal behaviour among participants, and negatively affected health and lifestyle outcomes 
(Millenky et al., 2011). The Year-Up program, which offers six months of full-time classes followed by 
six months of internships with U.S. companies to minority youths, aged 18 to 24, increased earnings one 
year after the end of the program but did not affect employment (Roder and Elliot, 2011). Carneiro and 
 
3 Experimental evaluations of federal programs such as JobStart, the Job Training Partnership Act, and the Work 
Experience Programs do not find beneficial effects on employment or earnings (Cave and Doolittle, 1991; Couch, 
1992; Orr et al., 1994). 
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3 Experimental evaluations of federal programs such as JobStart, the Job Training Partnership Act, and the Work 
Experience Programs do not find beneficial effects on employment or earnings (Cave and Doolittle, 1991; Couch, 
1992; Orr et al., 1994). 
81 
 
Heckman (2003) have summarized the lessons from previous studies into guidelines for designing 
effective interventions for youths-at-risk. The most promising programs consist of an integrated mix of 
education, occupational skills training, work-based learning, and supporting services, and also include 
adult mentoring to handle inappropriate attitudes. In this chapter we investigate the effects of a program 
which was designed according to these guidelines and focused on youths who were considered as a really 
problematic group. 
 In 2009 the Dutch government introduced the so-called Neighbourhood School Program (NSP) in 
Rotterdam, the second largest city of the country with a relatively high unemployment and crime rate. The 
NSP is a comprehensive and expensive program for youths-at-risk aged 16 to 23 living in disadvantaged 
areas. The aim of the program was to help youths-at-risk return to school or enter the labour market. 
Individuals in the NSP received a comprehensive set of educational, work and health services and were 
assigned to a personal coach. The design of the program seems quite similar to the Job Corps program. 
Compared to other programs discussed above the NSP is targeted at a more specific subpopulation of 
youths-at-risk who face complex behavioural, financial, or health related problems. Around 50% of the 
target population had been suspected of a crime before they entered the program and around 70% had 
only completed primary education. The program’s content is relatively intensive and adds assistance by 
professional health specialists to work-based and educational elements to help youths solve their 
problems. To evaluate the impact of the program we exploit exogenous variation in treatment status 
induced by a specific assignment rule to the program. This approach was chosen because random 
assignment of the target group to the program and to a control condition was considered not feasible and 
appropriate. After a series of discussions with the team responsible for the implementation of the program 
it was agreed to create a controlled natural experiment. The agreement was that during specific time 
windows potential candidates for the program would be assigned to the regular interventions used by the 
municipality. The time windows were chosen based on the expected number of participants in the 
program and the capacity restrictions of the two program sites. We use the youths that were eligible for 
the program but that were assigned to the regular interventions because of these time windows as our 
control group. Our data include administrative information about school enrolment, employment, and 
criminal behaviour three years after the start of the intervention. We investigate the impact of the program 
by comparing the outcomes of youths assigned to the NSP with the outcomes of youths assigned to 
regular interventions, conditional on the time of application. For assessing the impact of the program two 
additional issues are important; non-compliance with the assignment rules and non-starting in the 
program. It turned out that the project team did not fully comply with the assignment rules that were 
agreed upon. To address non-compliance with the assignment rule we use an instrumental variables 
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approach in which the intended assignment is used as an instrument (Angrist et al., 1996). The second 
issue is about youths that did not start in the program they were assigned to. In the empirical analysis we 
cannot estimate standard treatment-on-the-treated effects because the exclusion restriction that ‘never-
takers’ and ‘always-takers’ in treatment and control groups are treated in the same way is not likely to 
hold (see Section 4.4). This implies that the treatment that we evaluate in this study is the assignment to 
the NSP and the treatment effect is the combined effect of participants and non-starters in the NSP. In 
many policy evaluations the effect of the assignment to treatment is considered to be the most relevant 
effect.  
 We find that assignment to the program did not increase school enrolment or employment three 
years after the start of the program. Most important, we find evidence that assignment to the NSP 
increased criminal activity, especially among the youths who had been suspected of a crime before the 
time of entry. Additional analyses suggest that peer effects caused by grouping at-risk-youths together can 
explain this effect. Our study contributes to various strands of the economic literature on school dropout 
and crime. First, it investigates the effects of an intervention for youths-at-risk designed according to the 
main lessons from previous studies. Second, our findings with respect to school enrolment and 
employment are in line with a large body of the literature that shows no impact of training programs on 
the labour market outcomes of youths-at-risk (e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; LaLonde, 2003). Third, 
our results regarding crime are consistent with studies that document the adverse effects of group-based 
interventions on delinquent behaviour (Dishion et al., 1999) and studies that find evidence that peer 
effects due to grouping at-risk adolescents together can explain the reinforcement of criminal activity 
(Dodge et al., 2007). Fourth, our study might be important for designing field experiments in situations in 
which random assignment appears not to be feasible. We provide an example of a non-standard field 
experiment in which the assignment to the intervention was based on specific time windows.  
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the institutional 
background, the content of the intervention, and assignment to the program. Section 4.3 presents the data 
and Section 4.4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4.5 reports the main findings and Section 4.6 
presents additional analyses that add to the interpretation of our main findings. Section 4.7 concludes. 
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4.2 The NSP 
 
4.2.1 Background 
In the Dutch education system a school dropout is defined as someone aged under 23 who leaves school 
without having completed a particular level of education called the start-qualification. This start-
qualification is considered the minimum level of education needed to participate well in the labour market 
and corresponds to a degree in higher secondary education or intermediate vocational education.4
4.2.2 The intervention 
 
Rotterdam, the second largest city of the Netherlands, typically has a large share of school dropouts and 
unemployed youth (Ministry of Education, 2010; Municipality of Rotterdam, 2011). The fraction of 
school dropouts in Rotterdam (6.1 %) is almost twice the national average (3.2 %) and larger than that of 
the three other large cities (5.4 %). Out-of-school youths aged 18 to 27 without a job can apply for help 
and income services at their municipality of residence. Municipalities are obliged to offer a suitable 
reintegration program to applicants. Acceptance of this offer is compulsory for eligibility for social 
benefits. Youths aged under 18 without a start-qualification are not served because of the compulsory 
education requirement. In Rotterdam, the Young People’s Office (YPO) is responsible for the assignment 
of youths to reintegration programs. Each applicant is invited for a consultation, after which he or she is 
referred to the best-suited program. If youths refuse to participate in the proposed program, they do not 
receive a second offer and lose their rights to social benefits.  
The NSP was launched at two sites in Rotterdam in 2009 as an alternative to regular reintegration 
programs. The purpose of the NSP is to help multi-problem school dropouts return to formal education or 
work. Initially, the Ministries of Education, Social Affairs and Employment, Justice, and Health 
contributed 5.6 million Euros to finance a two-year pilot. After two years, the pilot was extended.  
The program’s target population consists of school dropouts aged 16 to 23 who are unemployed and face 
complex problems in several areas of their lives. More specifically, youths must satisfy all of the 
following criteria for NSP eligibility: 
• Is aged 16 to 23, 
                                                 
4 Unemployment among youths without a start-qualification was 13 % in 2009 and is more than twice as high as 
unemployment among youths with a start-qualification (Statistics Netherlands, 2011). 
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• Dropped out of school without having obtained a degree in intermediate vocational education or 
higher secondary education, 
• Does not work in a structured job for more than 12 hours a week, 
• Faces problems in at least two areas of their lives, including work, finances, health, housing, 
justice, and social environment, and 
• Has an IQ above 70.  
Participants in the program are formally registered as being enrolled in education and receive student 
grants. The program provides an integrated treatment of educational, work and care services. A special 
team of adult coaches and health specialists support the youths to solve their problems, increase their 
skills, and help them return to formal education or work. Each participant is counselled by a personal 
coach and is expected to be present five days a week, from 9:00 to 15:30. 
The program’s educational component consists of courses in specific subjects in which youths can obtain 
certificates. The educational level of these courses is comparable to the lowest level of intermediate 
vocational education. Besides increasing learning skills and knowledge, successful participation in these 
courses can contribute to self-esteem. With respect to work, neighbourhood schools use their regional 
networks to arrange small jobs or internships with local firms. These internships teach youths to 
participate in the labour market under the supervision of their coaches. In addition, group trainings are 
organized to improve social skills.5
Compared to the regular programs, the NSP differs in four ways. First, it is a small-scale program that 
groups youths together and treats them in a personal, customized way with flexible time duration. Second, 
it offers a more comprehensive mix of educational, job training, and health services. Third, it is a more 
 Next to the educational and work services, youths are professionally 
supported by health specialists, including social workers, psychiatric nurses, a behavioural specialist, and 
a (part-time) psychiatrist to help solve their personal problems. The NSP is characterized by its small-
scale and personal approach. Neighbourhood schools offer customized treatment with respect to both 
program content and duration. The precise content is adjusted to the specific needs of the individuals and 
the program length is flexible, with an average duration of around 10 months. Each of the two 
neighbourhood schools, one located in the north and the other in the south of Rotterdam, has a capacity of 
100 places. Youths accepted into the program are usually sent to one of these locations, based on their 
place of residence. The total costs of the program equal around 14,000 Euros per place per year.        
                                                 
5 A growing body of literature addresses the role of non-cognitive skills in explaining criminal behaviour. Hill et al. 
(2011) review interventions that focus on non-cognitive factors and argue that promoting social skills is one of the 
elements shared by a number of effective interventions.  
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intensive and expensive program. Fourth, participants are formally enrolled in education and receive 
student grants rather than social benefits.    
4.2.3 Assignment to the NSP 
 
In a series of discussions with the team that was responsible for the implementation of the NSP and the 
YPO it was agreed to create a controlled natural experiment. The agreement was that during several time 
windows potential candidates for the program would be assigned to the regular interventions used by the 
municipality. The time windows were chosen based on the expected number of participants in the 
program and the capacity restrictions of the two program sites. In the first period, between 1 August 2009 
and 1 March 2010, all youths who satisfied the eligibility criteria were assigned to the NSP.6 As of 1 
March 2010, the neighbourhood schools had reached their maximum capacity and hence could not accept 
more participants. Subsequently, all youths who satisfied the eligibility criteria and had their consultation 
at the YPO in the second period, between 1 March 2010 and 15 April 2010, were assigned to a regular 
reintegration program.7
Figure 4.1 presents our research design. The assignment rule ensures that treatment status depends 
deterministically on an individual’s consultation date at the YPO. Youths who enter the YPO in the first 
or third period are assigned to the NSP, while similarly eligible pupils who enter the YPO in the second 
or fourth period are assigned to one of the regular programs. This approach allows us to identify the 
effects of assignment to the NSP by comparing relevant schooling, labour market, and crime outcomes for 
both groups, conditional on the time of consultation. We measure these outcome variables on 1 November 
2012, two to three years after assignment to a program (see Section 4.3). 
 These youths received ‘the treatment as usual’ by the YPO and will be used as the 
control group in our analysis. They would have been assigned to the NSP in other periods. This procedure 
was repeated in subsequent periods. In the third period, between 15 April 2010 and 1 July 2010 all youths 
who satisfied the eligibility criteria were sent to the NSP and in the fourth period, between 1 July 2010 
and 15 September 2010, all youths who satisfied the eligibility criteria were assigned to a regular 
program.  
                                                 
6 When youths apply, the YPO ensures that they meet the eligibility criteria. We chose to start collecting data from 
1 August 2009 and thereby excluded youths that entered the YPO in the beginning of the NSP, between March and 
August 2009. This reduces the probability that the results are affected by potential start-up problems at the NSP. 
7 It was agreed that all youths would be sent to a regular program during this entire predetermined period. Hence, 
even when new places became available in the neighbourhood schools during this period (because of the outflow 
of participants), none of the applicants were sent to the NSP. 
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Our analysis focuses on youths aged 18 and older, since the regular reintegration programs do not accept 
16- and 17-year-olds because of compulsory education. A total of 383 individuals who satisfied the 
profile had a consultation at the YPO between 1 August 2009 and 15 September 2010, 93 in the first 
period, 129 in the second period, 134 in the third period, and 27 in the fourth. Variation in the number of 
consultations by period is mainly caused by typical school dropout patterns during the school year. Most 
dropouts leave school in the last months of the school year. This explains the peak in consultations during 
March till July (periods 2 and 3) and the much lower number of consultations in the first half of the 
school year and during the summer holidays (periods 1 and 4).  
 
Figure 4.1  Research design. 
15 September 2010 
15 April 2010 
 
 1 March 2010 
1 August 2009 
1 July 2010 
        1 November 2012 measurement of educational, labour 
market, and crime outcomes 
Period 1:   youths at YPO assigned to NSP (N=93)  
Period 3:   youths at YPO  assigned to NSP (N=134) 
Period 2:   youths at YPO assigned to regular program (N=129)  
Period 4:   youths at YPO assigned to regular program (N=27) 
 
Non-compliance                                                                                                                                    
According to the assignment rule, 227 youths should be assigned to the NSP and 156 youths should be 
assigned to a regular program. We received information on each individual’s consultation date and 
corresponding assignment from the YPO administration. These youths were assigned to one of the two 
neighbourhood schools or one of the 27 reintegration programs.  
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These data reveal that in practice not all youths were assigned according to their time of entry. The YPO 
employees did not always act in line with the assignment rule and sometimes over-ruled our research 
design by referring individuals who were not intended to be treated to the NSP, and vice versa. It turns 
out that 39 of the 227 individuals who should have been assigned to the NSP were sent to a regular 
program. Similarly, 12 of the 156 individuals who should have been assigned to a regular program were 
assigned to the NSP. Because of this non-compliance, we distinguish between an ‘intention-to-treat’ 
status and an ‘assignment’ status. Youths who entered the YPO in the first or third period were intended 
to be treated and youths who entered the YPO in the second or fourth period were not intended to be 
treated. The intention-to-treat variable is thus only determined by the consultation date. The assignment 
variable depends on the actual assignment and takes the value of one if an individual is assigned to the 
NSP and zero if not. The assignment differs from the intention-to-treat when the actual assignment is not 
in accordance with the assignment rule. A second – and less important – reason why assignment does not 
always coincide with the intended treatment is that four individuals had a second consultation at the YPO 
after 15 September 2010. These four individuals had initially been assigned to a regular program and 
were reassigned to the NSP after their second consultation. 8
                                                 
8 One of the individuals with a later assignment to the NSP, was intended to be treated, but initially referred to the 
control group. The other three individuals all had an intention-to-treat status equal to zero. 
 Of the 227 individuals who were intended to 
be treated, 38 (17%) were assigned to a regular program. Similarly, 15 of the 156 individuals (10%) not 
intended to be treated were assigned to the NSP. 
 
Furthermore, not all youths who were assigned to the NSP decided to participate. Of the 204 individuals 
assigned to the NSP, 104 refused to participate in the program. Hence, 51% of the youths that were 
assigned to NSP decided not to start at the neighbourhood school after the consultation at the YPO. These 
youths sometimes communicated that they did not have the intention to start, but in most cases they 
simply did not show up and could not be contacted. This large fraction of non-starters indicates that it is 
difficult to get the target group into treatment. For a comparison, the fraction of non-starters among the 
remaining 179 youths assigned to one of the regular reintegration programs was also relatively high, at 
35%. There are two potential explanations for the larger fraction of non-starters among youths assigned to 
the NSP. First, they may be less inclined to participate in a more intensive program that requires more 
effort and time. Second, youths in the NSP receive student grants instead of social benefits, which is 
financially less attractive. Figure 4.2 summarizes the assignment flows by intention-to-treat status and 
starting behaviour by assignment status for all 383 youths in our estimation sample. 
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Figure 4.2  Intention-to-treat, assignment, and starting behaviour. 
Intention-to-treat =1
(N=227) 
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Assignment = 1
(N=204)
Intention-to-treat=0
(N=156) 
189(83%)
 
4.3 Data 
Our data come from three sources. First, we use data about the educational and labour market position 
from the YPO’s administrative records. This information is collected in the status forms completed by the 
YPO on four different reference dates: 1 April 2011, 1 October 2011, 1 May 2012, and 1 November 2012. 
In addition to individual information on consultation dates and assigned programs, the status forms 
contain four dummy variables for each youth, indicating (i) whether the individual has ever participated in 
the assigned program, (ii) whether the individual has moved out of the program on the corresponding 
date, (iii) whether the individual is enrolled in regular education on the corresponding date and (iv) 
whether the individual had a job on the corresponding reference date. Second, individual background 
characteristics are collected from registration forms, which are completed by the YPO during the 
consultations. Third, we use the administrative data from the police of Rotterdam–Rijnmond. These data 
contain information on the number of crimes an individual is suspected of having committed during the 
period between1 August 2001 and 1 November 2012. 
 
As a first outcome, we use a dummy variable that indicates return to school or to the labour market. This 
variable has value one if an individual is in education and/or has a job and zero otherwise. We use this 
outcome variable to investigate the effects of the NSP on school enrolment and/or employment. Our main 
analyses use the data from the status form on reference date 1 November 2012, since this provides the 
most recent information on educational enrolment and employment and is most informative of the longer-
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term effects of the NSP. At this date all participating youths had moved out of the NSP. In addition, we 
have constructed a variable that indicates the yearly average number of crimes an individual is suspected 
of during the period between the consultation date and 1 November 2012. Although suspected individuals 
might not have committed a crime, it seems plausible that this variable has a positive correlation with 
criminal activity. We label this variable as the crime rate after the consultation date and use it to assess the 
effects of the NSP on criminal behaviour. Although a reduction in criminal activity is not an explicit goal 
of the program, it seems to be a relevant outcome regarding the multi-problem target population and the 
program’s health services focused on solving personal and behavioural problems.       
 
As covariates we can use a set of individual background characteristics, including gender, age, country of 
birth and educational attainment. In addition, we construct three variables indicating the average yearly 
number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-, four- or two-year periods before the 
consultation date at the YPO. We denote these as the eight-, four- and two-year pre-treatment crime rates 
and add these objective measures of problem intensity as covariates to our analyses.  
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all individuals in our estimation sample by intention-to-treat 
status. The first column reports the sample means of the 227 youths who were intended to be treated. The 
second column reports the sample means of the 156 youths who were not intended to be treated. The third 
column reports the p-value of the difference, calculated using a two-tailed t-test or a chi-squared test. The 
latest educational position (10 categories) indicates the most recent education type an individual was 
enrolled in at the time of consultation. The highest completed education level (eight categories) refers to 
the highest educational degree an individual has obtained. A large fraction, 69%, of the individuals in our 
estimation sample only completed primary education. The pre-treatment crime rates show the yearly 
average number of crimes an individual is suspected of in the period two, four or eight years before the 
consultation date. Individuals in our estimation sample are, on average, suspected of around 0.3 – 0.4 
crimes a year, depending on the period. A total of 52% of all youths in our sample were suspected of a 
crime at least once before the time of consultation, 53% in the intention-to-treat group and 50% in the 
other group (not shown in the table). The sample statistics reveal that both groups are quite similar on 
observed characteristics. We observe no statistically significant differences with respect to gender, age, 
educational attainment, or number of suspected crimes. Hence, the time windows we exploit for 
identifying the effects of the NSP are not (largely) correlated with observed characteristics of individuals.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics by intention-to-treat status 
 Intention-to-treat = 1 Intention-to-treat = 0 p-Value 
 Covariates   
Gender (male = 1)   0.58   0.65 0.16 
Age 20.59 20.63 0.80 
Country of birth      
    The Netherlands 
 
0.77 
 
0.71 
0.73 
 
    Morocco 0.05 0.04  
    The Antilles 0.08 0.10  
    Surinam 0.04 0.06  
    Other 0.06 0.08  
Latest educational position   0.31 
    Primary education 0.01 0.00  
    Practical education       0.00 0.01  
    Special education 0.04 0.05  
    Pre-vocational secondary education 0.04 0.07  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 1)  0.26 0.19  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 2) 0.42 0.44  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 3)     0.08 0.11  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 4) 0.08 0.08  
    Higher secondary education 0.00 0.01  
    Unknown 0.03 0.05  
Highest completed education level   0.25 
    Primary education 0.74 0.63  
    Pre-vocational secondary education 0.12 0.20  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 1)  0.07 0.06  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 2) 0.04 0.04  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 3)     0.00 0.00  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 4) 0.00 0.01  
    Higher secondary education 0.00 0.01  
    Unknown 
Pre-treatment crime rate (2-year period)*  
0.03 
0.39 
0.05 
0.44 
 
0.55 
Pre-treatment crime rate (4-year period)*  0.44 0.41 0.78 
Pre-treatment crime rate (8-year period)* 0.35 0.31 0.49 
 Outcome variables   
Educational and/or labour market position 0.30 0.28 0.71 
Crime rate (after consultation)* 0.33 0.29 0.55 
    
Total number of observations 227 156  
Notes.* Crime rates are the average yearly number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the relevant period. 
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The bottom panel of Table 4.1 gives a first impression of the potential effects on outcomes. We observe 
no significant differences between the groups with respect to either educational and/or labour market 
position and crime rates after the consultation at the YPO. The fraction of individuals in our sample who 
are either enrolled in school or employed on 1 November 2012 equals 29%. The average crime rate after 
the consultation date equals 0.31, which is slightly below the average pre-treatment crime rate.  
As discussed above, the selective assignment of youths to either the NSP or a regular program is a 
concern. To provide insight into this issue, we also compare observable characteristics by assignment 
status. Table 4.2 shows the sample statistics for both the group of youths actually assigned to the NSP and 
those assigned to the treatment as usual (a regular reintegration program).   
The observable characteristics of the two groups are quite similar. Both groups do not differ significantly 
with respect to gender, age, country of birth, or educational attainment. With respect to criminal activity, 
however, we observe that youths with a higher eight-year period pre-treatment crime rate are more 
frequently assigned to the NSP. This may suggest selective assignment.   
In our analyses (see Section 4.5) we control for all covariates. With respect to criminal behaviour, our 
main analyses include the eight-year pre-treatment crime rate. Although including a shorter period might 
yield a better indicator of an individual’s behaviour at the time of entry at the YPO, we believe that 
including a longer period is most informative. In addition, this is the only covariate that differs 
significantly between those assigned to the NSP and those assigned to a regular program.   
Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix presents the correlations between the most important variables in our 
analyses. Being male is positively correlated with both pre- and post-treatment crime rates. The pre-
treatment crime rate is strongly correlated with the post-treatment crime rate and negatively correlated 
with an educational or labour market position. The other variables are less strongly correlated. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics by actual assignment  
 
 Assigned to the NSP Assigned to regular program p-Value 
 Covariates   
Gender (male = 1)   0.61   0.60 0.77 
Age 20.53 20.68 0.36 
Country of birth      
    The Netherlands 
 
0.77 
 
0.72 
0.40 
 
    Morocco 0.05 0.04  
    The Antilles 0.08 0.10  
    Surinam 0.04 0.05  
    Other 0.05 0.10  
Latest educational position   0.38 
    Primary education 0.01 0.01  
    Practical education       0.02 0.00  
    Special education 0.05 0.04  
    Pre-vocational secondary education 0.05 0.06  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 1)  0.27 0.19  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 2) 0.42 0.44  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 3)     0.08 0.11  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 4) 0.07 0.10  
    Higher secondary education 0.00 0.01  
    Unknown 0.03 0.05  
Highest completed education level   0.25 
    Primary education 0.75 0.63  
    Pre-vocational secondary education 0.12 0.19  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 1)  0.06 0.07  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 2) 0.04 0.05  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 3)     0.00 0.00  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 4) 0.00 0.01  
    Higher secondary education 0.00 0.01  
    Unknown 
Pre-treatment crime rate (2-year period)*  
0.03 
0.44 
0.05 
0.38 
 
0.51 
Pre-treatment crime rate (4-year period)*  0.48 0.36 0.17 
Pre-treatment crime rate (8-year period)* 0.39 0.27 0.04 
 Outcome variables   
Educational and/or labour market position 0.27 0.32 0.30 
Crime rate (after consultation)* 0.36 0.26 0.13 
    
Total number of observations 204 179  
Notes.* Crime rates are the average yearly number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the relevant period. 
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 4.4 Empirical strategy 
For estimating the effect of the NSP we exploit variation in participation in the program induced by an 
assignment rule based on time windows. We start by estimating the impact of assignment to the NSP with 
the following equation: 
Yi = βo + β1 Di + β2 Xi + S (Ti )+ εi ,                                                                                                          (4.1)                                                                    
 
where Yi is the outcome variable of interest of individual i; Xi is a vector of individual background 
characteristics, including gender, age, age squared, country of birth, most recent education level, highest 
completed education level, and eight-year pre-treatment crime rate; Di  is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether individual i was assigned to the NSP; S (Ti ) is a smooth polynomial function of the month of 
entry, and εi is the error term. The coefficient of interest is β1. Since our counterfactual is assignment to a 
regular reintegration program, the estimated coefficient β1 should be interpreted as the effect of 
assignment to the NSP compared to assignment to a regularly available program. We use two main 
outcome variables: a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is enrolled in education and/or has 
a job on 1 November 2012 and the crime rate in the period between the consultation date and 1 November 
2012. 
A concern with estimating Equation (4.1) is non-compliance with the intended treatment by the YPO 
employees responsible for the assignment of individuals. Since estimation with ordinary-least squares 
(OLS) can yield inconsistent results because of selective assignment, we use an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach. To address the endogeneity problem, we instrument assignment by intended treatment and 
estimate equation (1) with two-stage-least squares (2SLS). The first stage equation, in which the 
assignment is regressed on the intended treatment and covariates, is 
 
Di = γo + γ1 Zi + γ2 Xi + S (Ti )+ ui,                                                                                                           (4.2) 
where Zi is a dummy variable indicating the intention-to-treat status. This variable takes the value one if 
individual i had a consultation at the YPO between 1 August 2009 and 1 March 2010 or between 15 April 
2010 and 1 July 2010 and zero if individual i had a consultation in the remaining periods, between 1 
March 2010 and 15 April 2010 or between 1 July 2010 and 15 September 2010.  
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We identify the treatment effect on the assumption that the intended treatment (Zi ) is not correlated with 
the outcome variable (Yi ), conditional on covariates. Our model controls for smooth polynomials of the 
month of entry, which pick up potential continuous time effects on outcomes. Since variation in our 
instrument is due only to differences in the time of entry, it seems plausible that the instrument is not 
correlated with unobservables in the error term, conditional on the continuous function of the month of 
entry. Hence, the identifying assumption is that there are no other discontinuous effects of the time of 
entry on the outcomes.    
A potential threat to the validity of our instrument might be the manipulation of consultation dates. Since 
we are using administrative data of the YPO, an independent agency with no particular interest in the 
relative performance of the NSP compared to other reintegration programs, manipulation of consultation 
dates seems not very plausible. Moreover, an inspection of the number of intakes around the cut-off dates 
does not reveal any suspicious patterns. We observe no increase or decrease in the number of 
consultations during these periods. It should also be noted that we observe non-compliance with the 
assignment rule. If the YPO would manipulate the dates this seems less likely.  
If the standard IV-assumptions hold, estimation with 2SLS yields a local average treatment effect that can 
be interpreted as the average treatment effect of assignment to the NSP for the subpopulation of compliers 
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Compliers are individuals whose treatment status is affected by the 
instrument. In our case, these are youths whose assignment to the NSP is completely determined by the 
intended treatment.  
It should be noted that our analysis focuses on the causal impact of assignment to the NSP, which from a 
policy perspective also seems the most relevant treatment variable. We instrument assignment to the NSP 
with the intended assignment to the NSP. This differs from the standard approach dealing with non-
compliance to treatment in which actual treatment is instrumented with assignment to treatment. Due to 
the policy implementation of the NSP we cannot estimate the causal effect of participation in the NSP by 
using intended assignment to the NSP as an instrumental variable. We are concerned that the exclusion 
restriction will not hold as it seems not likely that never-takers and always-takers (with respect to 
participation) in the treatment and control group will receive equal treatment. The YPO offers only one 
intervention to individuals in the treatment and in the control group. Individuals that are assigned to the 
NSP but who refuse to participate are not allowed to start in other programs. Similar youths in the control 
group, that would have refused to participate in case of assignment to the NSP, can either start in a regular 
program or not start in any program at all. Hence, the instrument not only affects participation in the NSP 
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but also affects the subsample of individuals who refuse to participate when assigned to NSP. We observe 
that 51 % of the youths assigned to the NSP did not start, whereas 35 % of the youths in the control group 
did not start in a program. This indicates that part of the youths in the control group that would have 
refused to start in case of assignment to the NSP, accept to start in a regular program. It follows that 
never-takers in the treatment and control group do not receive equal treatment and the exclusion 
restriction will not hold. This implies that we can only estimate the effect of assignment to the NSP, 
which is driven by both the effect of participation in the NSP and the effect of a different probability of 
starting in a program.  
 
 
4.5 Estimated effects on schooling, labour market and crime outcomes 
4.5.1 Main results 
This section shows the main estimation results of the effect of assignment to the NSP on the educational 
and/or labour market position and on the criminal activity. In Table 4.3 we present the OLS and IV 
estimates using six model specifications. The first model regresses the outcome variable on a constant, a 
dummy variable for assignment to the NSP, and a linear function of the month of entry at the YPO. 
Model (2) additionally controls for gender, age, age squared, and country of birth. Model (3) adds the 
most recent educational position and the highest completed education level, while model (4) also includes 
the crime rate during the eight-year period before the consultation date at the YPO.9 In models (5) and (6) 
the linear function of the month of entry is extended to quadratic and cubic polynomials, respectively.10
                                                 
9 Including the number of crimes during the shorter two- or four-year period instead of the eight-year period 
before the consultation date yields similar results. 
 
The top panel of Table 4.3 presents the estimated effects on a dummy variable for school enrolment 
and/or employment on 1 November 2012, while the middle panel reports the estimated effects on the 
number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the period between the consultation date and 1 
November 2012. In addition, the bottom panel of Table 4.3 shows the estimates of the first-stage 
regression, in which assignment to the NSP is regressed on the intended treatment. Each estimate is based  
10 Alternative specifications in which we include continuous functions of the day or week of entry rather than the 
month of entry yield similar estimation results.    
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on a separate regression and robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the program/location level 
are shown in parentheses.11
The OLS regressions show that assignment to the NSP is not associated with the educational or labour 
market position. All estimates are statistically insignificant and point estimates are slightly below zero. 
Since the OLS estimates may suffer from endogeneity, we proceed with IV estimates. The IV estimates 
are consistent with the OLS findings. In all specifications the effect of assignment to the NSP does not 
significantly differ from zero. Hence, we find no evidence that assignment to the NSP affects school 
enrolment or employment probabilities.  
    
 
With respect to criminal activity, the OLS regressions yield positive but statistically insignificant effects. 
The IV regressions also show positive point estimates. In the full model, including higher- order 
polynomials of the time of entry, we find marginally significant positive effects of assignment to the NSP. 
This suggests that assignment to the NSP leads to an increase in criminal activity. To test the sensitivity 
of this result, we estimate the full-model IV specification on a sample from which we excluded 
individuals with the largest number of pre-treatment crimes (all individuals suspected of 15 crimes or 
more in the eight-year period before the consultation date, 5 % of the sample). This yields an estimate of 
0.14 that is statistically significant at the 10 %-level (not shown in Table 4.3), which suggests that the 
result is not driven by a small subgroup. The inclusion of a higher-order term of the month of entry 
substantially affects the estimated effect on the crime rate. This indicates that there are unobserved 
differences in inflow over time, that are picked up by the smooth function of the month of entry.12
                                                 
11 The total number of clusters equals 29, which are the programs youths are referred to after their consultations. 
We distinguish 27 different regular reintegration programs and two locations within the NSP, in the north and 
south of Rotterdam. 
 The 
first-stage regression determines the effect of the intention-to-treat on assignment. The estimates are 
highly significant, with F-values above 93 in all our models. This implies that our analyses do not suffer 
from a weak instrument problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997).  
12 Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix presents additional estimation results for the specifications (1)-(4), including a third 
order polynomial of the month of entry. Adding covariates does not affect the estimated effects.  
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Table 4.3 Estimates of the effect of assignment to the NSP on schooling, labour market and    
crime  
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
  
 Dependent variable: Educational/labour market position  
       
OLS       
Assignment to the 
NSP 
 
 
-0.040 
(0.067) 
-0.051 
(0.049) 
-0.039 
(0.053) 
-0.029 
(0.051) 
-0.023 
(0.041) 
-0.023 
(0.041) 
IV (second stage)       
Assignment to the 
NSP 
0.032 
(0.082) 
0.010 
(0.073) 
0.024 
(0.088) 
0.032 
(0.083) 
0.052 
(0.076) 
0.052 
(0.073) 
       
       
 Dependent variable: Crime rate 
       
OLS       
Assignment to the 
NSP 
 
 
0.069 
(0.077) 
0.083 
(0.060) 
0.081 
(0.055) 
0.041 
(0.044) 
0.101 
(0.060) 
0.101 
(0.061) 
IV (second stage)       
Assignment to the 
NSP 
0.031 
(0.108) 
0.083 
(0.088) 
0.099 
(0.075) 
0.068 
(0.053) 
0.165* 
(0.084) 
0.163* 
(0.090) 
       
       
 Dependent variable: Assignment to the NSP 
       
First-stage       
Intended assignment 0.723*** 
(0.067) 
0.721*** 
(0.064) 
0.721*** 
(0.065) 
0.719*** 
(0.066) 
0.686*** 
(0.071) 
0.692*** 
(0.070) 
       
F-test for instrument 116.45 126.91 123.04 118.68 93.35 97.73 
       
Controls       
SES no yes yes yes yes yes 
Educational level no no yes yes yes yes 
Pre-treatment crime  no no no yes yes yes 
Polynomial control 
for month of entry 
 
linear linear linear linear quadratic cubic 
Observations 
 
383 383 383 383 383 383 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the *** 1% level 
and *10% level. The SES control variables include gender, age, age squared, and country of birth. The educational level controls 
include the latest educational position and the highest completed education level. Pre-treatment crime is the yearly average number of 
crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation date.  
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4.5.2 Heterogeneity 
 
We now investigate the impact of assignment to the NSP for subgroups. We examine whether the effects 
differ between suspected and non-suspected youths, men and women, older and younger individuals, and 
relatively lower- and higher-educated youths. A suspected individual is defined as an individual who has 
been suspected of a crime at least once during the eight-year period before entry at the YPO. A non-
suspected individual was never suspected of a crime during this period. We define individuals aged 20.6 
years (the average age in the estimation sample) or older as old and individuals aged under 20.6 years as 
young. Lower-educated youths are those who have only completed primary education and higher-
educated youths have obtained a secondary or higher educational degree.13
Table 4.4 presents the full-model IV estimation results of the effects of assignment to the NSP for these 
subpopulations (compare model (6) in Table 4.3). The second-stage results show that assignment to the 
NSP has no significant effects on educational or labour market position for all subpopulations. With 
respect to the number of crimes, we find a statistically significant positive effect, 0.36, for suspected 
individuals, while the point estimate for non-suspected individuals is close to zero.  
  
 
 
This finding implies that assignment to the NSP increases crime rates during the period between the 
consultation date and 1 November 2012, with 0.36 for the (compliant subpopulation of the) sample of 
youths suspected of a crime when they entered the program. We also find positive effects for the male 
subpopulation, while the effects for females are close to zero. Being suspected of a crime is strongly 
correlated with gender: 75% of the suspected subpopulation is male. In addition, statistically significant 
effects for the younger subpopulation are found (but the difference between estimated effects for young 
and old individuals is not very large). 
 
These findings indicate that the marginally significant effects of assignment to the NSP on criminal 
activity are driven by the effects on the subpopulation of suspected individuals. Table 4.A.3 in the 
Appendix presents all OLS and IV estimates for the subsample of suspected youths. Positive effects on 
crime rates are also found in the IV models that do not include a higher-order polynomial of the month of 
entry and in the OLS models. This provides additional evidence that assignment to the NSP increases 
criminal activity among youths who have been suspected of criminal activities in the past. 
 
                                                 
13 We have chosen this definition of higher education because 70% of youths in our estimation sample completed 
only primary education.  
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Table 4.4 IV estimates of the effect of assignment to the NSP on educational/labour market  
position and crime for subgroups        
                                                      
 (1) 
Suspected  
 
Not 
suspected 
(2) 
Male 
 
Female 
(3) 
Old 
 
Young 
(4) 
Lower- 
educated 
 
Higher- 
educated 
         
 Dependent variable: Educational/labour market position 
         
IV (second stage)         
Assignment to the 
NSP 
-0.002 
(0.094) 
0.135 
(0.107) 
0.161 
(0.134) 
-0.099 
(0.138) 
-0.024 
(0.093) 
0.097 
(0.081) 
-0.050 
(0.070) 
0.214 
(0.167) 
         
 Dependent variable: Crime rate 
         
IV (second stage)         
Assignment to the 
NSP 
0.355** 
(0.127) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
0.290** 
(0.118) 
-0.005 
(0.068) 
0.124 
(0.074) 
0.252** 
(0.120) 
0.117 
(0.086) 
0.281 
(0.222) 
         
 Dependent variable: Assignment to the NSP 
         
First-stage         
Intended treatment  0.600*** 
(0.077) 
0.732*** 
(0.104) 
0.721*** 
(0.054) 
0.594*** 
(0.129) 
0.695*** 
(0.084) 
0.678*** 
(0.071) 
0.698*** 
(0.056) 
0.687*** 
(0.122) 
         
F-test for 
instrument 
60.72 49.54 178.27 21.20 68.46 91.19 155.35 31.71 
         
Controls         
SES yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Educational level yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pretreatment crime yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial control 
for month of entry 
 
cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
Observations 
 
199 184 232 151 194 189 266 117 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the *** 1% level and 
**5% level. The SES control variables include gender, age, age squared, and country of birth. The educational level controls include the 
latest educational position and the highest completed education level. Pre-treatment crime refers to a variable indicating the yearly average 
number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation date.  
 
 
 
4.5.3 Alternative outcome measures 
 
In addition to our two main outcomes, we construct six related outcome variables: (1) a dummy variable 
that indicates whether an individual is enrolled in education on 1 November 2012; (2) a dummy variable 
that indicates whether an individual has work on 1 November 2012; (3) a dummy variable that indicates 
whether an individual has an educational and/or labour market position on 1 November 2012 or obtained 
an educational degree between the consultation date and 1 November 2012; (4) a dummy variable that 
100
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indicates whether an individual has ever been in education or worked on either of the four reference dates 
(1 April 2011, 1 October 2011, 1 May 2012, and 1 November 2012); (5) the crime rate during a one-year 
period after the consultation date; and (6) a dummy variable that indicates whether an individual is 
suspected of at least one crime in the period between the consultation date and 1 November 2012. Table 
4.5 presents the full-model (second-stage) IV estimates of the effect of assignment to the NSP for these 
six outcome variables. Each column corresponds to one outcome variable.  
 
Models (1) to (4) are related to educational and employment outcomes. Since the program is relatively 
more focused on educational outflow, one might hypothesize that it affected school enrolment more than 
employment. We find no evidence that the NSP specifically affected any one of these outcomes; both 
estimated effects on school enrolment and employment are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, we 
investigate the effects on an extended measure of educational and/or labour market success by including 
youths who have obtained a formal educational degree. In addition to educational enrolment, we received 
data on educational completion from the YPO. Five persons completed intermediate vocational 
educational before the latest reference date, two of whom assigned to the NSP and three to a regular 
program. Including these ‘successfully treated youths’ in our outcome measure does not affect estimation 
results. Finally, we assess potential short-run effects by looking at educational or labour market position 
on at least one of the four reference dates. Previous studies on youth programs found that positive effects 
can fade away in the longer term (e.g., Schochet et al., 2008; Rodriguez-Planas, 2012). If assignment to 
the NSP initially increases school enrolment or employment, we expect to see this on the earlier reference 
dates. A complicating factor is that not all youths moved out of their programs on the earlier reference 
dates. Variation in the start dates and program durations of youths cause differences in outflow between 
both groups. Because of the longer program durations in the NSP, the fraction of youths who left the 
program is larger in the control group for each of the reference dates. Since youths still in their programs 
are, by definition, not enrolled in education or employed, the analysis seems to provide a lower bound on 
the NSP’s potential short-run effects. The negative, statistically insignificant point estimate does not 
provide evidence of short-run gains. 
 
Models (5) and (6) are related to criminal behaviour. Previous studies found that youth programs in a 
residential setting reduced crimes during the treatment period but the effects did not persist (e.g., Sochet 
et al., 2001; Sochet et al., 2008; Millenky et al., 2011). To shed light on potential short-run reductions in 
criminal activity, we estimate the effects on crime rates only during the first year after the consultation 
date. The positive (but statistically insignificant) point estimate of 0.11 suggests that criminal activity was 
not reduced during the treatment period.  
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Table 4.5 Estimates of the effect of assignment to the NSP on six alternative outcome measures 
 
                     Educational and/or labour market position 
 
Criminal behaviour 
(1) 
Educational 
position on the 
latest 
reference date 
(2) 
Labour 
market 
position on 
the latest 
reference 
date 
(3) 
Educational/ 
labour market 
position or 
educational 
degree on  
the latest 
reference date 
(4) 
Educational/ 
labour market 
position on at 
least one of 
the four 
reference 
dates 
(5) 
Crime rate in 
one-year 
period after 
the  
consultation 
date 
(6) 
Suspected of 
at least one 
crime after the 
consultation 
date 
       
IV (second stage)       
Assignment to the 
NSP 
0.018 
(0.062) 
0.016 
(0.046) 
0.052 
(0.078) 
-0.061 
(0.073) 
0.115 
(0.156) 
0.017 
(0.084) 
       
       
Controls       
SES yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Educational level yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-treatment crime yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial control 
for month of entry 
 
cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
Observations 
 
383 383 383 383 383 383 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The SES control variables include gender, age, age squared, and country of birth. The 
educational level controls include the latest educational position and the highest completed education level. Pre-treatment crime refers to a 
variable indicating the yearly average number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation 
date.  
 
 
If anything, a comparison with the estimated effect of 0.16 on criminal activity in the whole period after 
the consultation date indicates that the positive impact of assignment to the NSP on crime rates increases 
over time. We investigate these timing issues further in Section 4.6. 
 
The impact on crime rates may be driven by effects on both the number of criminally active youths and 
the number of crimes among those already criminally active. The strong effect among the group of 
suspected individuals at the start of the program suggests that the latter is most prominent. We estimate 
the effect on a dummy variable for being suspected of a crime after the consultation date and find an 
insignificant point estimate close to zero. This finding implies that assignment to the NSP does not 
increase the number of criminally active youths and supports our finding that the overall increase in crime 
rates is driven by an increase in crimes among those who were already criminally active.     
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4.6 Mechanisms 
Our estimation results indicate that assignment to the NSP increases criminal activity, especially for the 
subpopulation of suspected individuals. We now examine two mechanisms that may explain our findings. 
First, we try to distinguish between criminal behaviour during program participation and after leaving the 
program. In our main analyses, we estimate the effects on crime rates after the consultation date, which 
includes both the active treatment period and the period after leaving the program. Criminal activity can 
differ between these periods. During the treatment criminal behaviour can, for example, be hampered by 
the supervision of the coaches or the program’s requirements. This can also lead to postponed criminal 
activity after leaving the program. On the other hand, if youths feel protected by their coaches when they 
get into trouble, they may be less deterred by potential sanctions and more inclined to risky criminal 
behaviour. A distinction in the crime rates provides insight into the timing of criminal activities. 
  
Second, we investigate whether peer group effects can explain our findings. Within each of the two 
neighbourhood schools, around 100 individuals are treated simultaneously. This can provide the 
opportunity to learn from each other or to motivate each other with respect to criminal activities. If 
individuals are influenced by their peer group, social interaction between youths within the 
neighbourhood school can affect criminal outcomes. Previous studies point out the importance of peer 
group effects. Glaeser et al. (1996) find that social interaction in criminal behaviour is an important factor 
in explaining the variation in crime rates across US cities. Dishion et al. (1999) conclude that 
interventions for at-risk adolescents delivered in peer groups can reinforce delinquency and other kinds of 
problem behaviour. High-risk youths seem particularly vulnerable to peer group pressure. Dodge et al. 
(2007) review the literature on deviant peer influences and state that group-based interventions can 
increase problem behaviour, since participants can learn from interaction with their deviant peers.  
To investigate these issues further, we have to restrict our estimation sample to youths who actually 
started in a program. For non-starters it is not possible to distinguish between the program and post-
program period or to investigate the influence of program peers. The restricted sample of starters consists 
of 217 individuals, of whom 100 participated in the NSP and 117 in one of the regular reintegration 
programs. Table 4.A.4 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of this selective subpopulation of 
starters. Both groups within this sample are quite similar on most observable characteristics, such as 
gender, educational attainment and criminal activity. We only observe a significant difference with 
respect to age: Starters in the NSP are younger than starters in a regular program.14
                                                 
14 Table 4.A.5 in the Appendix also reports OLS estimates of the effect of starting in the NSP compared to starting in 
a regular program on the educational/labour market position and crime rate. As discussed in Section 4.4, the 
 Table 4.6 shows the 
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average crime rates during and after the program for both groups of starters, with standard deviations in 
parentheses.15
 
 
The crime rates are roughly equal during the program, but after the program we observe a remarkable 
difference: Crime rates in the NSP stay at the same level, whereas crime rates in the regular programs 
decrease.16
 
 This pattern does not suggest a reduction in crime rates during the program or the 
postponement of criminal activities. 
Table 4.6 Crime rates during and after program participation 
 starters in the NSP starters in the 
control group 
 
Crime rate during the program 0.44 
(0.12) 
0.41 
(0.16) 
 
Crime rate after leaving the program 0.38 
(0.13) 
0.21 
(0.04) 
 
Number of observations 100 117  
Notes. The standard deviations of the average crime rates are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.7 shows the OLS estimates of models in which the crime rate during the program (left panel) and 
after the program (right panel) are regressed on a dummy variable for starting in the NSP and all the 
covariates. Since the impact of assignment to the NSP on criminal activity is mainly driven by the group 
of suspected individuals, we also perform our analyses on this subpopulation. Columns (1) and (2) show 
the estimated effects on crime rates during the program for the full sample and the subpopulation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimated impact of assignment to the NSP captures both the effect of participation in the NSP and the effect of a 
difference in starting probabilities. Although we cannot give a causal interpretation to the results the estimated 
effects suggest that starting in the NSP does not increase school enrolment or employment probabilities. 
15 This analysis used the actual start date to construct program duration rather than the consultation date. There 
can be slight differences between both dates, since it takes some time before an individual actually starts the 
program to which he or she is referred. Our main analyses use the consultation date, since non-starters do not 
have a start date. 
16 The differences in crime rates presented in Table 4.6 are not statistically significant. The p-value of the difference 
in crime rates after leaving the program equals 0.21. 
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suspected criminals. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) present the estimated effects on the post-program 
crime rates for both samples. 
 
Whereas we find no significant effects on the crime rate during the program, we find that starting in the 
NSP has a positive and statistically significant effect at the 1% level on the crime rate after program exit. 
In the complete sample the estimated effect is 0.25. When restricting the sample to suspected individuals, 
we find an even larger effect, 0.43. These findings suggest that the positive effect of assignment to the 
NSP on criminal activity is mostly driven by differences in post-program criminal behaviour. Whereas we 
observe a drop in criminal activity after an individual leaves a regular reintegration program, crime rates 
for starters in the NSP stay roughly at the same level. This finding is in line with the increasing impact of 
the NSP on crime rates over time (see Table 4.5, column (5) and Table 4.3, column (6)). 
 
 
Table 4.7 The effect of starting in the NSP (compared to starting in a control program) on the crime 
rates during and after the program 
 
 Effects on crime rate during program 
 
Effects on crime rate after the program 
 
 (1) 
Complete sample 
(2) 
Subsample of 
suspected 
individuals 
(3) 
Complete sample 
(4) 
Subsample of 
suspected 
individuals 
OLS     
Starting in the NSP 
 
 
-0.065 
(0.116) 
-0.132 
(0.268) 
0.254*** 
(0.050) 
0.426*** 
(0.127) 
     
Controls     
SES yes yes yes yes 
Educational level yes yes yes yes 
Pre-treatment crime yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial control for 
month of entry 
 
cubic cubic cubic cubic 
Observations 
 
217 121 217 121 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the *** 1% level. The 
SES control variables include gender, age, age squared and country of birth. The educational level controls include the latest educational 
position and the highest completed education level. Pre-treatment crime refers to a variable indicating the yearly average number of crimes 
an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation date.  
 
 
Potentially positive influences of program employees or coaches may be mitigated in the NSP by peer 
group effects. To investigate the existence of peer effects, we try to exploit the variation in pre-treatment 
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criminal activity across the two locations of the NSP (North or South). Individuals were assigned to the 
location based on their place of residence. Since interaction takes place within a location, we consider the 
subsample of youths at the specific location as the relevant peer group. We remove four individuals who 
were assigned twice from our sample, since they were referred to the NSP after the assignment period and 
started the program later. This leaves us with 96 starters during the assignment period. For the location 
South, the average pre-treatment crime rate (0.36) is 29% higher compared to that at North (0.28). Hence, 
an individual assigned to location South is more likely to face peers with criminal experience than an 
individual sent to location North.17
 
 
We now examine the existence of crime-related peer effects by estimating the effect of the average pre-
treatment crime rate in the peer group on the individual crime rate after the consultation date, conditional 
on individual pre-treatment crime rate and all the other covariates. The left panel of Table 4.8 shows the 
OLS estimates of the effects of both individual and average pre-treatment crime rates. Model (1) includes 
all 96 starters in the NSP; model (2) restricts the sample to the subpopulation of suspected individuals. If 
peer effects related to criminal behaviour exist, we expect to find positive effects for the average crime 
rate, especially in the subsample of suspected individuals. Table 4.8 shows that the estimates of the 
average pre-treatment crime rate are positive. When we only take into account suspected individuals, we 
find much larger and statistically significant estimates. This may provide evidence for the existence of 
crime-related peer effects. Nevertheless, since we only use variation between locations, we cannot rule 
out that our measure for peer effects picks up other unobservable differences between both locations. If 
our findings truly reveal crime-related peer effects, we expect our measure to be less clearly correlated 
with educational and/or labour market outcomes. If they reflect other differences, it seems more plausible 
that our measure is correlated with other outcomes as well. 
 
The right panel (models (3) and (4)) presents the estimation results of equivalent OLS models, in which a 
dummy variable for educational and/or labour market position is used as the outcome variable. We find 
insignificant effects of the average pre-treatment crime rate on educational and/or labour market position. 
Model (3) including all starters yields a positive point estimate, whereas model (4) including only 
suspected individuals yields a negative point estimate. Hence, the average pre-treatment crime rate seems 
to be related to individual criminal activity but not to individual success with respect to education or 
work.   
                                                 
17 We also compared the fraction of suspected individuals at the start of the program, which turns out to be similar 
in both sites. Hence, the difference in pre-treatment criminal activity is caused by higher crime rates among 
suspected individuals in location South. 
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Table 4.8 The effect of the average crime rate of peers on individual outcomes (starters in the NSP) 
 
 Dependent variable: Crime rate 
 
Dependent variable: Educational and/or 
labour market position 
 
 (1) 
Complete sample 
(2) 
Subsample of 
suspected individuals 
(3) 
Complete sample 
(4) 
Subsample of 
suspected individuals 
OLS     
Individual crime rate 
 
 
0.804*** 
(0.118) 
0.915*** 
(0.176) 
-0.273*** 
(0.098) 
-0.216* 
(0.125) 
Average crime rate in peer 
group 
1.563 
(1.457) 
5.089** 
(2.453) 
0.639 
(1.205) 
-0.729 
(1.741) 
     
     
Controls     
SES yes yes yes yes 
Educational level yes yes yes yes 
Pre-treatment crime yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial control for month 
of entry 
 
cubic cubic cubic cubic 
Observations 
 
96 54 96 54 
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the *** 1% level, **5% level 
and *10% level. The SES control variables include gender, age, age squared, and country of birth. The educational level controls include the 
latest educational position and the highest completed education level. Pre-treatment crime refers to a variable indicating the yearly average 
number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation date.  
 
 
This analysis does not allow a causal interpretation because the youths were not randomly assigned to the 
sites and we cannot fully rule out the possibility that the estimated effects of average pre-treatment crime 
rates reflect other differences between the two locations. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with 
crime-related peer effects and we interpret them as suggestive evidence that peer effects appear to explain 
the positive effect of assignment to the NSP on criminal activity. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
The NSP aims to increase school enrolment and employment among multi-problem school dropouts. 
Previous studies provide mixed evidence on the success of training programs for disadvantaged youths. It 
seems therefore difficult to effectively serve the vulnerable target group of at-risk adolescents and realize 
persistent social gains. The NSP is largely designed in line with lessons from the literature and shares 
several components with other promising programs. It offers an intensive and integrated approach of 
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educational and work services combined with professional care and personal mentoring. We evaluate the 
effects of the program by implementing a specific assignment rule that ensures that treatment status is 
determined by an individual’s application date. The effects of assignment to the NSP are estimated three 
years after the start of the program. 
We find no evidence that assignment to the NSP improves school enrolment or employment probabilities 
compared to the regular treatment. This finding is in line with a large body of the literature that shows no 
impact of training programs for at-risk youths on labour market outcomes (e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 
2003; LaLonde, 2003). In addition, we find evidence that assignment to the NSP increases criminal 
activity, especially among the subpopulation of youths suspected of a crime at the time of entry. This 
result is consistent with previous studies that document adverse effects of group counselling or group-
based interventions on criminal activity (Dishion et al., 1999). Deviant peer effects caused by grouping at-
risk adolescents together can explain the reinforcement of criminal behaviour (Dodge et al., 2007). 
Additional analyses provide suggestive evidence in line with this explanation. Hence, adverse peer effects 
due to placing at-risk youths together may have mitigated other promising elements of the NSP.  
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Appendix 4.A: Additional analyses 
 
Table 4.A.1 Correlation table 
 Male Age 
 
Low 
education 
level 
 
Pre-treatment 
crime rate (8- 
year period) 
 
Post-
treatment 
crime rate 
 
Educational/labour 
market position 
 
       
Male  1.000      
       
Age  -0.138 1.000     
       
Low education level  0.115 -0.073 1.000    
       
Pre-treatment crime rate 
 
0.308 0.001 0.157 1.000   
Post-treatment crime rate 
 
0.287 -0.043 0.085 0.508 1.000  
Educational/labour 
market position 
 
-0.174 -0.057 -0.134 -0.221 -0.209 1.000 
Notes.Youths with a low education level have primary education as their highest completed education level. The pre-treatment crime 
rate is the average number of crimes an individual is suspected of in the eight-year period before consultation at the YPO. The post-
treatment crime rate is the average number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the period between consultation at the YPO 
and 1 November 2012.    
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Table 4.A.2 OLS and IV estimates of the effects on crime rates (all models including a cubic 
polynomial of the month of entry)           
                                                   
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
OLS     
     
Assignment to the NSP  0.145* 
(0.081) 
0.143** 
(0.068) 
0.139** 
(0.065) 
0.101 
(0.061) 
     
IV (second stage)     
     
Assignment to the NSP  0.155 
(0.137) 
0.179 
(0.115) 
0.193* 
(0.106) 
0.163* 
(0.090) 
     
     
     
     
Controls     
SES no yes yes yes 
Educational level no no yes yes 
Pre-treatment crime no no no yes 
Polynomial control for 
month of entry 
 
cubic cubic cubic cubic 
Observations 
 
383 383 383 383 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the ** 5% level and 
*10% level. The SES control variables include gender, age, age squared, and country of birth. The educational level controls include the 
latest educational position and the highest completed education level. Pre-treatment crime refers to a variable indicating the yearly average 
number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation date.  
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Table 4.A.3 Subpopulation of suspected individuals: OLS and IV estimates of the effects on crime 
rates    
                                                          
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
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Table 4.A.4 Descriptive statistics: Comparison of starters in the NSP and regular programs  
 
 Started in the NSP Started in a regular program p-Value 
 Covariates   
Gender (male = 1)   0.65   0.56 0.20 
Age 20.20 20.75 0.01 
Country of birth      
    The Netherlands 
 
0.74 
 
0.68 
0.80 
 
    Morocco 0.06 0.05  
    The Antilles 0.08 0.12  
    Surinam 0.06 0.06  
    Other 0.06 0.09  
Latest educational position   0.29 
    Primary education 0.00 0.00  
    Practical education       0.02 0.00  
    Special education 0.04 0.04  
    Pre-vocational secondary education 0.04 0.07  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 1)  0.30 0.19  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 2) 0.45 0.44  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 3)     0.07 0.13  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 4) 0.05 0.09  
    Higher secondary education 0.00 0.01  
    Unknown 0.03 0.03  
Highest completed education level   0.45 
    Primary education 0.77 0.64  
    Pre-vocational secondary education 0.10 0.18  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 1)  0.05 0.07  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 2) 0.05 0.06  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 3)     0.00 0.00  
    Intermediate vocational education (level 4) 0.00 0.01  
    Higher secondary education 0.00 0.01  
    Unknown 
Pre-treatment crime rate (2-year period)*  
0.03 
0.44 
0.03 
0.42 
 
0.92 
Pre-treatment crime rate (4-year period)*   0.42 0.40 0.92 
Pre-treatment crime rate (8-year period)* 0.35 0.29 0.47 
 Outcome variables   
Educational and/or labour market position 0.33 0.33 0.96 
Crime rate (after consultation)* 0.35 0.27 0.42 
    
Total number of observations 117 100  
Notes.* Crime rates are the average yearly number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the relevant period. 
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Table 4.A.5 OLS estimates of the impact of starting in the NSP (compared to starting in a regular 
program) on educational/labour market position and the crime rate (subsample of starters)                                                             
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
       
 Dependent variable: Educational/labour market position 
OLS       
Starting in the NSP  0.011 
(0.110) 
0.002 
(0.087) 
0.011 
(0.087) 
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(0.089) 
0.014 
(0.088) 
0.014 
(0.088) 
       
 Dependent variable: Crime rate 
OLS       
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(0.101) 
0.022 
(0.081) 
0.031 
(0.075) 
0.033 
(0.062) 
0.080 
(0.058) 
0.079 
(0.056) 
       
       
Controls       
SES no yes yes yes yes yes 
Educational level no no yes yes yes yes 
Number of crimes no no no yes yes yes 
Polynomial control 
for month of entry 
 
linear linear linear linear quadratic cubic 
Observations 
 
217 217 217 217 217 217 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The SES control variables include gender, age, age squared ,and country of birth. The 
educational level controls include the latest educational position and the highest completed education level. Pretreatment crime refers to a 
variable indicating the yearly average number of crimes an individual is suspected of during the eight-year period before the consultation 
date.  
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5 
 
The impact of a comprehensive school reform policy for 
failing schools on educational achievement1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter estimates the effects of a comprehensive school reform program on high-stakes test scores in 
Amsterdam. The program implements a systematic and performance-based way of working within 
weakly performing primary schools and integrates measures such as staff coaching, teacher evaluations 
and teacher schooling, and the use of new instruction methods. Difference-in-differences estimates show 
substantial negative effects on test scores for pupils in their final year of primary school. The program 
decreased test scores with 0.17 standard deviations in the first four years after its introduction. A potential 
explanation for this finding is the intensive and rigorous approach that caused an unstable work climate 
with increased teacher replacement.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Suzanne Kok: Van Elk, R., S. Kok, 2014, The impact of a comprehensive 
school reform policy for failing school on educational achievement; Results of the first four years, CPB Discussion 
Paper 264.  
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5.1 Introduction 
The improvement of weakly performing schools is an important issue in many countries. Comprehensive 
school reform (CSR) methods have been widely used to turn around failing schools.2 These programs 
involve integrated changes at all levels within schools rather than incremental changes targeted at single 
aspects. The school is considered as the level of improvement and a program’s content is tailored to its 
specific needs. 3
   
 CSR models typically include various elements such as professional development of 
educators, an increased attention to instruction methods and the individual needs of pupils, improvement 
in classroom or school management, parental involvement, curriculum improvements and setting high 
achievement goals. Proponents of CSR methods argue that comprehensive changes are needed since the 
impact of isolated interventions can be distorted by dysfunction in other areas (Borman et al., 2004). 
However, the effectiveness of CSR programs in increasing student outcomes is by and large unclear. 
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the causal effects of a CSR policy on educational performance. 
We investigate the impact of the Amsterdam School Improvement Program (ASIP) in the Netherlands, 
which was introduced in 2008. The goal of the program is to improve the educational quality of failing 
primary schools in Amsterdam. The ASIP is an intensive two-year program that aims to implement a 
systematic and performance-based way of working. This includes data-driven teaching with educators 
that systematically measure pupil performance. This information is used to respond to the individual 
needs of the pupils. The ASIP uses improvement plans that are fitted to the particular needs of the schools 
and typically integrate measures such as staff coaching, teacher quality evaluations, teacher schooling, 
and the use of new instruction methods. The implementation of each improvement plan is guided by an 
expert team with strong educational experience.  
 
As of April 2008, all primary schools in Amsterdam that were judged to perform below national quality 
standards were invited to voluntarily participate in the program. To examine the impact of the program 
we compare the development of pupil achievement in failing schools in Amsterdam to that in failing 
schools outside Amsterdam. Our assessment of educational achievement is based on the CITO test. This 
is a nationwide, high-stakes test that pupils take in the highest grade (eight) of primary education. The test 
includes questions on language, math, and information processing. We make use of administrative data on 
CITO test scores from 2005 to 2012, which enables us to compare the change in performance in 
                                                 
2 The U.S. government has devoted over 2 billion dollars to the implementation of CSR programs in the 1990s and 
early 2000s (U.S. Department of Education, 2004; 2006). 
3 Over 800 variations of CSR models have been implemented in more than 5,000 schools in the US in the past 
decades (Rowan et al., 2004).  
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Amsterdam before and after the introduction of the CSR policy with the change in performance in other 
cities that did not introduce the CSR policy.    
 
This study relates to the literature on the effects of CSR models. Borman et al. (2003) provide an 
extensive overview of existing studies with respect to 29 of the most widely implemented CSR models in 
the U.S. Although they find overall promising results, the authors conclude that both quality of research 
designs and quantity of studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions on the effectiveness of CSR 
models. More recent studies show ambiguous effects of CSR models. Whereas some studies find positive 
effects on student performance (e.g. May and Supovitz, 2006), others find no significant effects (Gross et 
al., 2009; Bifulco et al., 2005) or mixed results across grades and subjects (Schwartz et al., 2004). While 
the overall record of CSR models appears to be encouraging, most results come from studies that do not 
use credible research designs to handle potential selection problems. Schools that adopt a comprehensive 
school model are likely to differ from other schools in a number of aspects, such as student composition, 
educational quality, or desire for innovation. Even if one controls for student characteristics or school 
fixed effects, estimated effects may still be biased because of unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Our main contribution is that we use a quasi-experimental research design to address potential 
endogeneity. We estimate difference-in-differences models to identify the effects of the introduction of 
the CSR policy. Difference-in-differences models have been frequently used in previous economic 
evaluation studies (see e.g. Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Card and Krueger, 1994; Blundell et al., 1998; 
Jacob, 2005). We present intention-to-treat estimates and find substantially negative effects on test scores 
in the first four years after the introduction of the program. This result is robust to a variety of sensitivity 
analyses. In our preferred specification the introduction of the ASIP decreases test scores by 0.17 standard 
deviations. The detrimental impact on test scores is largest for language and is generally larger at the left 
part of the test score distribution. Interviews with school-leaders of participating schools provide a 
candidate explanation for our findings. The rigorous and demanding approach appears to have caused an 
increase in teacher replacement. The resulting loss of school specific knowledge, increase in recruitment 
and hiring costs, and uncertain work atmosphere felt by teachers may have negatively affected pupil 
achievement. We cannot exclude that our findings reflect adjustment costs during the transition from a 
failing to a successful school and that it takes longer before beneficial effects become manifest. In any 
case, we conclude that the introduction of the ASIP induced major costs in terms of substantial test score 
losses for at least four cohorts of pupils.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief overview of previous studies. 
Section 5.3 describes the ASIP. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 discuss the empirical strategy and the data. Section 
5.6 presents the results and Section 5.7 discusses potential mechanisms that could explain our findings. 
Section 5.8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Previous studies 
 
The literature on CSR models largely consists of practitioner-oriented studies (see e.g. Herman et al., 
1999; Traub, 1999; Slavin and Fashiola, 1998). Although some of these studies provide an assessment of 
CSR models, none of them makes use of control groups to identify causal effects of CSR models on 
student achievement. Borman et al. (2003) provide an overview of existing studies with respect to 29 of 
the most widely implemented CSR models in the U.S. Considering only studies that are performed by an 
independent third party and that make use of some form of control groups, the strongest evidence for 
positive effects is provided by three programs: the Direct Instruction Program (DIP), the School 
Development Program (SDP) and Success for All (SFA). Remarkably, two of these, DIP and SFA, are 
relatively narrow-targeted interventions mainly focusing on better instruction methods and curriculum 
improvements. For one program, Edison, statistically significant negative effects have been found. This 
program intended to create innovative schools with a challenging curriculum, instruction methods tailored 
to the needs of the pupils and an emphasis on computer technology. In addition, the authors report large 
heterogeneity in the estimated effects between CSR models that cannot be explained by the differences in 
the specific measures included in the program. This suggests that school-specific requirements and/or the 
level and quality of implementation are more important for determining success. The average school 
across all studies reviewed had implemented its CSR model for around three years and the authors point 
out that, if cumulative effects exist, the analyses may underestimate the impact of CSR models. Although 
they find overall effects that appear promising, Borman et al. (2003) conclude that both quantity and 
quality of studies are insufficient to draw reliable conclusions on the effectiveness of CSR models yet. 
They advocate new programs to be evaluated making use of (quasi-) experimental research designs, to 
obtain more evidence-based knowledge on the effects of CSR. 
 
Some more recent, also non-experimental, studies show ambiguous results. In an 11-year longitudinal 
study May and Supovitz (2006) evaluate the impact of a CSR design, called ‘America’s Choice’, on 
student test performance in Rochester, New York. The authors find significant positive effects on student 
performance which accumulate over time. The impact of the reform seemed to be larger in later grades 
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than in the early grades, which might be due to a more powerful influence of the program measures in 
later grades. The authors argue that the positive impact of the program is likely to be caused by 
instruction methods targeted towards the needs of individual students, ambitious expectations for student 
performance and a supporting organizational structure within school that facilitate this tailored way of 
working. Gross et al. (2009) investigate the effects of federal CSR funds on student achievement in Texas 
making use of student-level panel data. Since schools have to apply for these funds, selection bias is a 
concern for the identification of the effects. The authors deal with this issue by controlling for school 
fixed effects and find that CSR funds did not significantly affect student’s reading performance. The 
effects on math performance varied across different student types. Bifulco et al. (2005) evaluate three 
reform programs in New York City, including the School Development Program (SDP), Success for All 
(SFA) and the More Effective Schools (MES) program. The authors selected control groups by a random 
sample of troubled schools and then adjusted the sample so that the treatment and control groups have a 
similar propensity to start a CSR program. In contrast to some previous studies (see Borman et al., 2003) 
they did not find evidence that the SDP or SFA program significantly contributed to student performance. 
These findings, however, do support results from other earlier evaluations of SDP in Maryland, Chicago 
and Detroit (Cook et al., 1998; 1999; Millsap et al., 2001). Positive effects on reading scores are found for 
the MES program in the short run, but these do not persist when the external program trainers leave the 
school. This finding may suggest that schools face difficulties to maintain progress on their own, after the 
end of the program. Schwartz et al. (2004) assess the impact of a CSR model on student performance in 
New York, called the New York Networks for School Renewal Project. Student test scores in these 
schools are compared to a control group of students attending a set of randomly selected New York public 
schools. The authors make use of three cohorts of students, who are in grades 4, 5 or 6 at the start of the 
program in 1995-1996. The authors find mixed effects across grades after two to three years: in grade 4 
CSR significantly increased both math and reading test scores, while the effects in grade 5 are 
insignificant for reading and negative for math. In grade 6, the program did not significantly affect 
performance.  
 
In sum, the number of studies that use a credible research design to examine the effect of CSR models on 
student achievement is limited and existing studies show mixed findings. Our study adds to the literature 
by investigating the impact of a CSR policy on high-stakes test scores in the Netherlands. The ASIP 
shares some of the elements of other promising programs, including the increased attention to the 
individual needs of pupils and the tailor-made improvement plans that are guided by external experts. Our 
main contribution lies in the use of a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences approach to identify the 
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effects of the program on pupil achievement.   
   
5.3 The Amsterdam School Improvement Program  
5.3.1 Background 
 
In the Netherlands, the quality of primary schools is judged by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. This 
governmental agency periodically investigates whether schools provide an acceptable standard of 
education. Each primary school is judged on a yearly basis by means of a risk analysis. This risk analysis 
includes several aspects such as student test results, the level of exams, personnel management, the 
financial position of the school, and compliance with Dutch educational laws. If the outcomes of the risk 
analysis provide evidence of weak performance, a more extensive quality analysis follows to determine 
whether schools are failing to meet the required educational quality standards. Based on these analyses 
the Inspectorate of Education classifies schools as ‘basic’, ‘weak’ or ‘very weak’. Schools that satisfy 
national quality standards are classified as basic, while schools classified as (very) weak perform below 
national standards. Inspection reports in 2006 and 2008 showed that the educational quality of a relatively 
large proportion of schools in Amsterdam was below the national standards. In Amsterdam 13 percent of 
all primary schools was classified as weak and 2.4 percent as very weak in 2008. The nationwide fraction 
of weak and very weak schools was 9.2 and 1.4, respectively (Inspectorate of Education, 2009). Primary 
schools in Amsterdam also performed worse compared to primary schools in the other large cities in the 
Netherlands (Inspectorate of Education, 2008). Concerns on those weakly performing schools have led to 
an intensive policy effort by the municipality of Amsterdam to improve educational quality (see e.g. 
Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). It invested in a comprehensive school reform program that was 
introduced in 2008. All schools in Amsterdam that were classified as weak or very weak in the beginning 
of 2008 were invited to voluntarily participate in the program. After the school year 2008-2009, all 
primary schools in Amsterdam became eligible for the program. Hence, the program was initially targeted 
at failing schools, but became also accessible for sound performing schools later on.  
5.3.2 Content 
 
The Amsterdam School Improvement Program (ASIP) is an intensive two-year program designed to 
improve educational quality of participating schools. It aims to implement a systematic and performance-
based way of working within the whole school. This includes ‘data-driven teaching’, meaning that 
teachers systematically measure pupil performance and use this information to adjust lessons to the 
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effects of the program on pupil achievement.   
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Netherlands (Inspectorate of Education, 2008). Concerns on those weakly performing schools have led to 
an intensive policy effort by the municipality of Amsterdam to improve educational quality (see e.g. 
Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). It invested in a comprehensive school reform program that was 
introduced in 2008. All schools in Amsterdam that were classified as weak or very weak in the beginning 
of 2008 were invited to voluntarily participate in the program. After the school year 2008-2009, all 
primary schools in Amsterdam became eligible for the program. Hence, the program was initially targeted 
at failing schools, but became also accessible for sound performing schools later on.  
5.3.2 Content 
 
The Amsterdam School Improvement Program (ASIP) is an intensive two-year program designed to 
improve educational quality of participating schools. It aims to implement a systematic and performance-
based way of working within the whole school. This includes ‘data-driven teaching’, meaning that 
teachers systematically measure pupil performance and use this information to adjust lessons to the 
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individual needs of the pupils. Schooling of teachers is used to improve their classroom practices, school-
leaders and other school personnel take courses to improve their skills in performance-based working, and 
instruction methods are often replaced. A consistent way of working throughout the school should create 
an efficient organization in which teachers are optimally facilitated in their primary teaching tasks. The 
program is guided by an expert team with strong educational experience.4
The ASIP consists of three steps. First, a profound quality analysis is made by the educational experts 
together with the school. This analysis includes instruction methods, student performance, student care, 
didactical routines and management performance, including leadership, communication skills and the 
existence of a coherent vision of education. An important aspect of the analysis is the evaluation of 
teacher quality through observations of lessons. The experts use a specific teacher evaluation system to 
judge teacher quality on a variety of classroom practices, including pedagogical, didactical, and 
organizational competences. 
  
5 Second, based on this analysis, the school sets up an improvement plan in 
collaboration with the experts. This improvement plan states the specific measures that have to be 
implemented to improve educational quality within two years. These measures are suited to the specific 
needs of the schools and typically involve schooling of teachers, coaching of school-leaders and the use 
of new instruction methods. Third, after the improvement plan has been tested and approved by the expert 
team, it has to be implemented. During the implementation period the schools are supported by the expert 
team. The experts serve as critical advisors and visit the school at least once every three months to 
regularly assess the progress. Each six months the improvements in educational quality is measured in 
classes based on the teacher evaluation system. The expert team evaluates the progress and educational 
quality of the school more broadly and extensively during the first formal audit one year after the start of 
the program. If needed, the plan may be adjusted. After two years, a second audit takes place, which can 
be considered as the end of the program.6
 
  
As part of the program the municipality of Amsterdam developed instruction courses for professional 
development of school personnel. These accredited courses focus on the development of performance-
based working skills and became available in the school year 2009-2010. 7
                                                 
4 The expert team largely consists of former inspectors of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. 
 The courses are not only used 
5 The teacher evaluation system (TES) is called ‘Kijkwijzer’. Van der Steeg and Gerritsen (2013) find that high 
teacher quality scores on this TES are associated with better pupil test scores. This suggests that the TES measures 
teacher practices that are important for the educational performance of pupils.  
6 In exceptional cases where educational goals are not achieved yet, the program can be extended by an additional 
third year.   
7 These courses are mainly targeted at school-leaders and supportive school personnel. 
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for schooling of educators at schools that participate in the ASIP, but are also accessible for other primary 
schools in Amsterdam that do not participate in the program.  
 
At the start of the ASIP, the municipality of Amsterdam also introduced new achievement goals for 
primary schools. The standards aimed for are above the nationwide standards of the Inspectorate of 
Education. 8
 
 The announcement of the achievement goals reflects the ambitious plans of the municipality 
and serves as a signal for primary schools in Amsterdam. However, no explicit sanctions follow if a 
school does not satisfy the standards.  
5.3.3 Costs and participation 
 
The costs of the ASIP depend on the specific measures in the improvement plan. The average costs of the 
two-year ASIP amount to around 300,000 Euros per school, of which 250,000 Euros for the 
implementation of the interventions and 50,000 Euros for counselling by the expert team. Costs are 
shared by the municipality and the schools. The amount of resources to be paid by the school is dependent 
on its financial position. On average, the matching percentage of the schools is around 25%. The total 
costs involved are substantial: on average the yearly ASIP investment is more than 10% of the total 
government funding for an average primary school. 9
There are 209 primary schools in Amsterdam, of which 50 participated in the ASIP by the end of the 
2010-2011school year: 16 schools started in the program during or before the 2008-2009 school year, 14 
during the 2009-2010 school year, and 20 during the 2010-2011 school year. It should be noted that these 
concern both schools that are classified as (very) weak and schools that are classified as basic. In our 
main analyses we focus on the sample of weak-performing schools in the beginning of 2008, which was 
the initial target population of the program (see Sections 5.4 and 5.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The achievement goals include (i) an average CITO test score of at least 534, (ii) at least 25% percent of the pupils 
assigned to higher secondary education, and (iii) at most 20% of the disadvantaged pupils assigned to specific 
secondary education levels that provide special care because of learning difficulties (called ‘Praktijkonderwijs’ and 
‘Leerwegondersteunend Onderwijs’).    
9 With an average primary school size of 220 pupils, the average yearly ASIP investment per pupil is around 680 
Euros. This is more than 10% of the per-pupil government funding of around 5,000 Euros.  
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5.4 Empirical strategy 
To assess the impact of the ASIP on educational performance, we adopt a difference-in-differences (DID) 
estimation approach. This approach essentially compares the change in educational performance after and 
before the start of the program in Amsterdam to the same change in other Dutch cities that did not 
implement a CSR program. We implement this strategy by estimating the following model: 
Yist = β0 + β1 Aist +  β2 Tt + β3 Aist*Tt + Xist + αs + τt + εist,                                                                       (5.1)         
where Yist is the test score of pupil i in school s in year t, Aist is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
pupil i is at school in Amsterdam and 0 otherwise, Tt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in case of a 
post-treatment year and value 0 in case of a pre-treatment year, Xist is a vector with individual background 
characteristics, αs are school fixed effects, τt are year dummies and εist  is the error term. The estimated 
coefficient β3 is the parameter of interest.  
 
For our main analysis we use data on the CITO test scores from 2005 to 2012. This is a nationwide, high-
stakes test that pupils take in their final year of primary school (see Section 5.5). We define the years 
2005 till 2008, before the start of the ASIP, as pre-treatment years. The years 2009 till 2012 are the post-
treatment years. Regarding the two-year program duration, one might argue whether 2009 is an 
appropriate post-treatment year. Therefore, we will also present results in case of only including later 
post-treatment years.  
 
We focus our main analysis on the sample of all schools in the Netherlands that were classified as ‘weak’ 
or ‘very weak’ by the Inspectorate of Education on 1 January 2008. These failing schools were the initial 
target group of the ASIP and constitute a homogeneous sample with respect to school quality according to 
the nationwide standards of the Inspectorate of Education. All of these schools in Amsterdam were 
eligible for participation in the ASIP, whereas similar weak-performing schools outside Amsterdam were 
not allowed to participate. We use all (very) weak schools outside Amsterdam as our main control group. 
In addition, we construct two alternative control groups that consist of only larger cities in the 
Netherlands. Schools in other large cities may be more similar to the schools in Amsterdam. The crucial 
assumption for identification of the treatment effect is the common trend assumption, which implies that 
the development of test scores in Amsterdam would have been the development in test scores in the 
control group in the absence of the ASIP. This rules out city-specific trends and composition effects. To 
investigate the validity of the common trend assumption we compare the pre-treatment test score 
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development in Amsterdam to the pre-treatment test score development in the control groups. We address 
the potential effect of the policy on the composition of schools by presenting a sensitivity analysis that 
includes only those schools that participated in the CITO test both before and after the introduction of the 
policy. Furthermore, we argue and provide supportive evidence that our estimation results are not likely 
to be affected by changes in the composition of pupils within schools. 
 
The estimated treatment effect should be interpreted as the effect of the introduction of the ASIP policy. 
The introduction of the policy offered all failing schools in Amsterdam the opportunity to participate in 
the program. Since not all of the eligible schools participated in the program, we estimate an intention-to-
treat (ITT) effect. The ITT effect differs from the effect of actual participation in the program. The 
standard approach to estimate the effect of participation for those who participate would be to use 
eligibility for the program as an instrumental variable for participation in the program (Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996). Estimation by two-stage-least-squares then yields the treatment-on-
the-treated effect, which is essentially equal to the ITT effect divided by the compliance rate (Bloom, 
1984). This analysis assumes that eligibility for the program, i.e. being at school in Amsterdam in a post-
treatment year, does not affect the outcomes of non-participating schools. This assumption is not likely to 
hold here because schools that do not participate in the ASIP have the opportunity to take the professional 
development courses from the 2009-2010 school year onwards, which may affect outcomes. It turns out 
that three schools in our estimation sample participated in the courses without following the complete 
ASIP program (see Section 5.5). This makes it impossible to strictly disentangle the effect of participation 
in the complete ASIP from participation in only the professional development courses. We therefore only 
present the estimated ITT effects, which pick up both effects.    
 
The potential influence of other implemented policies in Amsterdam does not seem to be a main concern 
in our analysis, because of the relatively large size of the ASIP. One project with the goal of raising 
pupil’s math performance was implemented in the south-east district of Amsterdam in 2008.10 Outside 
Amsterdam, the municipality of Rotterdam started an action program to improve the educational quality 
of primary schools in 2011.11
 
 To address the potential impact of these other programs we present 
sensitivity analyses in which we leave out the schools in the corresponding areas. 
                                                 
10 This program was called ‘Omdat elk kind telt in Zuidoost’. 
11 This action program is called ‘Beter Presteren’ and focuses on additional school time, professionalization of 
schools and parental involvement. 
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When calculating standard errors we take into account the presence of common group errors (Moulton, 
1986). In all estimation results we present robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school-
year level. Still, standard errors may be too small in our case where we use multiple years of data. 
Bertrand et al. (2004) show that ignoring serial correlation in outcomes can lead to over-rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no effect. To address this potential issue of serial correlation, we also present 
estimation results of a model in which we collapse the data before and after the introduction of the policy 
(Bertrand et al., 2004).   
 
5.5 Data 
We received information on schools that were classified as ‘weak’ or ‘very weak’ on 1 January 2008 from 
the Inspectorate of Education. For this sample of schools we obtained data on CITO test scores from the 
CITO organization. The CITO test is a nationwide, high-stakes test that pupils take in the highest grade of 
primary education (grade eight). It contains questions on language, math, and information processing. 
Test taking takes place during three days in the beginning of February and the test is used for the 
assignment of pupils to different levels of secondary education. Teachers use the test results to advice 
pupils on the most appropriate secondary education level and secondary schools often use threshold 
values for enrolment in more advanced types of secondary education. Test results at the school level are 
used by the Inspectorate of Education to judge the quality of primary schools. Each year more than 80 
percent of all primary schools participate in the CITO test. When a school chooses to participate in the 
CITO test, in principle all pupils in grade eight have to take the test. 12
Our dataset contains information on CITO test scores at the pupil level from 2005 to 2012 for all failing 
schools on the reference date 1 January 2008. The total sample includes 614 schools that are comparable 
with respect to educational quality according to the nationwide standards of the Inspectorate of Education. 
It should be noted that our sample contains only schools that have participated in the CITO test at least 
once during the period 2005-2012.
  
13
                                                 
12 An exception is made for pupils in special categories such as foreign students that have been in the Netherlands 
for a short time and students that are expected to be assigned to secondary education types with special care (see 
also Table 5.3).   
 The total number of observations equals 78,545. Our estimation 
sample contains 35 schools in Amsterdam that were eligible for the ASIP. A total of 24 of these 35 
schools have participated in the ASIP. Table 5.1 provides a more detailed overview of the timing of 
relevant events.  
13 The total number of primary schools that were classified as ‘weak’ or ‘very weak’ on 1 January 2008 equals 751. 
We do not observe the schools that never participated in the CITO test. 
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Table 5.1 Timing of Events 
 
Time 
 
Event 
February 2005 CITO test 2005 
February 2006 CITO test 2006 
February 2007 CITO test 2007 
February 2008 CITO test 2008 
April 2008 Municipality of Amsterdam introduces the ASIP  
April 2008 - February 2009 7 schools start in the ASIP 
February 2009 CITO test 2009 
February 2009 - September 2009 5 schools start in the ASIP 
September 2009 Municipality of Amsterdam introduces the professional 
development courses 
September 2009 - February 2010 3 schools start in the ASIP 
February 2010 CITO test 2010 
February 2010 - September 2010 3 schools start in the ASIP 
September 2010 - February 2011 5 schools start in the ASIP 
February 2011 CITO test 2011 
February 2011 - September 2011 1 school starts in the ASIP 
February 2012 CITO test 2012 
Notes. The presented number of schools that have started in the ASIP concern only those in our estimation sample.  
The CITO tests of 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 have taken place before the introduction of the policy. As 
of April 2008, all failing schools in Amsterdam were invited to participate in the ASIP. It turns out that 12 
schools started in the ASIP before or during the 2008-2009 school year, of which 7 before the CITO test 
of 2009; 6 schools started in the ASIP during the 2009-2010 school year, of which 3 before the CITO test 
of 2010; and 6 schools started in the ASIP during the 2010-2011 school year, of which 5 before the CITO 
test in 2011. From the 2009-2010 school year onwards, schools in Amsterdam could also participate in 
the professional development courses. In total 16 of the 35 schools in Amsterdam participated in these 
courses; 13 schools took the courses as part of the complete program, and 3 schools only took the courses 
without participation in the ASIP. 
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics of the CITO test scores in our sample. The test consists of 200 
questions: 100 questions on language, 60 questions on math and 40 questions on information processing. 
The test scores on language, math and information processing equal the number of correctly answered 
questions. The total score is a linear transformation of the total number of correctly answered questions 
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and ranges from 501 (lowest score) to 550 (highest score) each year. The linear transformation is such 
that the total scores are comparable across years. 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics of CITO test scores (total sample 2005-2012)  
 
 Average Standard deviation Min Max Observations 
Total score 532.60 10.30 501 550 78,545 
Language   70.27 14.08  10 100 78,545 
Math   40.16 11.60    1   60 78,545 
Information processing   28.42   6.57    0   40 78,545 
 
 
Figure 5.1 presents the total test score developments from 2005 to 2012 for Amsterdam, and for three  
control groups. The control groups contain failing schools outside Amsterdam. We use all schools outside 
Amsterdam that were classified as (very) weak by the Inspectorate on reference date 1 January 2008 as 
our main control group. In addition, we use two alternative control groups that consist of subsamples of 
large cities in the Netherlands: the so-called ‘G38’ and ‘G4’ cities. The G38 consists of 38 medium- and 
large cities and the G4 consists of the four largest cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague and Utrecht). Schools in other large cities may be more similar to the schools in Amsterdam.  
 
   
  Figure 5.1 CITO test scores for weakly performing schools in the Netherlands. 
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The availability of CITO test scores back to 2005, 3 years prior to the introduction of the policy, allows us 
to compare the pre-treatment test score trend in Amsterdam with that in the control groups. 
The performance of pupils in Amsterdam increased from 2005 till 2008. The increase in test scores is well 
comparable to that in other cities. The test score trend indicates that the schools in Amsterdam did not 
experience a pre-treatment performance dip that would invalidate the common trend assumption 
(Ashenfelter, 1978).14
 
 The level of test scores in Amsterdam is larger compared to that in the other three 
large cities in the Netherlands, almost identical to that in the group of 37 other medium and large cities, 
and smaller compared to the nationwide test score level. To test for differential trends between 
Amsterdam and the control group, we regressed the first-difference of the test score on a time trend and 
an interaction term between the time trend and a dummy variable for Amsterdam. This yields an 
insignificant coefficient for the interaction term (with a t-value of -0.46), indicating that there is no 
evidence for differential trends. This supports the credibility of our identifying common trend assumption. 
A comparison of the post-treatment development of test scores in Amsterdam to the post-treatment 
development of test scores outside Amsterdam provides a first impression of the impact of the program. 
After the introduction of the ASIP in 2008, we observe that the increase in test scores in Amsterdam 
becomes smaller compared to that in the other cities.  
The CITO dataset also contains information on individual background characteristics, such as gender, 
birth date and subsidy factor. In our empirical analyses we use these as covariates to control for 
observable changes in the pupil population over time. Table 5.3 presents the sample means of both the 
covariates and the outcome variables in 2008 (the most recent pre-treatment year) and 2012 (the most 
recent post-treatment year) for Amsterdam and the three control groups. The variable gender takes the 
value of one in case of a male and the value of zero in case of a female. We dispose of the year and month 
of birth of each pupil, from which we construct the age in years at the time of the test. We lack data on 
gender for 372 observations and on age for 359 observations. For this small fraction of our estimation 
sample, we impute missing values by the average value in the estimation sample. Furthermore, we 
dispose of categorical variables for the language spoken at home (seven categories), subsidy factor (six 
categories) and pupil category (six categories). The subsidy factor is an indicator of socioeconomic 
background. The Dutch funding scheme for primary schools distinguishes several groups of 
disadvantaged pupils, for whom primary schools receive additional funding. The subsidy factor depends 
                                                 
14 In case of a so-called ‘Ashenfelter dip’ one would expect schools in Amsterdam to improve after the introduction 
of the program, because of mean reversion. One might then incorrectly conclude that this improvement would be 
caused by the program.  
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on parental education level and can take values 0.3 and 1.2.15 A subsidy factor of 0.3 implies that a school 
receives 30% of additional funding and a subsidy factor of 1.2 implies 120% of additional funding. The 
subsidy factor takes value 0 in case of a non-disadvantaged pupil. In earlier years, before 2010, other rules 
for the subsidy factor were used that depended not only on parental education level, but also on profession 
and ethnic background. This explains that the factors can also take values 0.4 or 0.9 in the years 2005-
2009. The pupil category refers to specific groups of pupils for whom participation in the CITO test is not 
compulsory. Category ‘I’ stands for foreign pupils that have been in the Netherlands for less than four 
years; category ‘J’ for pupils that are expected to be assigned to special education; and category ‘K’ for 
pupils that are expected to be assigned to vocational secondary education with additional care.16
Asterisks indicate that the sample mean in the control group differs significantly from that in Amsterdam 
in the corresponding year. Pupils in Amsterdam are well comparable to those in the other three groups 
with respect to gender. The age of the pupils when taking the CITO test in Amsterdam is comparable to 
that in the G38, but somewhat below (above) that in the G4 (rest of the Netherlands) in the pre-treatment 
year. Amsterdam is less comparable to the control groups with respect to the other covariates. 
Amsterdam, the largest city in the Netherlands, typically has a large fraction of disadvantaged pupils. This 
explains the smaller fraction of pupils with Dutch as their home language, the larger fraction of pupils 
with a high subsidy factor and the larger fraction of pupils belonging to a special category. We observe 
that in the G38 and the G4, differences on these variables are smaller, though still statistically significant 
in most cases. Only the pre-treatment difference in pupil category between Amsterdam and the G4 is 
insignificant. In our empirical analyses we use these variables as covariates to control for observable 
changes in the student population over time in Amsterdam and the control groups. The bottom panel 
presents the CITO test scores that have been standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation 
of one in the full sample. Pre-treatment test scores in Amsterdam are very similar to those in the G38, and 
below (above) those in the rest of the Netherlands (G4).  
 All of 
these categorical variables contain one category to refer to an unknown value. The language spoken at 
home is unknown for around 12% of the observations in the years 2005-2011. In 2012 this information 
was not collected, implying that it is unknown for all observations. The subsidy factor is unknown for 
around 30% of the observations in the years 2005-2009 and for around 12% of the observations in the 
years 2010-2012.  
                                                 
15 The subsidy factor equals 1.2 in case the highest completed education level is primary education for at least one 
of the parents and lower secondary education for the other. The subsidy factor equals 0.3 in case lower secondary 
education is the highest completed education level for both parents (or the parent which is responsible for daily 
care). 
16 This type of education is called ‘Leerwegondersteunend Onderwijs’ (LWOO). Pupils in this category generally 
suffer from learning arrears, low IQ and/or social or emotional problems.  
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Table 5.3 Sample means in 2008 and 2012  
 
 Amsterdam Rest Netherlands G38 G4 
 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 
 Covariates        
Gender (male = 1) 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 
Age 12.12 12.00  12.06*** 12.00 12.14   12.07***    12.21***    12.09*** 
Home language         
  Dutch 0.51 0.00    0.81*** 0.00    0.66*** 0.00    0.59*** 0.00 
  Other Western- 
  Europe  
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  Arabic 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 
  Surinam 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  Turkish 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.00 
  Other 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 
  Unknown 0.18 1.00 0.10 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.18 1.00 
Subsidy factor         
  0 0.30 0.61     0.62***    0.71***     0.47***     0.63***    0.33***    0.57*** 
  0.3 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 
  0.4 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 
  0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  1.2 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.23 
  Unknown 0.66 0.04 0.26 0.11 0.41 0.10 0.55 0.08 
Pupil category         
  No special category 0.80 0.79    0.92***    0.90***    0.88***    0.89*** 0.85    0.86*** 
  I 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
  IJ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  IK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  J 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  K 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.09 
 Outcome variables        
Total score -0.21 -0.11 0.00*** 0.15*** -0.20 0.05*** -0.32** -0.01** 
Language -0.18 -0.36 0.02*** -0.08*** -0.18 -0.19*** -0.29** -0.26** 
Math -0.05  0.03 0.08*** 0.19*** -0.06 0.14*** -0.18** 0.11* 
Information 
processing 
-0.25 -0.14 -0.02*** 0.18*** -0.19 0.04*** -0.26 -0.04** 
         
Schools   34   34   500   487    112    132    32     38 
Observations 901 991 8,739 9,275 2,411 2,996 733 1,023 
Notes. Asterisks indicate that the sample mean in the control group differs significantly from that in Amsterdam in the corresponding year at a 
*10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level. Tests of significant differences for gender, age, and the outcome variables are based on a two-tailed t-
test. Tests of significant differences for the categorical variables are based on a chi-squared test. 
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We observe that the total test scores have improved over time, both in Amsterdam and in the three control 
groups. The difference in test scores between 2012 and 2008 is smaller in Amsterdam compared to the 
three control groups for each of the test subjects. 
 
5.6 Results 
 
5.6.1 Main findings 
 
Table 5.4 presents the estimates of the effect of the introduction of the ASIP on CITO test scores for three 
model specifications. The first model (column 1) regresses the standardized CITO test score on a dummy 
for Amsterdam, a dummy for a post-treatment year, an interaction term that indicates a post-treatment 
year in Amsterdam, and year dummies.17
The top panel reports the estimation results for the complete sample. The middle panel shows similar 
results for the subsample of 38 middle and large Dutch cities and the bottom panel presents them for the 
subsample containing the four largest cities in the Netherlands. For each of these samples we present the 
estimated effects on the total CITO score as well as on the specific subjects language, math, and 
information processing. Since all test scores are standardized, the estimated effects can be interpreted in 
terms of standard deviations. 
 The second model adds individual pupil background 
characteristics such as gender, age, age squared, home language, subsidy factor and pupil category. The 
third model additionally includes school fixed effects. 
In the complete sample we find negative effects of the introduction of the ASIP on CITO test scores in all 
model specifications. The addition of controls increases the size of the point estimates. This can be 
explained by a more favourable development of covariates (related to higher test scores) in Amsterdam 
compared to the control groups.18
                                                 
17 Estimated treatment effects in models without the year dummies are very similar.    
 When estimated with all individual background characteristics and 
school fixed effects, the estimated effect implies that the introduction of the ASIP decreases the total 
CITO test score by 0.17 standard deviations. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Statistically significant negative effects are also found for each of the subjects of the test. The 
negative impact is largest for language and smallest for math, with estimated effects of -0.19 and -0.09, 
18 For example, the increase in the share of non-disadvantaged pupils with a subsidy factor of 0 between 2008 and 
2012 is larger in Amsterdam than that in other cities (see Table 5.3). Since non-disadvantaged pupils are more 
likely to perform well on the CITO test, inclusion of this control variable decreases the estimated treatment effect.   
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respectively. The G38 and G4 samples yield similar results. We find negative and statistically significant 
effects in all models, within a range from -0.11 to -0.20. These results indicate that the ASIP has 
negatively affected educational performance in the highest grade of primary education in the first four 
years after its introduction.  
Table 5.4  Difference-in-differences estimates of the introduction of the ASIP 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
A. Complete Sample    
Total score -0.105*(0.062) -0.144***(0.049) -0.170***(0.036) 
Language -0.109*(0.060) -0.152***(0.046) -0.188***(0.034) 
Math -0.052 (0.056) -0.078*(0.047) -0.086**(0.036) 
Information processing -0.127**(0.061) -0.160***(0.049) -0.179***(0.035) 
Observations 78,545 78,545 78,545 
Schools 614 614 614 
    
B. G38    
Total score -0.127*(0.068) -0.154***(0.053) -0.190***(0.040) 
Language -0.117*(0.067) -0.155***(0.050) -0.200***(0.037) 
Math -0.107*(0.061) -0.114**(0.052) -0.136***(0.040) 
Information processing -0.114*(0.067) -0.139***(0.053) -0.164***(0.039) 
Observations 27,882 27,882 27,882 
Schools 173 173 173 
    
C. G4    
Total score -0.181**(0.084) -0.145**(0.066) -0.149***(0.049) 
Language -0.162*(0.085) -0.140**(0.063) -0.158***(0.046) 
Math -0.175**(0.074) -0.131**(0.064) -0.120**(0.049) 
Information processing -0.143*(0.086) -0.113*(0.068) -0.107**(0.050) 
Observations 13,597 13,597 13,597 
Schools 74 74 74 
    
Individual characteristics no yes yes 
School fixed effects  no no yes 
    
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** 
denotes significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
 
 
5.6.2 Heterogeneity 
 
We proceed by investigating the impact of the introduction of the ASIP across different groups of pupils. 
We distinguish between male and female, higher and lower socio-economic status, and Dutch and foreign 
pupils. We define all pupils with a subsidy factor larger than 0 to have low socio-economic status and all 
other pupils to have high socio-economic status. Pupils with home language other than Dutch are defined 
as ‘foreign’ and all other pupils as ‘Dutch’. We leave out pupils with missing values on these variables. 
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Table 5.5 reports the estimated full model effects for each of the subgroups, taking into account the 
complete sample containing all weakly performing schools in the Netherlands. The estimated effects on 
the test scores are reasonably in line with the total sample estimates and are similar across subgroups.19
 
 
With respect to the specific subjects, the estimated effects on math turn insignificant in models (3), (5) 
and (6), but the differences in effects sizes across the subsamples are not large. Table 5.A.1 in the 
Appendix presents the results for the G38 and G4 samples. The results in the G38 sample are in line with 
our findings of no differential effects across subgroups in the complete sample. The results in the G4 
suggest that the introduction of the policy has been more detrimental for non-disadvantaged pupils than it 
has been for disadvantaged pupils. This finding holds for each of the subjects and differs from our 
findings in the other samples. In sum, we conclude that we find no strong evidence that specific groups of 
pupils are particularly affected by the policy. When taking into account only the four largest cities, the 
policy seems to have had a more detrimental impact for non-disadvantaged pupils. 
Table 5.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects:  Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP  
 
 (1) 
 
Male 
(2) 
 
Female 
(3) 
 
Low socio-
economic status 
(4) 
 
High socio-
economic status 
(5) 
 
Foreign 
 
(6) 
 
Dutch 
       
Total score -0.164*** 
(0.042) 
-0.164*** 
(0.040) 
-0.205*** 
(0.069) 
-0.196*** 
(0.046) 
-0.106* 
(0.057) 
-0.130*** 
(0.048) 
Language -0.186*** 
(0.041) 
-0.178*** 
(0.037) 
-0.231*** 
(0.066) 
-0.230*** 
(0.045) 
-0.107* 
(0.058) 
-0.151*** 
(0.046) 
Math -0.074* 
(0.040) 
-0.088** 
(0.043) 
-0.075 
(0.078) 
-0.091** 
(0.046) 
-0.068 
(0.058) 
-0.038 
(0.046) 
Information 
processing 
-0.178*** 
(0.045) 
-0.174*** 
(0.039) 
-0.277*** 
(0.073) 
-0.211*** 
(0.048) 
-0.123** 
(0.061) 
-0.171*** 
(0.050) 
       
Observations 38,607 39,566 12,006 48,527 7,150 53,385 
Schools 614 614 556 608 419 601 
       
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed 
effects  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
 
 
                                                 
19 In models (3) and (4) the estimated effects are both larger (in absolute value) than the total sample estimates, 
while models (5) and (6) both yield smaller estimates. This can be explained by the fact that we leave out pupils 
with missing values on socioeconomic status or home language. 
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19 In models (3) and (4) the estimated effects are both larger (in absolute value) than the total sample estimates, 
while models (5) and (6) both yield smaller estimates. This can be explained by the fact that we leave out pupils 
with missing values on socioeconomic status or home language. 
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19 In models (3) and (4) the estimated effects are both larger (in absolute value) than the total sample estimates, 
while models (5) and (6) both yield smaller estimates. This can be explained by the fact that we leave out pupils 
with missing values on socioeconomic status or home language. 
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In addition to the effects for different groups, we investigate the impact of the ASIP on different parts of 
the test score distribution by estimating quantile regressions. Table 5.6 presents the estimated effects for 
various quantiles of the test score distributions. With respect to the total test score, the estimated 
coefficients differ across quantiles. The impact is most detrimental at the lower tale of the distribution. 
The introduction of the ASIP decreases the lower quartile of the total test score distribution by 0.19 
standard deviations, the median by 0.18 standard deviations (which is close to the OLS coefficient of -
0.17) and the upper quartile by 0.11 standard deviations. The impact is smallest at the upper decile, -0.06, 
and largest at the lower decile, -0.25. This pattern of decreasing estimated effect sizes with quantile also 
shows up for the specific subjects language and information processing. The pattern is less clear for math, 
though also here the estimated effects are smaller (in absolute value) in the upper tail of the test score 
distribution. Table 5.A.2 in the Appendix presents quantile regression results for the G38 and G4 samples. 
The findings in the G38 are consistent with the observed pattern in the complete sample. The picture in 
the G4 is less clear. The largest effect sizes are not always found to be at the lowest decile, but in most 
cases the smallest effect sizes are found at the upper decile. Hence, our finding of a less detrimental 
impact at the upper part of the test score distribution is confirmed in both other samples as well. 
Table 5.6 Quantile regressions results:  Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP for 
quantiles of the test score distributions 
 (1) 
quantile 
regression 
0.1 
(2) 
quantile 
regression 
 
0.25 
(3) 
quantile 
regression 
 
0.50 
(4) 
quantile 
regression 
0.75 
(5) 
quantile 
regression 
0.90 
 
      
Total score -0.247*** 
(0.038) 
-0.193*** 
(0.032) 
-0.183*** 
(0.029) 
-0.108*** 
(0.03) 
-0.062**  
(0.029) 
Language -0.246*** 
(0.041) 
-0.192*** 
(0.032) 
-0.212*** 
(0.028) 
-0.161*** 
(0.027) 
-0.093*** 
(0.029) 
Math -0.097** -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.063** -0.052** 
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) 
Information 
processing 
-0.309*** 
(0.043) 
-0.240*** 
(0.035) 
-0.186*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.138*** 
(0.025) 
-0.077*** 
(0.026) 
Observations 78,545 785,45 78,545 78,545 78,545 
Schools 614 614 614 614 614 
      
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed effects  yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Notes. Each cell represents a separate quantile regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % 
significance level.  
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5.6.3 Sensitivity 
 
Table 5.7 presents several sensitivity analyses to probe the robustness of our main findings. First, we 
restrict our sample to schools that participated in the CITO test in each of the years 2005 to 2012. A 
potential concern is that the introduction of the policy affected participation in the CITO test. For 
instance, it might be that non-treated schools outside Amsterdam were closed due to persistently bad 
performance, in which case they do not show up in our data in all post-treatment years. This might bias 
our estimates downwards if the weakest performing schools outside Amsterdam drop out of the 
estimation sample. Column (1) presents estimation results for the sample consisting of only schools that 
participate each year. This includes 399 schools containing 63,165 pupils. The estimated effects are 
slightly larger (in absolute value) than the main estimates. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be 
biased by selective attrition of schools. 
Table 5.7 Sensitivity: Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP on CITO test score (full 
model). 
 (1) 
 
Sample of 
schools that 
participate in 
the CITO 
test in all 
years 2005-
2012 
(2) 
 
Sample 
excluding 
the south-
east district 
in 
Amsterdam 
(3) 
 
Sample 
excluding 
schools in 
Rotterdam 
(4) 
 
Sample 
excluding the 
year 2009 
(5) 
 
Sample 
excluding the 
years 2009, 
and 2010 
(6) 
 
Sample 
excluding the 
years 2009, 
2010 and 
2011 
(7) 
 
Sample 
collapsed to 
before/after 
observations at 
school level 
        
Total score -0.190*** 
(0.037) 
-0.128*** 
(0.039) 
-0.169*** 
(0.035) 
-0.169*** 
(0.039) 
-0.208*** 
(0.043) 
-0.299*** 
(0.057) 
-0.144** 
(0.063) 
Language -0.200*** 
(0.035) 
-0.155*** 
(0.037) 
-0.189*** 
(0.034) 
-0.187*** 
(0.037) 
-0.217*** 
(0.041) 
-0.321*** 
(0.053) 
-0.177** 
(0.059) 
Math -0.109*** 
(0.037) 
-0.042 
 (0.040) 
-0.081** 
(0.036) 
-0.100** 
(0.039) 
-0.153*** 
(0.043) 
-0.204** 
(0.059) 
-0.075 
 (0.064) 
Information 
processing 
-0.201*** 
(0.037) 
-0.140*** 
(0.036) 
-0.184*** 
(0.035) 
-0.165*** 
(0.038) 
-0.181*** 
(0.044) 
-0.274*** 
(0.057) 
-0.144** 
(0.065) 
        
Observations 63,165 76,956 75,955 69,030 59,438 49,462 1,145 
Schools 399 607 601 612 612 609 614 
        
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed 
effects  
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 1 / 5 / 10 % significance level.  
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5.6.3 Sensitivity 
 
Table 5.7 presents everal sensitiv ty an lyses to probe the robustness of our main findings. Fir t, we 
restrict our sample to schools that participated in the CITO test in each of the years 2005 to 2012. A 
potential concern is that the introduction of the policy affected participat on in the CITO test. For 
instance, it might be that non-treated schools outside Amsterdam were closed due to persistently bad 
performance, in which case they do not show up in our data in all post-trea ment years. This might bias 
our estimates downwards if the weakest performing schools utside Amsterdam drop out of the 
estimation sample. Column (1) pres nts e timation results for the sample consisting of only schools that 
participate each year. This includes 399 schools containing 63,165 pupils. The estima ed effects are 
slightly larger (in absolute value) than the main estimates. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be
biased by selective attrition of schools. 
able 5.7 Sensitivity: Estimated effects of the introduction f the ASIP on CITO test score (full
odel). 
 (1) 
 
Sample of 
schools that 
partic pate in 
the CITO 
test in all 
years 2005-
2012 
(2) 
 
Sample 
excluding 
the south-
east district 
in 
Amsterdam 
(3) 
 
Sample 
excluding 
schools in 
Rotterdam 
(4) 
 
Sample 
excluding the 
year 2009 
(5) 
 
Sample 
excluding the 
years 2009, 
and 2010 
(6) 
 
Sample 
excluding the 
years 2009,
2010 and 
2011 
(7) 
 
Sample 
collapsed to 
before/after 
observations t 
school level 
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(0. 37) 
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(0.039) 
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(0.035) 
-0.169*** 
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(0.043) 
-0.299*** 
(0.057) 
-0.144** 
(0.063) 
Language -0.200*** 
(0. 35) 
-0.155**  
(0.037) 
-0.189*** 
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(0.037) 
-0.217*** 
(0.041) 
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-0.177** 
(0.059) 
ath -0.109*** 
(0. 37) 
-0.042 
 (0.04 ) 
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(0.036) 
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(0.039) 
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-0.204** 
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proces ing 
-0.201*** 
(0. 37) 
-0.140**  
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(0.044) 
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(0.057) 
-0.144** 
(0.065) 
        
Observations 63,165 76,956 75,9 5 69,030 59,438 49,462 1,145 
Schools 399 607 601 612 612 609 614 
        
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed 
ef ects  
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Notes. Each cell repres nts a separate r gression. Robust stand rd e rors, clustered at the sc ool-year level, are in pare thes s. * / ** / **  denotes 
significance at a 1 / 5 / 10 % significance l vel.  
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Second, we exclude schools whose results might have been affected by other programs from the sample. 
We leave out schools in the south-east of Amsterdam to address the potential influence of the program 
that was raised to improve pupil’s math performance in this district. The district contains 7 primary 
schools in our sample including 1,589 pupils. If the program has improved results, we would expect the 
estimated effects to become more detrimental. Instead, we find negative point estimates that are smaller 
(in absolute value) than our main estimates and the estimated effect for math turns insignificant (see 
column 2). This suggests that our main results are not biased upwards because of the impact of the 
program in the south-east district. Furthermore, we exclude schools in Rotterdam and find estimated 
effects that are very similar to our main estimates (see column 3). This suggests that the action program 
launched by the municipality of Rotterdam in 2011 does not affect our findings.20
 
    
Third, we perform similar analyses on a sample in which we leave out the year 2009. Since the first 
schools that participated in the ASIP started in 2008, one might argue whether 2009 is an appropriate 
post-treatment year. Excluding 2009 from the sample, using only 2010 to 2012 as the post-treatment 
years, yields similar result (see column 4). Regarding the two-year program duration, it might take even 
longer before the impact of the program was felt in the CITO test scores. To provide insight into the 
timing of effects, we further reduce the number of post-treatment years taken into account. In model (5) 
we leave out the years 2009 and 2010 whereas model (6) additionally excludes the year 2011 from our 
sample. In case of an improvement in test scores over time, we expect to find better results in models that 
include only the most recent post-treatment years. Instead, the negative point estimates of the effect of the 
ASIP become larger in models (5) and (6). Hence, we find no evidence for cumulative effects over time in 
the first four years after the introduction of the program.  
 
A complicating factor for analysing cumulative effects is that not all schools started in the program at the 
same time. If participation in the ASIP causes an initial decrease in test scores that is followed by an 
upward development, a concern might be that an improvement in test scores of participating schools that 
started in 2008-2009 is negated by a decrease in test scores in schools that started in later years. This, 
however, seems a less plausible interpretation of our findings because of the relatively large share of 
schools in our sample that started in 2008-2009 (see Table 5.1). We further address this issue by 
excluding all schools in Amsterdam that did not start in the ASIP before or during the 2008-2009 school 
year. Including only the 12 schools in Amsterdam that participated in 2008-2009 (and all other schools 
outside Amsterdam), we would expect to find increasing effects when restricting the sample to more 
                                                 
20 Excluding the schools in Rotterdam in the G4 sample yields an estimated effect of -0.167***(0.061) on the total 
CITO test score. 
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recent post-treatment years in case of cumulative effects. Table 5.A.3 in the Appendix presents the 
estimation results for the four sets of post-treatment years. We find that the negative point estimates of the 
impact of the ASIP become larger when we restrict the sample to more recent post-treatment years. This 
is consistent with our conclusion of no improvement in test scores over time.  
 
In addition, we have estimated four separate models that each include one post-treatment year. The results 
are shown in Table 5.A.4 in the Appendix. We find mostly statistically significant negative estimates for 
each of the years. The estimated effects on test scores are smallest (in absolute value) in the years 2010 
and 2011, and largest in 2012. Table 5.A.5 presents similar results when estimated on the sample that 
excludes schools in Amsterdam that did not start in the ASIP before or during the 2008-2009 school year. 
The estimated effects on test scores are smaller (in absolute value) and statistically insignificant for the 
year 2010, while larger and statistically significant for the other post-treatment years. We conclude that 
also these separate estimates for each post-treatment year do not provide evidence of increasing effects 
over time.  
 
Fourth, we address concerns on over-significance of our estimates because of potential serial correlation 
problems, by collapsing the data before and after the introduction of the ASIP at the school level 
(Bertrand et al., 2004). This leaves us with 1145 observations.21
A final concern might be that the policy has affected the testing pool within schools that participate in the 
CITO test. More specifically, if the policy caused a relative increase in the CITO test participation of 
weak students (with low unobserved ability) in Amsterdam compared to other cities, this might have 
biased our estimated effects downwards. A change in the tested population induced by the program, 
however, does not seem very likely since a larger CITO test participation was no clear element or goal of 
the ASIP. Hence, the program did not explicitly stimulate additional participation of (low ability) students 
in the test. Still, one might be concerned that the ASIP implicitly affected the testing pool if increased 
scrutiny limited opportunities to exclude weak students from the test. 
 We find a statistically significant effect 
on the total test score of -0.14 at the 5%-level.  
22
                                                 
21 The sample contains 614 schools and 2 time periods. Not all 614 schools are present in both the before and the 
after period: there are 561 schools in the before period and 584 schools in the after period.  
 In our data we do not observe a 
particularly large increase in the number of students that take the test in Amsterdam relative to other cities 
after the introduction of the policy. In addition, the share of pupils placed in special categories stays 
22 Since the CITO test scores are important for judging educational quality, schools may have an incentive for 
shaping the testing pool. Previous studies have shown that schools can respond strategically to the 
implementation of accountability policies by excluding weak students from the test (e.g. Jacob, 2005). 
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reasonably constant over time, both in Amsterdam and other cities (see also Table 5.3). Ideally, we would 
have disposed of the total number of students in grade eight for each school and year. This would have 
enabled us to compare the development of participation shares in the CITO test between Amsterdam and 
other cities, and to estimate the effect of the policy on CITO test participation. However, our CITO data 
only contain information on the pupils that participated in the test. Therefore, we have performed an 
additional analysis making use of another dataset, called COOL, that includes a representative sample of 
around 10% of all Dutch primary schools in the pre-treatment year 2007-2008 and post-treatment year 
2010-2011 (Driessen at al., 2009; 2012). These data include information on CITO test participation for 
the pupils in grade eight. Regressing a dummy variable for CITO test participation on a dummy variable 
for Amsterdam, a dummy variable for the post-treatment year, an interaction term between Amsterdam 
and the post-treatment year, and a set of pupil background characteristics yields an insignificant estimated 
effect for the interaction term that is close to zero.23 Although this analysis is performed on a different 
sample that concerns not only failing schools but also sound performing schools, we interpret our finding 
of no effect as supportive evidence that the introduction of the policy did not affect participation in the 
CITO test.24
A related issue is the impact of grade retention. If the policy has affected retention, this could have 
changed the pupil composition in grade eight. Since we do not dispose of formal information on grade 
retention, we investigate this issue further by comparing the age of the pupils after and before the 
introduction of the policy in Amsterdam and in the other cities. We perform two analyses. First, we 
regress age on a dummy for Amsterdam, a dummy for a post-treatment year, an interaction term that 
indicates a post-treatment year in Amsterdam, year dummies and all other covariates. Second, we use a 
similar specification to estimate the effect of the introduction of the policy on a dummy variable 
indicating whether a pupil is older than 12.5. We use this dummy variable as an indicator for grade 
retention since pupils aged above 12.5 are most likely to have retained in grade. The first column of Table 
5.A.6 in the Appendix presents the estimation results. We find statistically significant effects in both 
models: the age at which pupils take the test decreases with around 0.08 years (row 1) and the probability 
of grade retention decreases with around 3 percentage points (row 2). These results suggest that the 
retention probability has decreased following the introduction of the policy. This may have biased our 
  
                                                 
23 The estimated effect for the interaction term is 0.001 (0.029). The included pupil background characteristics are 
gender, age, age squared, and a categorical socioeconomic status variable that distinguishes six categories based 
on parental education level and ethnic origin. The total sample includes 18,887 pupils in grade eight divided over 
676 different schools. 
24 Restricting the sample to only those that were classified as weak or very weak on 1 January 2008 leaves us with 
only 6 schools in Amsterdam, of which 3 participated in the ASIP. A similar analysis on this subsample yields an 
estimated effect for the interaction term of 0.005 (0.006). 
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23 The estimated effect for the interaction term is 0.001 (0.029). The included pupil background characteristics are 
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estimates downwards if an additional year in education increases test scores for weak pupils. To address 
this issue, we proceed with two robustness analyses that are presented in columns 2 - 5 of Table 5.A.6. 
First, we estimate the effect of the introduction of the policy on the CITO test score for the subsample of 
pupils who have not been retained. Excluding pupils who are aged above 12.5 yields a statistically 
significant negative effect, -0.14, which is somewhat below (in absolute value) the estimated effect in the 
complete sample, -0.17 (see column 2).25
We conclude that our finding that the introduction of the ASIP negatively affected test scores in grade 
eight of primary education is robust to a variety of sensitivity tests.  
  
 Second, we estimate the impact of the policy for three 
subsamples that exclude schools in Amsterdam with the largest decrease in age (see columns 3-5). We 
define the decrease in age as the average age of test taking in the years after the introduction of the policy 
minus the average age of test taking in the years before the introduction of the policy. In the first 
subsample we exclude all schools in Amsterdam for which the average age of test taking decreases with 
0.2 years or more (eight schools). The second subsample leaves out all schools in Amsterdam with a 
decrease in age of at least 0.15 years (twelve schools) and the third subsample leaves out all schools in 
Amsterdam with a decrease in age of at least 0.10 years (sixteen schools). In this way schools that are 
most likely to have faced a reduction in retention following the introduction of the policy are excluded 
from the analyses. Leaving out such schools obviously reduces the estimated impact of the policy on age 
and on the indicator for grade retention (see rows 1 and 2 in columns 3, 4, and 5). The estimated effect on 
the indicator for grade retention is statistically insignificant and close to zero in all models. In each of the 
three subsamples we find statistically significant negative effects of the introduction of the policy on the 
CITO test score, ranging from -0.14 to -0.17 (see row 3 in columns 3, 4, and 5). These results are close to 
our main estimates and suggest that our findings are not importantly affected by the potential impact of 
grade retention. 
5.7 Interviews and potential mechanisms 
To gain further insight into the effects of the policy, we have taken interviews with school-leaders of 
participating schools. We focused on the schools that started in the ASIP before or during the 2008-2009 
                                                 
25 Please note that this analysis is not fully informative on the magnitude of potential bias caused by the impact of 
grade retention. After all, it does not exclude those pupils in Amsterdam that have not retained after the 
introduction of the policy, but that would have retained in the absence of the policy. In addition, the lower 
estimated effect may well be explained by the exclusion of weak performing pupils for whom the impact of the 
policy on test scores is likely to be more detrimental (see Table 5.6). 
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school year and found seven school-leaders who were willing to provide information on their experiences 
with the program. The outcomes of these interviews reveal a potential explanation for our empirical 
findings. The overall opinions of the school-leaders were very similar and yield a consistent picture that is 
two-fold. Most of the school-leaders expected that the program would result in better educational quality 
in the longer term. They especially appreciated the use of teacher quality evaluations which provided 
insight into teacher behaviour that revealed current weaknesses in classroom practices and provided a 
clear view on potential improvements. In addition, the courses for school-leaders on performance-based 
working and the use of new instruction methods were mentioned as valuable elements of the program. At 
the same time, they experienced the ASIP as an intensive and radical program with a rigorous approach. 
Most of them reported severe resistance among teachers, for whom the program was especially 
demanding. The teachers were confronted with direct feedback on their classroom behaviour, changes in 
their instruction materials, and were expected to put in effort to improve their competences in addition to 
their regular teaching tasks. Almost all school-leaders report the exit of school personnel after the 
introduction of the program. Some of them left the school voluntarily because they did not want to go 
along with the changes induced by the program, but others were forced to leave because they appeared 
not capable to satisfy the required standards. The proportion of replaced teachers seems to be substantial. 
Three school-leaders explicitly mention the number of replaced teachers. Two of them report that around 
25% of the initial teacher population was replaced; the other one reports that even around 90% of the 
initial teacher population was replaced. According to most school-leaders, the replacement of teachers 
also led to uncertainty among school personnel.  
The outcomes of the interviews provide suggestive evidence that the ASIP has increased teacher mobility. 
This finding is consistent with existing literature on the impact of school reforms on school personnel. 
Figlio and Loeb (2011) discuss the relationship between school accountability and teacher labour markets. 
They refer to interview and survey research providing evidence that teachers value a cohesive and 
supportive work environment that acknowledges their efforts and competences, while they interpret 
increased scrutiny and/or high-stakes testing as a reduction in their classroom autonomy and a message of 
being viewed as incompetent (e.g. Luna and Turner, 2001). The authors state that school reforms that 
influence these aspects of the work place are likely to affect teacher mobility. In addition, they discuss 
empirical studies providing evidence that accountability systems especially increase teacher attrition in 
schools that are labelled as low performing (see e.g. Feng et al., 2010). The ASIP, initially targeted at 
weak performing schools, increased scrutiny by lesson observations and may have contributed to the 
feeling of an unsupportive work atmosphere. In addition, the teacher evaluations may have helped the 
school-leaders to identify and replace ineffective teachers.   
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The increased mobility can negatively affect pupil’s test scores in the short term via two mechanisms 
(Figlio and Loeb, 2011). First, recruitment and hiring of new teachers can take time and resources away 
from the regular instruction tasks. Second, the leave of (experienced) teachers implies a loss of specific 
knowledge on the school’s way of working, instruction program and pupils. It takes time before new 
teachers have developed this knowledge. In addition to these mechanisms, the changing and uncertain 
work environment may have disturbed an optimal focus on primary instruction tasks among teachers.  
 
In sum, the program appears to have created an unstable work atmosphere with increased teacher 
mobility. This may explain the negative impact on educational achievement in the first four years after its 
introduction. In the longer term, however, teacher mobility need not be detrimental if the least effective 
teachers are replaced by more effective teachers. In that case one might expect better performances once 
the more effective teachers are hired and the new work environment within schools has been stabilized for 
a while. Our main analyses concern the impact on a high-stakes test during the first four years after the 
introduction of the program. We do not find evidence for an improvement in the CITO test scores over 
these years. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that these findings reflect adjustment costs of the reform 
policy and that it takes longer before more beneficial effects become manifest in the CITO test scores.  
 
5.8 Conclusion  
CSR methods have been widely used as an instrument to improve failing schools, but the evidence on its 
effectiveness remains limited. We estimate the effects of the ASIP, a CSR policy introduced in the 
Netherlands in 2008 with the goal of improving the educational quality of weak-performing primary 
schools in Amsterdam. The program implements performance-based working at all levels within the 
school and typically integrates measures such as staff coaching, teacher observations and teacher 
schooling, and the use of new instruction methods. Each program is tailored towards the specific needs of 
the school and is guided by educational experts. 
 
Difference-in-differences estimates show substantial and statistically significant detrimental effects on the 
educational achievement of pupils in the highest grade of primary education. This finding is robust to a 
broad range of sensitivity tests. In our preferred specification, test scores decrease by 0.17 standard 
deviations in the first four years after the introduction of the policy. The overall negative effects are larger 
for language scores than for math scores. The size of the estimated effects varies across different parts of 
the test score distribution. The largest negative effects are generally found at the left part of the test score 
distribution, and the least detrimental effects at the upper tail of the test score distribution.  
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Interviews with school-leaders of participating primary schools reveal a candidate explanation for our 
findings. Although most of the school-leaders expected that the program would result in better 
educational quality in the longer term, they experienced the ASIP as an intensive program with a rigorous 
approach. It was especially confronting and demanding for teachers, who were judged based on lesson 
observations and expected to improve their competences. All required efforts had to be made in addition 
to their primary teaching tasks. Almost all school-leaders report the replacement of teachers after the 
introduction of the program. Some of them left the school voluntarily because of disagreement with the 
program, but others were forced to leave because they appeared not capable to satisfy the required 
standards. The outflow of teachers implies a loss of school specific knowledge and an increased focus on 
hiring new personnel that may have gone at the cost of instruction tasks. In addition, it seems to have 
created uncertainty among school personnel which can have disturbed an optimal focus on instruction 
tasks. Altogether, an increased teacher mobility induced by the program is a potential explanation for our 
negative findings on educational achievement. In that case, one might expect more beneficial effects in 
the longer term if less effective teachers are replaced by more effective ones and once the work 
environment within schools has been stabilized for a while. We do not find evidence for increasing effects 
over time in the first four years after the introduction of the policy. Nevertheless, we still cannot exclude 
that our findings reflect adjustment costs of the reform, and that it takes longer before beneficial effects 
become manifest in the CITO test scores. Even in such a case, one may question whether the future gains 
will outweigh the initial losses. In any case, we conclude that the introduction of the comprehensive 
school reform induced large costs in terms of a substantial decrease in educational performance for at 
least four cohorts of pupils. 
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Appendix 5.A: Additional results 
 
 
Table 5.A.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects:  Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP in 
the G38 en G4 samples 
 (1) 
 
Male 
(2) 
 
Female 
(3) 
 
Low socio-
economic status 
(4) 
 
High socio-
economic status 
(5) 
 
Foreign 
 
(6) 
 
Dutch 
 A. G38         
Total score -0.190*** 
(0.046) 
-0.184*** 
(0.044) 
-0.200*** 
(0.076) 
-0.208*** 
(0.052) 
-0.103* 
(0.060) 
-0.130** 
(0.052) 
Language -0.200*** 
(0.045) 
-0.192*** 
(0.040) 
-0.211*** 
(0.072) 
-0.226*** 
(0.050) 
-0.091 
(0.060) 
-0.147*** 
(0.049) 
Math -0.135*** 
(0.044) 
-0.134*** 
(0.048) 
-0.098 
(0.085) 
-0.144** 
(0.053) 
-0.077 
(0.061) 
-0.063 
(0.051) 
Information 
processing 
-0.166*** 
(0.049) 
-0.158*** 
(0.043) 
-0.263*** 
(0.081) 
-0.182*** 
(0.053) 
-0.130** 
(0.064) 
-0.143*** 
(0.054) 
Observations 13,534 14,198 5,374 13,892 5,108 14,553 
Schools 173 173 169 171 156 169 
       
 B. G4      
Total score -0.169*** 
(0.058) 
-0.120** 
(0.055) 
-0.051 
(0.095) 
-0.200*** 
(0.064) 
-0.124 
(0.076) 
-0.095 
(0.062) 
Language -0.171*** 
(0.058) 
-0.137*** 
(0.049) 
-0.092 
(0.086) 
-0.202*** 
(0.062) 
-0.081 
(0.073) 
-0.124** 
(0.059) 
Math -0.143*** 
(0.054) 
-0.088 
(0.060) 
0.038 
(0.102) 
-0.152** 
(0.063) 
-0.146* 
(0.079) 
-0.027 
(0.060) 
Information 
processing 
-0.131** 
(0.061) 
-0.080*** 
(0.056) 
-0.100 
(0.105) 
-0.193*** 
(0.065) 
-0.126 
(0.079) 
-0.119* 
(0.064) 
Observations 6,692 6,817 2,877 5,630 3,034 6,047 
Schools 74 74 72 73 72 73 
       
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed 
effects  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
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Interviews with school-leaders of participating primary schools reveal a candidate explanation for our 
findings. Although most of the school-leaders expected that the program would result in better 
educational quality in the longer term, they experienced the ASIP as an intensive program with a rigorous 
approach. It was especially confronting and demanding for teachers, who were judged based on lesson 
observations and expected to improve their competences. All required efforts had to be made in addition 
to their primary teaching tasks. Almost all school-leaders report the replacement of teachers after the 
introduction of the program. Some of them left the school voluntarily because of disagreement with the 
program, but others were forced to leave because they appeared not capable to satisfy the required 
standards. The outflow of teachers implies a loss of school specific knowledge and an increased focus on 
hiring new personnel that may have gone at the cost of instruction tasks. In addition, it seems to have 
created uncertainty among school personnel which can have disturbed an optimal focus on instruction 
tasks. Altogether, an increased teacher mobility induced by the program is a potential explanation for our 
negative findings on educational achievement. In that case, one might expect more beneficial effects in 
the longer term if less effective teachers are replaced by more effective ones and once the work 
environment within schools has been stabilized for a while. We do not find evidence for increasing effects 
over time in the first four years after the introduction of the policy. Nevertheless, we still cannot exclude 
that our findings reflect adjustment costs of the reform, and that it takes longer before beneficial effects 
become manifest in the CITO test scores. Even in such a case, one may question whether the future gains 
will outweigh the initial losses. In any case, we conclude that the introduction of the comprehensive 
school reform induced large costs in terms of a substantial decrease in educational performance for at 
least four cohorts of pupils. 
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Appendix 5.A: Additional results 
 
 
Table 5.A.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects:  Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP in 
the G38 en G4 samples 
 (1) 
 
Male 
(2) 
 
Female 
(3) 
 
Low socio-
economic status 
(4) 
 
High socio-
economic status 
(5) 
 
Foreign 
 
(6) 
 
Dutch 
 A. G38         
Total score -0.190*** 
(0.046) 
-0.184*** 
(0.044) 
-0.200*** 
(0.076) 
-0.208*** 
(0.052) 
-0.103* 
(0.060) 
-0.130** 
(0.052) 
Language -0.200*** 
(0.045) 
-0.192*** 
(0.040) 
-0.211*** 
(0.072) 
-0.226*** 
(0.050) 
-0.091 
(0.060) 
-0.147*** 
(0.049) 
Math -0.135*** 
(0.044) 
-0.134*** 
(0.048) 
-0.098 
(0.085) 
-0.144** 
(0.053) 
-0.077 
(0.061) 
-0.063 
(0.051) 
Information 
processing 
-0.166*** 
(0.049) 
-0.158*** 
(0.043) 
-0.263*** 
(0.081) 
-0.182*** 
(0.053) 
-0.130** 
(0.064) 
-0.143*** 
(0.054) 
Observations 13,534 14,198 5,374 13,892 5,108 14,553 
Schools 173 173 169 171 156 169 
       
 B. G4      
Total score -0.169*** 
(0.058) 
-0.120** 
(0.055) 
-0.051 
(0.095) 
-0.200*** 
(0.064) 
-0.124 
(0.076) 
-0.095 
(0.062) 
Language -0.171*** 
(0.058) 
-0.137*** 
(0.049) 
-0.092 
(0.086) 
-0.202*** 
(0.062) 
-0.081 
(0.073) 
-0.124** 
(0.059) 
Math -0.143*** 
(0.054) 
-0.088 
(0.060) 
0.038 
(0.102) 
-0.152** 
(0.063) 
-0.146* 
(0.079) 
-0.027 
(0.060) 
Information 
processing 
-0.131** 
(0.061) 
-0.080*** 
(0.056) 
-0.100 
(0.105) 
-0.193*** 
(0.065) 
-0.126 
(0.079) 
-0.119* 
(0.064) 
Observations 6,692 6,817 2,877 5,630 3,034 6,047 
Schools 74 74 72 73 72 73 
       
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed 
effects  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
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e dix 5. : Additional results 
 
 
a le 5. .1 Heterogeneous treatment effects:  Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP in
t e 38 en G4 samples 
 (1) 
 
Male 
(2) 
 
Female 
(3) 
 
Low socio-
economic status 
(4) 
 
High socio-
econ mic status 
(5) 
 
Foreign 
 
(6) 
 
Dutch 
 . 38      
otal score -0.190*  
(0.046) 
-0.184*** 
(0. 4 ) 
-0.200**  
(0. 76) 
-0.208**  
(0.052) 
-0.1 3* 
(0.060) 
-0.130** 
(0.052) 
anguage -0.20 *  
(0.045) 
-0.192*** 
(0. 40) 
-0.211**  
(0. 72) 
-0.226**  
(0.05 ) 
-0.091 
(0.060) 
-0.147*** 
(0.049) 
ath -0.135*  
(0.04 ) 
-0.134*** 
(0. 48) 
-0. 98 
(0. 85) 
-0.144** 
(0.053) 
-0.077 
(0.061) 
-0.063 
(0.051) 
Infor ation 
processing 
-0.16 *  
(0.049) 
-0.158*** 
(0. 43) 
-0.263**  
(0. 81) 
-0.182**  
(0.053) 
-0.130** 
(0.064) 
-0.143*** 
(0.054) 
bservations 13,534 14,198 5,374 13,892 5,108 14,553 
Schools 173 173 169 17  156 169 
       
 . 4      
otal score -0.169*  
(0.058) 
-0.120** 
(0. 5 ) 
-0. 51 
(0. 95) 
-0.200**  
(0.064) 
-0.124 
(0.076) 
-0.095 
(0.062) 
anguage -0.171*  
(0.058) 
-0.137*** 
(0. 49) 
-0. 92 
(0. 86) 
-0.20 **  
(0.062) 
-0.081 
(0.073) 
-0.124** 
(0.059) 
ath -0.143*  
(0.054) 
-0. 8  
(0. 60) 
0. 38 
(0.102) 
-0.152** 
(0.063) 
-0.146* 
(0.079) 
-0.027 
(0.060) 
Infor ation 
processing 
-0.131*  
(0.061) 
-0. 80*** 
(0. 56) 
-0.100 
(0.105) 
-0.193**  
(0.065) 
-0.126 
(0.079) 
-0.119* 
(0.064) 
bservations 6,692 6,817 2,877 5,630 3,0 4 6,047 
Schools 74 74 72 73 72 73 
       
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
otes. Each cel  represents a separate regression. Robust standard erro s, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / * / ** denotes 
significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % significance level.  
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Table 5.A.2 Quantile regressions results:  Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP for 
quantiles of the test score distributions in the G38 and G4 samples 
 (1) 
quantile 
regression 
0.1 
(2) 
quantile 
regression 
 
0.25 
(3) 
quantile 
regression 
 
0.50 
(4) 
quantile 
regression 
0.75 
(5) 
quantile 
regression 
0.90 
 
 A. G38        
Total score -0.246*** 
(0.042) 
-0.208*** 
(0.033) 
-0.220*** 
(0.031) 
-0.130*** 
(0.029) 
-0.093*** 
(0.034) 
Language -0.236*** 
(0.047) 
-0.211*** 
(0.035) 
-0.227*** 
(0.030) 
-0.174*** 
(0.030) 
-0.099*** 
(0.032) 
Math -0.142*** 
(0.042) 
-0.158*** 
(0.040) 
-0.166*** 
(0.034) 
-0.127*** 
(0.030) 
-0.067** 
(0.030) 
Information 
processing 
-0.266*** 
(0.047) 
-0.201*** 
(0.036) 
-0.164*** 
(0.033) 
-0.140*** 
(0.029) 
-0.066** 
(0.029) 
Observations 27,822 27,822 27,822 27,822 27,822 
Schools 173 173 173 173 173 
      
 B. G4     
Total score -0.156*** 
(0.055) 
-0.159*** 
(0.041) 
-0.172*** 
(0.039) 
-0.130*** 
(0.039) 
-0.086** 
(0.040) 
Language -0.135*** 
(0.050) 
-0.166*** 
(0.043) 
-0.219***  
(0.039) 
-0.144*** 
(0.039) 
-0.065 
(0.040) 
Math -0.058 
(0.052) 
-0.155*** 
(0.050) 
-0.166*** 
(0.041) 
-0.116*** 
(0.038) 
-0.086** 
(0.039) 
Information 
processing 
-0.217*** 
(0.058) 
-0.117*** 
(0.046) 
-0.090** 
(0.041) 
-0.132*** 
(0.039) 
-0.039 
(0.038) 
Observations 13,597 13,597 13,597 13,597 13,597 
Schools 74 74 74 74 74 
      
Individual 
characteristics 
yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed effects  yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Notes. Each cell represents a separate quantile regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes significance at a 10 / 5 / 1 % 
significance level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143
143 
 
Table 5.A.3 Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP: Different post-treatment years 
included. Sample without schools in Amsterdam that did not start in the ASIP in 2008-2009 
 (1) 
 
Post-treatment years: 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
(2) 
 
Post-treatment years: 
2010, 2011, 2012 
(3) 
 
Post-treatment years: 
2011, 2012 
(4) 
 
Post-treatment years: 
2012 
     
Total score -0.237*** 
(0.067) 
-0.208*** 
(0.071) 
-0.287*** 
(0.081) 
-0.353*** 
(0.122) 
Language -0.236*** -0.221*** -0.283*** -0.380*** 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.081) (0.116) 
Math -0.179*** -0.171** -0.262*** -0.279** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.076) (0.117) 
Information processing -0.198*** -0.143** -0.200*** -0.270** 
 (0.063) (0.069) 
 
(0.078) (0.114) 
Observations 73,182 64,352 55,469 46,214 
Schools 591 589 589 587 
     
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes 
School fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
     
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** 
denotes significance at a 1 / 5 / 10 % significance level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.A.4 Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP for separate post-treatment years  
 
 
 (1) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2009 
(2) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2010 
(3) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2011 
(4) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2012 
     
Total score -0.189*** 
(0.053) 
-0.094 
(0.059) 
-0.128*** 
(0.050) 
-0.299*** 
(0.057) 
Language -0.206*** -0.130** -0.125*** -0.321*** 
 (0.049) (0.056) (0.045) (0.053) 
Math -0.071 0.002 -0.109** -0.204** 
 (0.051) (0.058) (0.051) (0.059) 
Information processing -0.225*** -0.143** -0.100* -0.274*** 
 (0.051) 
 
(0.059) (0.053) (0.057) 
Observations 48,711 48,788 49,172 49,462 
Schools 575 586 599 609 
     
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes 
School fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
     
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 1 / 5 / 10 % significance level.  
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Table 5.A.5 Estimated effects of the introduction of the ASIP for separate post-treatment years. 
Sample without schools in Amsterdam that did not start in the ASIP in 2008-2009 
 (1) 
Post-treatment year: 
2009 
(2) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2010 
(3) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2011 
(4) 
 
Post-treatment year: 
2012 
     
Total score -0.339*** 
(0.092) 
-0.053 
(0.081) 
-0.226*** 
(0.085) 
-0.353*** 
(0.122) 
Language -0.299*** -0.088 -0.187** -0.380*** 
 (0.093) (0.074) (0.079) (0.116) 
Math -0.237** -0.001 -0.256*** -0.279** 
 (0.099) (0.091) (0.091) (0.117) 
Information processing -0.361*** -0.042 -0.137* -0.270** 
 (0.070) 
 
(0.088) (0.078) (0.114) 
Observations 45,475 45,528 45,900 46,214 
Schools 553 564 576 587 
     
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes 
School fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
     
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 1 / 5 / 10 % significance level.  
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Table 5.A.6 Additional analyses: Grade retention   
 (1) 
Total sample 
(2) 
Sample excluding 
pupils with  
age > 12.5 
(3) 
Sample excluding 
schools in 
Amsterdam with 
decrease in  
age > 0.2 
(4) 
Sample excluding 
schools in 
Amsterdam with 
decrease in  
age > 0.15 
(5) 
Sample excluding 
schools in 
Amsterdam with 
decrease in  
age > 0.10 
  
Dependent variable: age 
      
Introduction of the ASIP -0.079*** 
(0.015) 
 
 -0.039** 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
 Dependent variable: dummy variable indicating age > 12.5 
 
Introduction of the ASIP 
 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
 
0.002 
(0.014) 
 Dependent variable: total CITO test score  
      
Introduction of the ASIP -0.170*** 
(0.036) 
-0.139*** 
(0.037) 
-0.174*** 
(0.038) 
-0.140*** 
(0.039) 
-0.159*** 
(0.044) 
      
      
Observations 78,545 66,823 76,820 76,027 75,195 
Schools 
 
614 614  606   602 598 
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes yes 
School fixed effects  yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. Each cell represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the school-year level, are in parentheses. * / ** / *** denotes 
significance at a 1 / 5 / 10 % significance level.  
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6 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to provide new evidence on the effectiveness of educational policies. It presents four 
empirical evaluations of educational policies in the Netherlands. The thesis applies design-based research 
methods in real policy cases and contributes to several topics in the literature of the economics of 
education. The main findings per chapter, including potential policy implications, are presented below, 
followed by a brief discussion on the limitations of the presented studies and suggestions for further 
research. The chapter ends with some overall concluding remarks. 
 
6.1 Summary of main findings 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the effects of the timing of tracking on higher education completion. The age at 
which students are tracked into different education types is one of the most remarkable differences across 
countries. In our analysis, we use data from the Secondary Education Pupil Cohorts of 1989, and exploit 
the coexistence of a tracked and a comprehensive system within the Dutch education system. Some 
schools in the Netherland directly track 12 year old pupils that leave primary education into categorial 
classes of a particular education level, while other schools offer comprehensive classes that postpone the 
time of tracking with one or two years. This causes variation in the timing of tracking, which we exploit 
to analyse the effects of early tracking by comparing higher education completion of pupils who start 
secondary education in a categorial class (the ‘tracked’ pupils) to those who start in a comprehensive class 
(the ‘non-tracked’ pupils). To deal with selection problems we restrict our estimation sample to a 
particular school advice group that is homogeneous with respect to ability, use a large set of covariates, 
and adopt an instrumental variables approach. In the instrumental variable model we use the variation in 
tracking that is caused by the regional supply of school types. Our main analysis focuses on pupils at the 
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margin of the Dutch high and low tracks. This group is likely to be most affected by the timing of 
tracking. We find negative effects of early tracking on completion of higher education. The OLS 
estimates are supported by the IV estimates. The OLS estimates show that early tracking decreases the 
probability of completion of higher education by approximately 5 percentage points. In the 1989 cohort, 
average completion of higher education for the tracked pupils is around 21%. Hence, our estimation 
results suggest that pupils can increase their probability of completing higher education by around 25% 
by postponing the timing of tracking. The IV estimates yield even more detrimental effects for early 
tracking. Additional analyses suggest that higher ability pupils are not negatively affected by being 
grouped in a comprehensive class together with the lower ability ones. This indicates that postponing 
tracking to older children would increase the number of people completing higher education. Our study 
contributes to the understanding of optimal tracking ages. It supports the conclusion of the OECD (2007) 
that the early tracking regime in the Netherlands causes a constraint for the growth of higher education 
participation. The results suggest that postponing tracking to children older than 12 would increase the 
number of people completing higher education in the Netherlands.   
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on the role of incentives in education. Since empirical work has 
found difficulties to show a relationship between increased resources and improved educational 
achievement, the literature on the use of incentives in education has expanded rapidly in recent years. 
Previous studies have mainly focused on incentives for students, teachers and schools. This study 
analyses the effectiveness of a new type of financial incentive scheme targeted at the level of school 
districts. We exploit the gradual introduction of the incentive scheme for local education authorities to 
reduce school dropout in the Netherlands in 2006. In the first year, covenants with financial incentives 
were offered to 14 out of 39 school districts with the highest number of dropouts. This selection rule, and 
a unique dataset containing individual information on the whole student population in both the pre- and 
post-treatment year, allows us to evaluate the effects of the treatment by means of a (local) difference-in-
differences approach. We find statistically insignificant effects of the policy on dropout probability. These 
findings are robust to a variety of specifications and sensitivity tests. An additional analysis provides 
suggestive evidence for manipulation of outcomes in response to the program. This study provides no 
evidence that an incentive scheme targeted at regional education authorities has been effective in 
improving educational outcomes. The ineffectiveness of the scheme might be due to strategic behaviour 
at the cost of purposive actions. This once more points out the importance of a proper design with well-
thought prior conditions for a successful implementation of incentive programs in education. Further 
research to improve knowledge on optimal designs seems highly valuable regarding the promise of 
incentive-based policies to increase educational quality at relatively low costs.   
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margin of the Dutch high and low tracks. This group is likely to be most affected by the timing of 
tracking. We find negative effects of early tracking on completion of higher education. The OLS 
estimates are supported by the IV estimates. The OLS estimates show that early tracking decreases the 
probability of completion of higher education by approximately 5 percentage points. In the 1989 cohort, 
average completion of higher education for the tracked pupils is around 21%. Hence, our estimation 
results suggest that pupils can increase their probability of completing higher education by around 25% 
by postponing the timing of tracking. The IV estimates yield even more detrimental effects for early 
tracking. Additional analyses suggest that higher ability pupils are not negatively affected by being 
grouped in a comprehensive class together with the lower ability ones. This indicates that postponing 
tracking to older children would increase the number of people completing higher education. Our study 
contributes to the understanding of optimal tracking ages. It supports the conclusion of the OECD (2007) 
that the early tracking regime in the Netherlands causes a constraint for the growth of higher education 
participation. The results suggest that postponing tracking to children older than 12 would increase the 
number of people completing higher education in the Netherlands.   
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on the role of incentives in education. Since empirical work has 
found difficulties to show a relationship between increased resources and improved educational 
achievement, the literature on the use of incentives in education has expanded rapidly in recent years. 
Previous studies have mainly focused on incentives for students, teachers and schools. This study 
analyses the effectiveness of a new type of financial incentive scheme targeted at the level of school 
districts. We exploit the gradual introduction of the incentive scheme for local education authorities to 
reduce school dropout in the Netherlands in 2006. In the first year, covenants with financial incentives 
were offered to 14 out of 39 school districts with the highest number of dropouts. This selection rule, and 
a unique dataset containing individual information on the whole student population in both the pre- and 
post-treatment year, allows us to evaluate the effects of the treatment by means of a (local) difference-in-
differences approach. We find statistically insignificant effects of the policy on dropout probability. These 
findings are robust to a variety of specifications and sensitivity tests. An additional analysis provides 
suggestive evidence for manipulation of outcomes in response to the program. This study provides no 
evidence that an incentive scheme targeted at regional education authorities has been effective in 
improving educational outcomes. The ineffectiveness of the scheme might be due to strategic behaviour 
at the cost of purposive actions. This once more points out the importance of a proper design with well-
thought prior conditions for a successful implementation of incentive programs in education. Further 
research to improve knowledge on optimal designs seems highly valuable regarding the promise of 
incentive-based policies to increase educational quality at relatively low costs.   
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Chapter 4 investigates the effects of the Neighbourhood School Program (NSP), a comprehensive 
program for multi-problem school dropouts, by means of a field experiment. Previous studies provide 
mixed evidence on the success of training programs for disadvantaged youths. It seems therefore difficult 
to effectively serve the vulnerable target group of at-risk adolescents and realize persistent social gains. 
The NSP is largely designed in line with lessons from the literature and shares several components with 
other promising programs. It offers an intensive and integrated approach of educational and work services 
combined with professional care and personal mentoring. To assess the effects of the program we make 
use of capacity constraints at the NSP and implement a specific assignment rule such that treatment status 
is determined only by an individual’s application date. We make use of administrative data on school 
enrolment, employment, and criminal behaviour, and investigate the impact of the program three years 
after its introduction. We estimate various regression models, which essentially compare outcomes 
between youths assigned to the NSP and youths assigned to standard intervention activities, conditional 
on the time of application. To address noncompliance with the assignment rule, we use an instrumental 
variables approach in which actual assignment is instrumented by intended assignment. We find 
statistically insignificant effects of assignment to the NSP on school enrolment or employment. This 
finding is in line with a large body of the literature that shows no impact of training programs for at-risk 
youths on labour market outcomes (LaLonde, 2003; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Most important, we 
find evidence that assignment to the NSP increases criminal activity compared to standard intervention, 
especially among the youths who were suspected of a crime at the time of entry. This result is consistent 
with previous studies that document adverse effects of group counselling or group-based interventions on 
criminal activity (Dishion et al., 1999). Deviant peer effects caused by grouping at-risk adolescents 
together can explain the reinforcement of criminal behaviour (Dodge et al., 2007). Additional analyses 
provide suggestive evidence in line with this explanation. Hence, adverse peer effects due to placing at-
risk youths together may have negated other promising elements of the NSP. This study provides 
additional evidence that it is difficult to design effective programs that help vulnerable young dropouts 
back on track. In addition, the findings suggest that one should be cautious to treat youths-at-risk 
simultaneously, since peer effects can reinforce adverse behaviour. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of comprehensive school reform (CSR) policy for failing schools on 
student achievement. CSR policies have been widely used as an instrument to improve failing schools, 
but the evidence on its effectiveness remains limited. We estimate the effects of the Amsterdam School 
Improvement Program (ASIP), a CSR policy introduced in the Netherlands in 2008. The program 
implements performance-based working at all levels within the school and typically integrates measures 
such as staff coaching, teacher observations and teacher schooling, and the use of new instruction 
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methods. Each program is tailored towards the specific needs of the school and is guided by educational 
experts. Failing schools in Amsterdam were eligible for the program, whereas similar schools outside 
Amsterdam were not allowed to participate. Our assessment of student achievement is based on the high-
stakes CITO test that pupils take in their final year of primary school. We make use of administrative data 
on CITO test scores from 2005 to 2012, which enables us to compare the development of student 
achievement in failing schools in Amsterdam to that in failing schools outside Amsterdam in a difference-
in-differences framework. Difference-in-differences estimates show substantial and statistically 
significant detrimental effects on CITO test scores. This finding is robust to a broad range of sensitivity 
tests. In our preferred specification, test scores decrease by 0.17 standard deviations in the first four years 
after the introduction of the policy. Interviews with school-leaders of participating schools provide a 
candidate explanation for our findings. The rigorous and demanding approach appears to have caused an 
increase in teacher replacement. The resulting loss of school specific knowledge, increase in recruitment 
and hiring costs, and uncertain work atmosphere felt by teachers may have negatively affected pupil 
achievement. We cannot exclude that our findings reflect adjustment costs during the transition from a 
failing to a successful school and that it takes longer before beneficial effects become manifest. For 
instance, if teacher outflow indeed explains our findings, one might expect better performances once more 
effective teachers are hired and the new work environment within schools has been stabilized for a while. 
In any case, we conclude that the introduction of the CSR policy induced major costs in terms of 
substantial test score losses for at least four cohorts of pupils.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
 
The focus in the empirical studies in this thesis is on the identification of causal policy effects by using 
evaluation methods that address selection problems. These methods contribute to the credibility of the 
presented results. The presented studies also have their limitations.  
 
First, the impact evaluations not always reveal the underlying mechanisms or critical factors that can 
explain the outcomes. For example, the analysis on the effects of tracking age is not informative on the 
mechanisms that translate early tracking to outcomes. Potential mechanisms include peer effects, teacher 
quality effects, or consequences for teachers related to the ability variance in the classroom. Low ability 
pupils may benefit from the interaction with their high-achieving peers in comprehensive classes. If better 
teachers prefer to teach relatively high ability classes, teacher sorting may result in a higher quality of 
education in these classes. In tracked classes with a lower ability variance, teaching may be easier since 
151
150 
 
methods. Each program is tailored towards the specific needs of the school and is guided by educational 
experts. Failing schools in Amsterdam were eligible for the program, whereas similar schools outside 
Amsterdam were not allowed to participate. Our assessment of student achievement is based on the high-
stakes CITO test that pupils take in their final year of primary school. We make use of administrative data 
on CITO test scores from 2005 to 2012, which enables us to compare the development of student 
achievement in failing schools in Amsterdam to that in failing schools outside Amsterdam in a difference-
in-differences framework. Difference-in-differences estimates show substantial and statistically 
significant detrimental effects on CITO test scores. This finding is robust to a broad range of sensitivity 
tests. In our preferred specification, test scores decrease by 0.17 standard deviations in the first four years 
after the introduction of the policy. Interviews with school-leaders of participating schools provide a 
candidate explanation for our findings. The rigorous and demanding approach appears to have caused an 
increase in teacher replacement. The resulting loss of school specific knowledge, increase in recruitment 
and hiring costs, and uncertain work atmosphere felt by teachers may have negatively affected pupil 
achievement. We cannot exclude that our findings reflect adjustment costs during the transition from a 
failing to a successful school and that it takes longer before beneficial effects become manifest. For 
instance, if teacher outflow indeed explains our findings, one might expect better performances once more 
effective teachers are hired and the new work environment within schools has been stabilized for a while. 
In any case, we conclude that the introduction of the CSR policy induced major costs in terms of 
substantial test score losses for at least four cohorts of pupils.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
 
The focus in the empirical studies in this thesis is on the identification of causal policy effects by using 
evaluation methods that address selection problems. These methods contribute to the credibility of the 
presented results. The presented studies also have their limitations.  
 
First, the impact evaluations not always reveal the underlying mechanisms or critical factors that can 
explain the outcomes. For example, the analysis on the effects of tracking age is not informative on the 
mechanisms that translate early tracking to outcomes. Potential mechanisms include peer effects, teacher 
quality effects, or consequences for teachers related to the ability variance in the classroom. Low ability 
pupils may benefit from the interaction with their high-achieving peers in comprehensive classes. If better 
teachers prefer to teach relatively high ability classes, teacher sorting may result in a higher quality of 
education in these classes. In tracked classes with a lower ability variance, teaching may be easier since 
151 
 
course material can be better adapted to the needs of the pupils. In addition to these differences between a 
tracked and a comprehensive class, our empirical results also reflect differences between tracking ages in 
the ability of educators to allocate students to appropriate school types. Tracking pupils at an early age 
may imply more uncertainty with respect to the pupil’s true capabilities and hence a higher risk of 
sending them to an inappropriate school type. The role of such mechanisms remains a valuable topic for 
further research which may contribute to a more profound understanding of the effects of the timing of 
tracking. 
 
Second, there may be concerns on the external validity of the presented results. The focus in our studies 
on the internal validity by addressing selection problems does not take away potential concerns on the 
predictive power of the results in a different context. Obviously, each empirical study provides evidence 
on the policy effects in the particular educational environment under consideration. If heterogeneity in 
responses is limited, these results are informative for other environments as well. If not, additional 
evidence from other studies can contribute to a more general picture of the effects of the policy. All of the 
studies in this thesis are concerned with policies implemented in the Dutch education system. It is not 
obvious that our findings can be directly translated to other countries as well. For example, the 
effectiveness of centralized incentives can be dependent on specific characteristics of the education 
system, such as the large school autonomy in the Netherlands. Since school autonomy might limit the 
power of education authorities, it is conceivable that this type of incentive scheme will be more successful 
in other education systems. Additional research efforts across countries can shed light on the effectiveness 
of incentive programs in different education systems.  
6.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The findings in this thesis provide insight into the effects of various types of educational policies. Our 
results point out that it is by no means obvious that policy interventions always work out the way they 
were meant to. We find that two intensive programs for troubled youths and schools did not succeed in 
improving outcomes. Instead, for both programs we find adverse effects. Such programs require 
substantial resources and human efforts. Our results fit in a large body of studies that show that additional 
resources do not guarantee an improvement of educational outcomes (Hanushek, 2006; Woessmann 
2003). These findings can explain the current interest in other, more cost-effective ways to improve the 
education system. Policies based on incentives are generally less costly compared to resource-based 
interventions. Such policies include incentives for teachers and students (Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer 
et al., 2009; Lavy, 2002, 2009) as well as accountability systems for schools (Hanushek and Raymond, 
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2005; Jacob, 2005; Dee and Jacob, 2011). This thesis contributes to this literature by investigating a new 
type of financial incentives for regional educational authorities. We find no evidence that the incentive 
scheme improved educational outcomes. In addition to incentive-based policies, policies targeted at 
institutional features of the education system have the potential to improve outcomes at negligible costs. 
This thesis provides evidence that the number of people that graduate from higher education can be 
increased by postponing the age at which students are tracked into different types of secondary education 
from 12 to 13 or 14. Such institutional changes would require (almost) no additional resources.    
Naturally, the findings in this thesis do not imply that intensive programs or resource-based policies will 
never work. They illustrate that the more expensive interventions not necessarily perform better than 
interventions that require less resources. This suggests that putting in additional resources is not always 
the best way to address problems or to improve the system. The findings that policy instruments can have 
no, or even detrimental, effects on outcomes point out the importance of a proper knowledge on the 
impact of policy interventions. Now that the empirical evaluation methods have largely matured and 
found credible ways to address selection problems, policymakers can benefit from the insights provided 
by new evaluation studies. These insights can be used to adjust the content of interventions, to select the 
most promising interventions or to abandon policies that have been shown to be ineffective. In this way 
additional design-based evaluations can valuably contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources and 
an improvement of the education system.  
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Motivatie en doel 
 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op het identificeren van effectief beleid in het onderwijs. Dit is belangrijk 
vanwege meerdere redenen. Ten eerste heeft het recente verleden laten zien dat de invoering van nieuw 
beleid niet altijd even succesvol is geweest. De parlementaire onderzoekscommissie 
onderwijsvernieuwingen, onder leiding van de huidige minister van Financiën Jeroen Dijsselbloem, 
evalueerde in 2008 enkele van de meest ingrijpende vernieuwingen in het onderwijs in de jaren negentig 
van de vorige eeuw. Het ging daarbij om de invoering van het vmbo, de basisvorming en de tweede fase. 
De commissie concludeerde dat de overheid haar kerntaak, het zeker stellen van deugdelijk onderwijs, 
ernstig had verwaarloosd. De commissie merkte onder meer op dat verschillende - mogelijk 
conflicterende - wijzigingen tegelijkertijd werden ingevoerd en dat beleidskeuzen vaak werden bepaald 
door het financiële kader. Daarnaast wees zij op het gebrek aan een grondige probleemanalyse en 
wetenschappelijke onderbouwing voor de nieuwe maatregelen. Eén van de adviezen voor de toekomst 
betrof het gebruik van beleidsevaluaties om nieuw beleid wetenschappelijk te valideren. Wanneer een 
dergelijke onderbouwing ontbreekt, zou nieuw beleid eerst kleinschalig moeten worden ingevoerd ten 
behoeve van een wetenschappelijke evaluatie.  
 
De toegenomen aandacht voor de wetenschappelijke onderbouwing van beleid is zichtbaar in meer 
landen. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk bepleitte de regering Blair onder het motto ‘what matters, is what 
works’ zich bij beslissingen niet langer te laten leiden door politiek-ideologische argumenten, maar door 
objectieve wetenschappelijke analyses (Blair en Cunningham, 1999). In de Verenigde Staten legde de 
regering Bush met de ‘No Child Left Behind-wet’ uit 2001 de nadruk op het gebruik van 
onderwijsmethoden- en activiteiten waarvan de werking wetenschappelijk is aangetoond. Het invoeren 
van ineffectief beleid kan kostbaar zijn en ongewenste gevolgen met zich meebrengen voor de 
onderwijskwaliteit. 
 
Ten tweede is onderwijs een belangrijke determinant van economisch en maatschappelijk succes. De 
interesse van economen in onderwijs gaat terug naar studies over menselijk kapitaal in de jaren ’50 en ’60 
van de vorige eeuw (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1958, 1962). De theorie van het menselijk kapitaal beschouwt 
onderwijs als een investering in het verwerven van kennis van vaardigheden. De kosten die hiermee 
gepaard gaan, betreffen onder meer de uitgaven voor het volgen van onderwijs en het misgelopen loon 
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vanwege het feit dat men niet werkt, maar op school zit. Een belangrijke bate van de investering is het 
hogere toekomstige loon ten gevolge van de verworven vaardigheden. Sinds de eerste studies over 
menselijk kapitaal is een omvangrijke literatuur ontstaan die het belang van onderwijs voor economische 
en maatschappelijke uitkomsten aantoont. Hoger opgeleiden hebben in het algemeen een hoger loon 
(Card, 1999; Ashenfelter et al, 1999), zijn gezonder (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2007) en vertonen 
minder crimineel gedrag (Lochner en Moretti, 2004; Machin et al., 2011; Webbink et al., 2012). Een 
groot aantal empirische studies vindt private rendementen van onderwijs tussen de 5 en 10% (Card, 1999; 
Ashenfelter et al, 1999; Harmon et al., 2003; Heckman et al., 2006). Dit betekent dat het volgen van een 
extra jaar onderwijs leidt tot een 5 tot 10% toename van inkomsten over de levensloop. Daarnaast wijst 
een toenemend aantal studies op het belang van onderwijs voor economische groei. De meeste van deze 
studies relateren het gemiddeld behaalde onderwijsniveau in een land aan de economische groei en vinden 
sociale rendementen die iets hoger liggen dan de private rendementen (De la Fuente en Domenench 2006; 
Cohen en Soto 2007; Coe et al. 2009). Meer recente studies hebben zich ook gericht op de rendementen 
op cognitieve vaardigheden. Deze cognitieve vaardigheden worden gemeten door middel van toetsscores. 
Het meten van de hoeveelheid menselijk kapitaal op basis van cognitieve vaardigheden in plaats van het 
behaalde onderwijsniveau maakt het mogelijk om rekening te houden met verschillen in de 
onderwijskwaliteit tussen landen. Deze studies verschaffen bewijs dat cognitieve vaardigheden sterk 
gerelateerd zijn aan individuele opbrengsten en de economische groei van landen (Hanushek en 
Woessmann, 2008, 2012).  
 
Het belang van menselijk kapitaal voor economisch en maatschappelijk succes verklaart de wereldwijde 
belangstelling voor goed onderwijsbeleid. In de meeste landen is de voorziening en financiering van 
onderwijs voornamelijk een taak van de overheid. Beleidsmakers hebben te maken met beperkte 
budgetten en moeten belangrijke keuzes maken over de inzet van schaarse middelen. Dit vereist kennis 
over de werking van verschillende beleidsopties. Beleidsevaluaties kunnen inzicht verschaffen in de 
effecten van overheidsinterventies op onderwijsuitkomsten. Deze inzichten kunnen gebruikt worden voor 
het versterken van het onderwijsbeleid door effectief gebleken maatregelen te introduceren of uit te 
breiden, of door ineffectief gebleken maatregelen aan te passen of stop te zetten.  
 
De complexe onderwijsproductiefunctie bemoeilijkt een betrouwbare beleidsevaluatie. 
Onderwijsuitkomsten worden bepaald door diverse factoren die het leerproces van leerlingen of studenten 
beïnvloeden, zoals kenmerken van de school, de leraar, ouders of familie, medeleerlingen en omgeving 
(Hanushek, 1986). De veelheid aan observeerbare en niet observeerbare factoren die onderwijsuitkomsten 
beïnvloeden, maakt het niet eenvoudig om het oorzakelijk effect van een specifieke beleidsinterventie te 
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isoleren. In de empirische economische literatuur is de afgelopen decennia veel aandacht geweest voor 
het vaststellen van causale effecten van beleid. Dit heeft geleid tot een verandering van 
onderzoeksmethoden op basis van controlestrategieën naar methoden op basis van specifieke 
onderzoeksdesigns die goede oplossingen kunnen bieden voor dit probleem (Imbens en Wooldridge, 
2009; Angrist en Pischke, 2010). Met behulp van deze ‘design-based’ onderzoeksmethoden kunnen de 
oorzakelijke effecten van beleid op een geloofwaardige wijze worden vastgesteld.  
 
Dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan de zoektocht naar effectieve beleidsmaatregelen in het 
onderwijs. Het proefschrift presenteert vier empirische evaluaties van onderwijsbeleid. Hierbij worden 
moderne onderzoeksdesigns toegepast op concrete beleidsinterventies in Nederland. In elk van de studies 
ligt de nadruk op een geloofwaardige identificatie van het oorzakelijk effect van het beleid. Het 
proefschrift draagt bij aan verschillende stromingen binnen de literatuur van de onderwijseconomie door 
nieuwe kennis te verschaffen over de effecten van verschillende typen beleidsinterventies. Dit betreft 
zowel institutioneel beleid, beleid gebaseerd op financiële prikkels, als beleid waarbij extra middelen 
worden ingezet voor de implementatie van nieuwe programma’s gericht op specifieke doelgroepen. De 
eerste studie richt zich op het effect van het tijdstip van selectie op de afronding van het hoger onderwijs. 
De tweede studie evalueert de effectiviteit van een nieuw type financiële prikkel voor regionale 
onderwijsautoriteiten gericht op het terugdringen van voortijdig schoolverlaten. De derde studie 
analyseert de effecten van de wijkschool, een speciaal programma voor schoolverlaters met een 
meervoudige problematiek in Rotterdam, op een aantal sociaaleconomische uitkomsten. De vierde studie 
evalueert de effecten van een veelomvattend programma voor zwak presterende scholen in Amsterdam op 
de onderwijsprestaties van leerlingen.  
 
 
Ontwikkelingen op het terrein van beleidsevaluaties 
 
De veelheid aan factoren die bepalend zijn voor onderwijsuitkomsten maakt het niet eenvoudig om het 
oorzakelijk effect van een beleidsinterventie vast te stellen. Te midden van al deze, mogelijk niet 
observeerbare, invloeden is het immers moeilijk om het effect van het beleid te isoleren. Een betrouwbare 
beleidsevaluatie vereist dat het beleidseffect op een geloofwaardige manier kan worden gescheiden van 
de overige factoren. 
 
Beleidsevaluaties rusten op een essentieel principe dat volgt uit het zogenoemde ‘potentiële 
uitkomstenmodel’ (Rubin, 1974, 1977). Dit model gaat er van uit dat elk individu twee potentiële 
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uitkomsten heeft: een uitkomst in de situatie met het nieuwe beleid en een uitkomst in de situatie zonder 
het nieuwe beleid. Het oorzakelijk effect van het beleid is vervolgens het verschil tussen deze twee 
mogelijke uitkomsten. Wanneer beleidseffecten heterogeen zijn, volgt het gemiddelde beleidseffect uit 
het gemiddelde verschil tussen beide uitkomsten in de populatie. In de praktijk observeren we echter maar 
één van de twee mogelijke uitkomsten. De potentiële uitkomst zonder het nieuwe beleid is niet 
observeerbaar voor de groep die wordt blootgesteld aan het beleid. Voor deze uitkomst zijn we dus 
aangewezen op een andere groep waarbij het nieuwe beleid niet is ingevoerd. De aanname die vervolgens 
nodig is om het oorzakelijke effect vast te stellen, is dat de waargenomen uitkomst van deze 
controlegroep gelijk is aan die van de experimentgroep in de situatie zonder het nieuwe beleid. De 
belangrijkste uitdaging voor een beleidsevaluatie is dus om een betrouwbare controlegroep te vinden 
waarvoor deze aanname geldt.  
 
Zelfselectie in een experiment- of controleconditie vormt een bedreiging voor de validiteit van deze 
aanname. Individuen die er voor kiezen om blootgesteld te worden aan het beleid verschillen per definitie 
van individuen die daar niet voor kiezen. Deze, mogelijk niet observeerbare, verschillen kunnen een 
vergelijking van uitkomsten tussen experiment- en controlegroep vertekenen. Wanneer men bijvoorbeeld 
het effect van klassengrootte op leerprestaties wil evalueren, moet men zich er van bewust zijn dat keuzes 
van scholen of ouders kunnen leiden tot een selectieve toewijzing van leerlingen aan grote en kleine 
klassen. Scholen kunnen er de voorkeur aan kunnen geven om zwakkere leerlingen in een kleinere klas te 
plaatsen en betrokken ouders kunnen moeite doen om hun kind in een kleine klas te plaatsen. Hierdoor 
kunnen verschillen in prestaties tussen leerlingen in grote en kleine klassen ook worden veroorzaakt door 
andere, niet geobserveerde kenmerken in plaats van door de klassengrootte. 
 
Selectieprocessen zijn het belangrijkste probleem in beleidsevaluaties. Wanneer de beleidsvariable (die 
aangeeft of een individu wel of niet te maken heeft met het nieuwe beleid) is gecorreleerd met niet 
observeerbare factoren die de uitkomst beïnvloeden, leveren standaard regressiemethoden geen 
betrouwbare schatting van het effect van het beleid. In de traditionele literatuur over de productie van 
onderwijsuitkomsten was nog weinig aandacht voor dit probleem. Hanushek (1986) vatte de resultaten 
van 147 schattingen van onderwijsproductiefuncties samen. De geschatte effecten van factoren zoals 
klassengrootte en diverse kenmerken van leraren op onderwijsprestaties liepen sterk uiteen. De resultaten 
voor elk van de factoren verschilden zowel in teken als in statistische significantie. De auteur 
concludeerde uit deze tegenstrijdige resultaten dat er blijkbaar geen duidelijk verband is tussen 
onderwijsinputs en onderwijsprestaties. In geen van de studies werd echter nog rekening gehouden met 
selectieproblemen. Het is dus ook goed mogelijk dat een vertekening van de geschatte effecten door 
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selectie een verklaring is voor de inconsistentie van de onderzoeksresultaten. Het selectieprobleem is pas 
echt onder de aandacht gekomen sinds een aantal studies op het gebied van arbeidseconomie problemen 
ondervonden bij het vaststellen van causale effecten van trainingsprogramma’s voor werklozen 
(Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter en Card, 1985; Lalonde, 1986). Een invloedrijke studie van Lalonde 
(1986) was een belangrijke mijlpaal in dit bewustwordingsproces. De studie evalueerde de effecten van 
een trainingsprogramma op twee manieren: één op basis van een gerandomiseerd experiment waarbij 
rekening kon worden gehouden met zelfselectie en één op basis van een econometrische evaluatie waarbij 
geen rekening kon worden gehouden met zelfselectie. Het bleek dat de resultaten van beide evaluaties erg 
verschillend waren en de auteur concludeerde dan ook dat studies die niet goed rekening houden met 
zelfselectie vertekende resultaten kunnen opleveren. Als reactie op deze bevindingen heeft het empirisch 
onderzoek zich vanaf begin jaren negentig sterk gericht op geloofwaardige onderzoeksdesigns, waarmee 
op een goede manier rekening kan worden gehouden met het selectieprobleem. Dit heeft geresulteerd in 
een sterke toename van ‘design-based’ studies waarin expliciet aandacht wordt besteed aan de 
identificatie van het beleids- of behandeleffect. De verschuiving van controlestrategieën en 
econometrische methoden naar ‘design-based’ studies is een belangrijke ontwikkeling geweest in de 
empirische economie in de afgelopen decennia. 
 
Deze ontwikkeling, door Angrist en Pischke (2009) betiteld als ‘de geloofwaardigheidsrevolutie in de 
empirische economie’, heeft sterk bijgedragen aan de kennis over onderzoeksmethoden die 
geloofwaardige oplossingen bieden voor het selectieprobleem. De meest overtuigende oplossing vanuit 
onderzoeksperspectief is het gecontroleerde experiment, waarbij individuen door middel van loting 
worden toegewezen aan een experiment- of controlegroep. De aselecte toewijzing verzekert dat de 
beleidsvariabele niet samenhangt met niet-geobserveerde factoren. In een dergelijk gerandomiseerd 
experiment is het verschil in uitkomsten tussen de experiment- en controlegroep een zuivere schatter van 
het gemiddelde beleidseffect. Anders gesteld levert een regressie van een uitkomstvariabele op een 
constante en de beleidsvariabele een zuivere schatter voor het beleidseffect. Door covariaten aan de 
regressiespecificatie toe te voegen kan de precisie van de schatting worden verbeterd. Het aantal 
gerandomiseerde experimenten in de empirische economie is de afgelopen decennia sterk toegenomen. 
Eén van de grootste experimenten in het onderwijs is het Tennesse STAR experiment (Krueger, 1999). 
Deze studie evalueert de effecten van klassengrootte door leerlingen in de onderbouw van de basisschool 
aselect toe te wijzen aan kleine of grote klassen. Op deze manier wordt gevonden dat een kleine klas leidt 
tot een bescheiden verbetering van de leerprestaties. Meer recent zijn ook sociale experimenten 
uitgevoerd om de effecten van het gebruik van financiële prikkels in het onderwijs te onderzoeken 
(Angrist en Lavy, 2009; Angrist et al., 2009; Kremer et al., 2009).  
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Experimenten in het onderwijs zijn lang niet altijd mogelijk. Experimenten kosten veel tijd en geld, en 
zijn ook niet altijd gewenst of geschikt. Daarnaast kunnen ethische overwegingen een belemmering 
vormen voor het starten van een experiment. Wanneer een gecontroleerd experiment niet mogelijk is, 
kunnen ook zogenoemde quasi-experimenten of natuurlijke experimenten een geloofwaardige oplossing 
bieden. Bij een natuurlijk experiment ontstaat de aselecte toewijzing aan een experiment- of 
controlegroep niet door de hand van de onderzoeker, maar door een toevallige situatie in de 
werkelijkheid. Bij natuurlijke experimenten wordt gebruik gemaakt van exogene variatie in behandeling 
veroorzaakt door bestaande instituties, regels, of natuurlijke krachten. We onderscheiden drie soorten 
natuurlijke experimenten: instrumentele variabele analyses, regressiediscontinuïteiten en difference-in-
differences modellen.   
 
Instrumentele variabele (IV) analyses maken gebruik van een situatie waarin een bepaalde variabele, het 
instrument, zorgt voor exogene variatie in de toewijzing aan de interventie. Dit betekent dat het 
instrument wel invloed heeft op de toewijzing aan de experiment- of controlegroep, maar geen invloed op 
de uitkomsten. Doordat enkel gebruik wordt gemaakt van de variatie in toewijzing die veroorzaakt wordt 
door het instrument, biedt deze methode een oplossing voor het selectieprobleem. IV modellen maken het 
mogelijk de effecten van beleidsinterventies consistent te schatten met behulp van ‘two-stage-least-
squares’ (2SLS). Wanneer de effecten homogeen zijn, geeft dit het gemiddelde effect van de interventie. 
Imbens en Angrist (1994) laten zien dat een IV schatting in het geval van heterogene effecten moet 
worden geïnterpreteerd als een lokaal gemiddeld effect van de interventie. Zij introduceren de 
monotoniciteitsaanname, die inhoudt dat de toewijzing aan de interventie op monotone wijze wordt 
beïnvloed door het instrument. Onder deze aanname en de standaard IV aanname dat het instrument 
alleen invloed heeft op de uitkomst via de toewijzing aan de interventie, kunnen IV schattingen 
geïnterpreteerd worden als het oorzakelijk beleidseffect voor de deelgroep van individuen wier toewijzing 
aan de interventie wordt beïnvloed door het instrument. Voor het toepassen van IV modellen is het 
noodzakelijk geschikte instrumenten te vinden die aan deze voorwaarden voldoen. Een speciaal geval 
betreft studies waarin een gerandomiseerde toewijzing gebruikt wordt als instrument voor uiteindelijke 
behandeling (zie bijvoorbeeld Angrist, 1990; Bloom et al., 1997). Daadwerkelijke deelname aan de 
interventie kan afwijken van de toewijzing als individuen zich niet houden aan de toewijzing. In 
dergelijke gevallen met een binair instrument verdeelt de monotoniciteitsaanname de populatie in drie 
groepen: de zogenoemde ‘compliers’, ‘never-takers’ en ‘always-takers’. De ‘compliers’ zijn de 
individuen die hun toewijzing altijd naleven. De ‘never-takers’ en ‘always-takers’ kiezen er nooit of altijd 
voor om deel te nemen aan de interventie, onafhankelijk van hun toewijzing. Aangezien hun deelname 
aan de interventie niet varieert met het instrument, verschaffen IV schattingen geen informatie over het 
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betreft studies waarin een gerandomiseerde toewijzing gebruikt wordt als instrument voor uiteindelijke 
behandeling (zie bijvoorbeeld Angrist, 1990; Bloom et al., 1997). Daadwerkelijke deelname aan de 
interventie kan afwijken van de toewijzing als individuen zich niet houden aan de toewijzing. In 
dergelijke gevallen met een binair instrument verdeelt de monotoniciteitsaanname de populatie in drie 
groepen: de zogenoemde ‘compliers’, ‘never-takers’ en ‘always-takers’. De ‘compliers’ zijn de 
individuen die hun toewijzing altijd naleven. De ‘never-takers’ en ‘always-takers’ kiezen er nooit of altijd 
voor om deel te nemen aan de interventie, onafhankelijk van hun toewijzing. Aangezien hun deelname 
aan de interventie niet varieert met het instrument, verschaffen IV schattingen geen informatie over het 
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effect van de interventie voor deze deelgroepen. In gevallen met eenzijdige naleving kan worden 
aangetoond dat het lokale gemiddelde effect van de interventie gelijk is aan het gemiddelde effect voor de 
deelnemers aan de interventie (Bloom, 1984). Deze situatie ontstaat wanneer individuen die zijn 
toegewezen aan de interventie de mogelijkheid hebben om deel te nemen, terwijl het voor individuen die 
niet zijn toegewezen onmogelijk is om deel te nemen. De intuïtie hierachter is dat er in dergelijke 
gevallen geen ‘always-takers’ bestaan, waardoor alle deelnemers aan de interventie ‘compliers’ zijn.  
Overzichten van het gebruik van IV modellen in de economische literatuur worden gepresenteerd in 
Angrist en Krueger (2001) en Angrist en Pischke (2009). Een voorbeeld waarbij IV modellen vaak zijn 
toegepast betreft de literatuur over de rendementen op onderwijs. Het behaalde onderwijsniveau is een 
endogene variabele die afhangt van vele factoren, zoals niet-observeerbare vaardigheden of motivatie. Het 
gebruik van instrumenten voor behaald onderwijsniveau kan helpen om vertekende schattingsresultaten 
van het rendement op onderwijs te voorkomen. De studies in deze literatuur maken gebruik van variatie in 
behaald onderwijsniveau die wordt veroorzaakt door verschillen in het regionale aanbod van scholen 
(Card, 1995), schoolgeld (Kane and Rouse, 1995) of leerplicht (Angrist en Krueger, 1991; Acemoglu en 
Angrist, 2001; Oreopoulos, 2006). 
 
Regressiediscontinuïteiten maken gebruik van een bepaalde afkapgrens die gehanteerd wordt in 
regelgeving of instituties. De toewijzing aan de interventie hangt dan af van een score op een bepaalde 
onderliggende variabele. Individuen die boven (of onder) een bepaalde grenswaarde scoren krijgen te 
maken met de interventie en individuen die lager (of hoger) scoren niet. Door individuen met 
vergelijkbare scores rondom de afkapgrens te vergelijken, kan een oorzakelijk effect van het beleid 
worden vastgesteld. Hierbij wordt dan in de analyses gecontroleerd voor een continue functie van de 
onderliggende variabele om te corrigeren voor de (kleine) verschillen tussen individuen met verschillende 
scores. De aanname die nodig is om een oorzakelijk effect te identificeren is dat individuen net onder de 
grenswaarde niet verschillen van de individuen net boven de grenswaarde, conditioneel op de continue 
functie van de onderliggende variabele en overige observeerbare covariaten. Deze aanname impliceert dat 
er geen andere verstorende discontinuïteiten rondom de grenswaarde mogen zijn. Om deze aanname zo 
geloofwaardig mogelijk te maken, worden regressiediscontinuïteiten vaak geschat binnen een klein 
interval rondom de grenswaarde. Er kan onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen zogenoemde ‘sharp designs’ 
en ‘fuzzy designs’ (Hahn et al., 2001). In een ‘sharp design’ is de toewijzing aan de interventie een 
deterministische functie van de onderliggende variabele. Dat wil zeggen dat alle individuen met een score 
boven de grenswaarde worden toegewezen, terwijl alle individuen met een score onder de grenswaarde 
niet worden toegewezen. In een ‘fuzzy’ design is de kans op toewijzing aan de interventie discontinu op 
de grenswaarde, maar verandert deze kans niet van 0 naar 1. Fuzzy design kunnen worden geanalyseerd 
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met behulp van instrumentele variabele modellen. Een dummy variabele die aangeeft of de score boven 
de grenswaarde ligt kan daarbij gebruikt worden als instrument voor toewijzing aan de interventie.  
 
Imbens en Lemieux (2008) en Van der Klaauw (2008) geven een overzicht van het gebruik van 
regressiediscontinuïteiten in de empirische economie. Op het gebied van onderwijs hebben meerdere 
studies de effecten van klassengrootte onderzocht door gebruik te maken van discontinuïteiten die werden 
veroorzaakt door regels voor maximum klassengrootte. De intuïtie is dat cohorten waarbij het totaal 
aantal leerlingen net groter is dan de maximum klassengrootte worden gesplitst in twee groepen, terwijl 
cohorten waarbij het totaal aantal leerlingen net kleiner is dan de maximum klassengrootte bij elkaar in 
één klas worden geplaatst. Op deze manier zorgt de regelgeving voor exogene variatie in klassengrootte. 
Angrist en Lavy (1999) gebruiken een dergelijke regel in Israël om de effecten van klassengrootte te 
onderzoeken. Zij vinden dat kleinere klassen leiden tot een beperkte verbetering van leerprestaties. Deze 
bevinding wordt ondersteund in andere studies die gebruik maken van soortgelijke regels (Urquiola, 
2006; Browning en Heinesen, 2007). Vroegere studies naar de effecten van klassengrootte, waarin nog 
geen rekening werd gehouden met selectieproblemen, lieten een grote variatie aan uitkomsten zien. De 
recente studies op basis van (natuurlijke) experimenten laten veel minder variatie zien, waarbij de 
algemene conclusie lijkt te zijn dat kleinere klassen leiden tot een bescheiden verbetering van 
leerprestaties. Het is aannemelijk dat de consistentere onderzoeksresultaten mede voortkomen uit het 
gebruik van geschikte onderzoeksdesigns die op een goede manier rekening houden met 
selectieproblemen. 
 
Difference-in-differences modellen maken gebruik van voor- en nametingen van individuen die te maken 
krijgen met nieuw beleid en individuen die niet, of in mindere mate, te maken krijgen met dat beleid. 
Deze modellen zijn goed toepasbaar wanneer beleid regionaal wordt ingevoerd. De ontwikkeling van 
uitkomsten in deze regio’s (de experimentgroep) kan vervolgens vergeleken worden met de ontwikkeling 
van uitkomsten in regio’s waar de maatregel niet is ingevoerd (de controlegroep). De identificerende 
aanname is de ‘common trend’. Deze veronderstelt dat de ontwikkeling van uitkomsten in de 
controlegroep gelijk is aan de ontwikkeling in de experimentgroep als het beleid niet zou zijn ingevoerd. 
 
Difference-in-differences modellen zijn veelvuldig toegepast in empirisch economisch onderzoek (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Ashenfelter en Card, 1985; Card en Krueger, 1994; Blundell et al., 1998). Voorbeelden op 
het gebied van onderwijs zijn Pischke (2007), die de effecten van de duur van een onderwijsjaar op 
leerprestaties bestudeert, en diverse studies die onderzoek doen naar de effecten van ‘accountability’ 
systemen in de Verenigde Staten (Hanushek en Raymond, 2004; Jacob, 2005; Dee en Jacob, 2011). Dit 
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type beleid houdt in dat de prestaties van scholen worden beoordeeld volgens vooraf vastgestelde 
standaarden, waarbij consequenties worden verbonden aan het niet halen van bepaalde normen. De 
studies maken gebruik van het feit dat dergelijk beleid vaak in specifieke staten is ingevoerd en laten zien 
dat accountability beleid bij kan dragen aan een verbetering van onderwijsprestaties. 
 
Resultaten 
 
Dit proefschrift presenteert vier empirische evaluaties van verschillende typen onderwijsbeleid in 
Nederland. In elk van de studies ligt de nadruk op een geloofwaardige identificatie van het oorzakelijke 
beleidseffect, door de toepassing van ‘design-based’ onderzoeksmethoden. De interventies betreffen één 
institutionele beleidsmaatregel, één maatregel gebaseerd op financiële prikkels en twee maatregelen 
waarbij extra middelen worden ingezet voor de implementatie van nieuwe programma’s gericht op 
specifieke doelgroepen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op de effecten van het tijdstip van selectie op het behalen van een diploma in het 
hoger onderwijs. Dit hoofdstuk past in de literatuur over institutionele kenmerken van onderwijsstelsels. 
Het tijdstip waarop leerlingen worden geselecteerd in verschillende onderwijsniveaus is één van de meest 
opvallende verschillen tussen landen. Eerdere studies naar de effecten van selectie hebben gebruik 
gemaakt van verschillen tussen landen (Schuetz et al., 2005; Hanushek en Woessmann, 2006). Het 
Nederlandse onderwijssysteem biedt de mogelijkheid om het effect van het tijdstip van selectie te 
onderzoeken binnen één land. Sommige scholen in Nederland bieden categoriale klassen aan, waarbij 
leerlingen na het verlaten van het primair onderwijs op 12-jarige leeftijd direct worden geselecteerd in een 
bepaald onderwijsniveau. Andere scholen bieden gecombineerde klassen aan waarin leerlingen bij elkaar 
geplaatst worden. Deze gecombineerde klassen stellen het tijdstip van selectie met één of twee jaar uit. 
Dit veroorzaakt variatie in het tijdstip van selectie die we benutten door het afronden van het hoger 
onderwijs onder vroeg geselecteerde leerlingen te vergelijken met het afronden van het hoger onderwijs 
onder later geselecteerde leerlingen. In deze studie maken we gebruik van VOCL (Voortgezet Onderwijs 
Cohort Leerlingen) data uit 1989. Het belangrijkste probleem voor het vaststellen van een oorzakelijk 
effect is zelfselectie in de verschillende type scholen. Hier wordt op een aantal manieren mee omgegaan. 
We beperken allereerst de onderzoeksgroep tot leerlingen die het primair onderwijs hebben verlaten met 
een mavo-advies. Dit is een homogene groep leerlingen wat betreft vaardigheden, die naar verwachting 
het sterkst zal worden beïnvloed door het tijdstip van selectie. Daarnaast maken we gebruik van een 
instrumentele variabele aanpak. Hierbij wordt het regionale aanbod van typen scholen gebruikt als 
instrument voor vroege selectie. In alle analyses wordt gecontroleerd voor een grote verzameling 
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achtergrondkenmerken. De schattingsresultaten laten zien dat vroege selectie een negatief effect heeft op 
het afronden van het hoger onderwijs. OLS schattingen suggereren dat vroege selectie de kans op het 
behalen van een diploma in het hoger onderwijs met ongeveer 5 procentpunt verkleint. De IV schattingen 
laten nog grotere negatieve effecten van vroege selectie zien. Additionele analyses wijzen uit dat 
leerlingen met een havo-advies niet negatief worden beïnvloed wanneer zij samen met leerlingen met een 
mavo-advies in een gecombineerde klas geplaatst worden. De onderzoeksresultaten suggereren dat het 
aantal hoog opgeleiden kan worden vergroot door uitstel van het tijdstip waarop leerlingen worden 
geselecteerd in verschillende onderwijsniveaus.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 is gerelateerd aan de literatuur over het gebruik van financiële prikkels binnen het onderwijs. 
Een groot aantal empirische studies vindt geen relatie tussen extra middelen voor het onderwijs en een 
verbeterde onderwijskwaliteit (Woessmann, 2003; Hanushek, 2006). De conclusie dat additionele 
middelen geen garantie betekenen voor betere onderwijsprestaties, heeft geleid tot een sterk toegenomen 
belangstelling voor de mogelijkheden van financiële prikkels in het onderwijs. Wereldwijd zijn 
verschillende vormen van beleid gebaseerd op prikkels ingevoerd. Empirische studies laten zien dat 
dergelijke beleidsvormen kunnen bijdragen aan een verbetering van onderwijsprestaties (Angrist en Lavy, 
2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Lavy, 2002, 2009). Tegelijkertijd keren leraren en hun vakbonden zich vaak 
sterk tegen het gebruik van financiële prikkels en laten diverse studies zien dat strategisch gedrag een 
bedreiging vormt voor de effectiviteit van dit type beleid (Glewwe et al., 2003; Jacob, 2005; Figlio en 
Getzler, 2006). Eerdere studies hebben zich voornamelijk gericht op financiële prikkels voor leerlingen, 
leraren en scholen. Deze studie beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan de literatuur door zich te richten op een 
nieuw type financiële prikkel gericht op regionale onderwijsautoriteiten. Nederland kent 39 RMC-regio’s 
(Regionale Meld en Coördinatiefunctie voor voortijdig schoolverlaten) die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de 
regionale registratie en bestrijding van voortijdig schoolverlaten. Met 14 van deze RMC-regio’s zijn in 
2006 convenanten afgesloten die een financiële prikkel bevatten om het aantal voortijdig schoolverlaters 
in de regio terug te dringen. Deze RMC’s konden extra middelen ontvangen wanneer zij er in slaagden 
het aantal voortijdig schoolverlaters te verminderen. De 14 RMC’s werden geselecteerd op basis van het 
aantal voortijdig schoolverlaters voorafgaand aan de invoering van het beleid. De introductie van het 
beleid in een deel van de RMC-regio’s en het gebruik van de specifieke selectieregel maakt het mogelijk 
om lokale difference-in-differences modellen te schatten. Deze aanpak combineert een difference-in-
differences model met een regressiediscontinuïteit. Hierbij wordt een difference-in-differences model 
geschat rondom de grenswaarde voor selectie voor het convenant. In het onderzoek wordt gebruik 
gemaakt van administratieve data over voortijdig schoolverlaten in het jaar voor en het jaar na de 
introductie van het beleid voor alle leerlingen in Nederland. We vinden statistisch insignificante effecten 
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achtergrondkenmerken. De schattingsresultaten laten zien dat vroege selectie een negatief effect heeft op 
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van het beleid op voortijdig schoolverlaten. Deze resultaten zijn robuust voor een groot aantal 
modelspecificaties en gevoeligheidsanalyses. Dit suggereert dat de financiële prikkel voor regionale 
onderwijsautoriteiten niet effectief is geweest in het terugdringen van het aantal voortijdig 
schoolverlaters. Additionele analyses lijken er op te wijzen dat de financiële prikkels hebben geleid tot 
een strategische reactie van de onderwijsautoriteiten.  
 
De volgende twee hoofdstukken zijn gewijd aan de effecten van intensieve programma’s voor specifieke 
doelgroepen. Hoofdstuk 4 evalueert de effecten van de wijkscholen in Rotterdam op een aantal 
sociaaleconomische uitkomsten door middel van een veldexperiment. De wijkscholen bieden een 
intensief programma voor schoolverlaters met complexe problemen op meerdere gebieden (zoals arbeid, 
financiën, gezondheid, huisvesting en sociale omgeving). Het programma heeft als doel hen te begeleiden 
naar het reguliere onderwijs of naar werk. Voortijdig schoolverlaters hebben een grotere kans op latere 
werkloosheid of betrokkenheid bij criminele activiteiten (zie bijvoorbeeld Lochner en Moretti, 2004; 
Machin et al., 2011). De hoge maatschappelijke kosten die daar mee gepaard gaan, legitimeren publiek 
gefinancierde interventies gericht op het verbeteren van de vooruitzichten voor deze jongeren. Eerdere 
studies hebben laten zien dat het niet eenvoudig is om effectieve programma’s te ontwikkelen voor deze 
doelgroep (LaLonde, 2003; Carneiro en Heckman, 2003). De wijkschool is grotendeels vormgegeven in 
lijn met de meest veelbelovende interventies uit de literatuur. De wijkscholen bieden een veelomvattend 
programma dat bestaat uit een combinatie van onderwijs, werk en zorgdiensten, en persoonlijke 
begeleiding door coaches. Aangezien een aselecte toewijzing van doelgroepjongeren aan de wijkschool 
en een controleconditie niet mogelijk bleek, is een gecontroleerd natuurlijk experiment opgezet waarbij de 
toewijzing van jongeren gebaseerd werd op specifieke tijdsperiodes. Deze tijdsperiodes zijn vooraf 
vastgesteld op basis van capaciteitsrestricties op de wijkscholen. Gedurende bepaalde periodes zijn 
jongeren uit de doelgroep verwezen naar de wijkschool, terwijl vergelijkbare jongeren uit de doelgroep in 
andere periodes zijn verwezen naar een controleconditie. Deze laatste groep jongeren krijgt de 
standaardbehandeling die bestaat uit een verwijzing naar een regulier re-integratietraject. De toewijzing 
aan de wijkschool of controlegroep hangt op deze manier enkel af van het moment van aanmelding. Deze 
aanpak illustreert een mogelijke opzet van een veldexperiment in situaties waarin een gerandomiseerd 
experiment niet mogelijk is. De effecten van het programma worden vervolgens vastgesteld door het 
vergelijken van uitkomsten van jongeren die verwezen zijn naar de wijkschool met de uitkomsten van 
jongeren die verwezen zijn naar een regulier traject, conditioneel op het moment van aanmelding. We 
gebruiken een instrumentele variabele aanpak om te corrigeren voor het feit dat in de praktijk niet alle 
jongeren conform de verwijzingsregel zijn toegewezen. Hierbij wordt de daadwerkelijke verwijzing 
geïnstrumenteerd met de verwijzing zoals die had moeten plaatsvinden op basis van de regel. In het 
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onderzoek wordt gebruik gemaakt van administratieve data over onderwijspositie, arbeidsmarktpositie en 
crimineel gedrag drie jaar na de start van de interventie. De data over criminaliteit zijn afkomstig van de 
politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond. We vinden insignificante effecten van het programma op de 
onderwijspositie of het hebben van een baan. Deze bevinding past in een groot deel van de literatuur waar 
geen effecten worden gevonden van trainingsprogramma’s voor probleemjongeren op 
arbeidsmarktuitkomsten. Het belangrijkste resultaat is dat een verwijzing naar de wijkschool leidt tot een 
toename van criminele activiteit. Dit effect wordt veroorzaakt door een toename van criminele activiteit 
onder de groep jongeren die al verdacht werd van een misdrijf voor aanvang van het programma. Dit 
resultaat is consistent met eerdere studies die hebben aangetoond dat een groepsgewijze aanpak van 
probleemjongeren kan leiden tot een toename van criminaliteit (Dishion et al., 2007). Peer effecten 
vormen een mogelijke verklaring voor deze bevinding.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 evalueert de effecten van een beleidsprogramma van de gemeente Amsterdam gericht op het 
verbeteren de onderwijskwaliteit op zwak presterende basisscholen. Dit programma is gebaseerd op de 
zogenoemde ‘comprehensive school reforms’, die met name in de Verenigde Staten veel zijn gebruikt 
voor het verbeteren van zwakke scholen. Een dergelijke aanpak richt zich op de gehele school en bestaat 
uit een geïntegreerde verzameling maatregelen die op verschillende lagen binnen de school wordt 
ingevoerd. Empirisch bewijs voor de effectiviteit van dit type programma’s is echter nog beperkt en 
eerder onderzoek is vaak niet gebaseerd op geloofwaardige onderzoeksdesigns die een oplossing bieden 
voor het selectieprobleem (Borman et al., 2003). Deze studie maakt gebruik van een ‘difference-in-
differences’ aanpak om de effecten van de verbeteraanpak in Amsterdam op de onderwijsprestaties van 
leerlingen te schatten. De verbeteraanpak implementeert een systematische en opbrengstgerichte manier 
van werken binnen de school. Het programma kent een integrale aanpak bestaande uit diverse elementen, 
zoals evaluaties van de kwaliteit van leraren door middel van lesobservaties, cursussen voor leraren, 
schoolleiders en ander schoolpersoneel en het gebruik van nieuwe instructiemethoden. Vanaf 2008 
konden alle basisscholen in Amsterdam die door de Inspectie van het Onderwijs als ‘zwak’ of ‘zeer zwak’ 
waren beoordeeld op vrijwillige basis deelnemen aan de aanpak. In het onderzoek wordt gebruik gemaakt 
van CITO toetsscores in groep 8 voor de jaren 2005 tot en met 2012. Dit maakt het mogelijk om de 
ontwikkeling van CITO toetsscores op zwak presterende scholen in Amsterdam te vergelijken met de 
ontwikkeling van CITO toetsscores op zwak presterende scholen buiten Amsterdam in een difference-in-
differences model. De schattingsresultaten wijzen op een negatief effect op de toetsscores in de eerste vier 
jaar na de invoering van het beleid. De introductie van het beleid heeft de toetsscores met 0.17 
standaarddeviaties verlaagd. Interviews met schooldirecteuren van deelnemende scholen verschaffen een 
mogelijke verklaring voor deze bevinding. Uit deze interviews komt naar voren dat de veeleisende aanpak 
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van het programma heeft geleid tot een toename in de (uitgaande) mobiliteit van leraren. Het is denkbaar 
dat het verlies aan schoolspecifieke kennis, de benodigde aandacht voor het vinden van geschikte 
vervangers en het onzekere werkklimaat hebben bijgedragen aan de verslechtering van leerprestaties. 
Mogelijk reflecteren de bevindingen aanpassingskosten en kan het beleid op langere termijn betere 
effecten sorteren. De studie concludeert dat het beleid in ieder geval grote kosten met zich meebrengt in 
termen van substantieel lagere toetsscores voor ten minste vier cohorten leerlingen.  
 
Concluderende opmerkingen 
 
De resultaten in dit proefschrift verschaffen inzicht in de effecten van verschillende soorten 
beleidsmaatregelen. De bevindingen maken duidelijk dat beleid niet altijd uitpakt zoals vooraf beoogd. 
Twee intensieve programma’s voor probleemjongeren en zwak presterende scholen blijken niet succesvol 
in het verbeteren van uitkomsten. We vinden zelfs negatieve effecten van beide programma’s. Dergelijke 
beleidsmaatregelen kosten veel geld, tijd, en energie. De resultaten passen in het beeld uit eerdere studies 
dat extra middelen geen garantie zijn voor betere uitkomsten. Dit beeld verklaart de toegenomen 
belangstelling voor andere, meer kosteneffectieve manieren om het onderwijssysteem te verbeteren. 
Beleid gebaseerd op financiële prikkels is in het algemeen minder duur dan beleid waarbij extra middelen 
worden vrijgemaakt voor de implementatie van nieuwe programma’s. Dergelijk beleid behelst zowel 
financiële prikkels voor studenten of leraren als zogenoemde ‘accountability’ systemen, waarbij scholen 
worden beoordeeld volgens vooraf vastgestelde normen. Dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan deze 
literatuur door onderzoek te doen naar een nieuw type beleid met financiële prikkels voor regionale 
onderwijsautoriteiten. Dit onderzoek levert geen bewijs dat dit beleid bijdraagt aan betere 
onderwijsprestaties. Naast beleid gebaseerd op financiële prikkels, heeft ook beleid dat zich richt op 
institutionele kenmerken van het onderwijssysteem de potentie om uitkomsten te verbeteren tegen geringe 
kosten. Zo laat dit proefschrift zien dat het aantal hoog opgeleiden kan worden vergroot door de 
leeftijd waarop leerlingen worden geselecteerd in verschillende onderwijsniveaus te verhogen van 12 naar 
13 of 14. Een dergelijke institutionele wijziging zou nauwelijks extra kosten met zich meebrengen. 
 
Vanzelfsprekend impliceren de resultaten in dit proefschrift niet dat beleid waarbij extra middelen worden 
ingezet voor de implementatie van specifieke programma’s nooit succesvol kan zijn. Zij illustreren wel 
dat dure interventies niet noodzakelijkerwijs effectiever zijn dan interventies die minder middelen vragen. 
Dit suggereert dat het verhogen van budgetten of toekennen van extra middelen niet altijd de beste aanpak 
is om problemen op te lossen of om het systeem te verbeteren. De bevindingen dat beleidsinstrumenten 
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geen, of zelfs negatieve, effecten kunnen hebben, geven het belang aan van een goede kennis van de 
werking van beleid. Nu de empirische evaluatietechnieken een zodanige ontwikkeling hebben 
doorgemaakt dat zij betrouwbare oplossingen kunnen bieden voor selectieproblemen, kunnen 
beleidsmakers de vruchten plukken van inzichten uit nieuwe evaluatiestudies. Deze inzichten kunnen 
gebruikt worden voor de aanpassing van beleidsinstrumenten, het opschalen van effectief beleid, of het 
stopzetten van maatregelen die niet werkzaam blijken. Op deze manier kunnen nieuwe beleidsevaluaties 
bijdragen aan een efficiëntere allocatie van middelen en een verbetering van het onderwijssysteem.  
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